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Summary	  
	  
	  This	  paper	  offers	  an	  international	  explanation	  of	  the	  civil	  wars,	  ongoing	  conflicts,	  and	   other	   forms	   of	   political	   strife	   occurring	   in	   those	   African	   countries	   where	  most	   of	   the	   world’s	   diamonds	   are	   mined.	   	   Specifically,	   it	   argues	   that	   China’s	  emergence	   as	   the	   second	   largest	   world	  market	   for	   diamonds	   after	   the	   United	  States	  has	  adversely	  affected	  the	  diamond	  industry	  and	  been	  responsible	  for	  the	  resurgence	  of	  the	  ‘blood	  diamond’	  phenomenon.	  	  	  	  After	   reviewing	   China’s	   investment	   behaviour	   in	   Africa,	   I	   conduct	   a	   historical	  reconstruction	  of	  contemporary	  scholarship	  on	  the	  causes	  of	  political	  instability,	  including	   civil	   war.	   	   The	   latter	   consist	   of	   three	   frameworks	   –	   psychological	  (greed	  and	  grievance),	   lootability	   (geological	   factors)	   and	   revenue	   frameworks	  (government	   capacity)	   –	   to	   explain	   why	   conflicts	   occur	   in	   diamond	   rich	  countries.	  	  	  	  Following	  that,	   I	  show	  how,	  one	  should	  also	  address	   transnational	   factors	  such	  as	  diamond	  smuggling	  in	  Africa,	  and	  international	  factors,	  particularly	  the	  major	  shift	   in	   the	   world	   market	   for	   diamonds	   that	   China’s	   increasing	   demand	   has	  created,	   thus	   turning	   the	  presence	  of	  diamonds	   in	  Africa	   into	  a	  resource	  curse.	  	  After	   careful	   analysis	   and	   advice	  provided	  by	   those	  who	   reviewed	   this	   study	   I	  would	   like	   to	   state	   that	   civil	  wars	   are	   the	  worst	   possible	   outcome	   that	   occurs	  when	  there	  are	  political	  problems	  in	  countries	  and	  before	  it	  happens,	  there	  are	  certain	  stages	  that	  states	  face	  which	  is	  an	  important	  part	  of	  this	  paper.	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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  	  On	   November	   26,	   2010,	   two	   reporters	   from	   Bloomberg	   were	   brutalised	   by	   a	  group	   of	   diamond	   dealers	   in	   Manica,	   Mozambique	   because	   they	   were	  investigating	   how	   trading	   towns	   like	   Manica	   and	   others	   around	   Africa	   were	  keeping	   the	   scourge	   of	   blood	   diamonds	   alive.	   	   Mozambique	   is	   not	   an	   official	  diamond	  producer	  and	  yet	  traders	  from	  all	  over	  the	  world	  flock	  there	  to	  acquire	  the	   diamonds	   that	   are	   being	   illegally	   exported	   from	   the	   diamond	   mines	   of	  Chiadzwa	   and	   Marange	   in	   neighbouring	   Zimbabwe.	   	   These	   illegal	   mines	   are	  tainting	   the	   diamond	   industry	   as	   the	   gems	   are	  mined	   by	   forced	   labour	   under	  inhumane	  conditions	  and	  proceeds	  from	  the	  sales	  are	  used	  to	  finance	  the	  cronies	  in	  the	  government.1	  These	   smuggled	   diamonds	   eventually	   find	   their	   way	   into	   the	   legal	  diamond	  pipeline	  and	  most	  of	   them	  end	  up	  on	  brides	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	   love.	   	  The	  issue	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  has	  plagued	  the	  industry	  since	  the	  early-­‐1980s	  when	  the	  rebels	  of	  the	  National	  Union	  for	  the	  Total	  Independence	  of	  Angola	  (UNITA)	  were	  
found	   using	   diamonds	   to	   finance	   their	   war	   effort	   in	   the	   Angolan	   Civil	   War.2	   	   It	  became	  a	  global	   issue	  when	   the	  U.N.	  and	  other	  NGOs	  decided	   to	   take	  action	  as	  the	  phenomenon	  spread	   to	  other	  parts	  of	  Africa	   like	  Sierra	  Leone.3	   	  Back	   then,	  most	   of	   the	   stones	  were	  mined	   and	   sent	   to	   the	   polishing	   factories	   of	   Antwerp	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Brian	  Latham	  and	  Fred	  Katerere,	  “Smuggled-­‐Diamond	  Revenue	  Flows	  to	  Mugabe's	  Zimbabwe	  Before	  Vote,”	  Bloomberg,	  December	  29,	  2010,	  accessed	  December	  29,	  2010,	  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-­‐12-­‐28/smuggled-­‐diamond-­‐revenue-­‐flows-­‐to-­‐mugabe-­‐s-­‐zimbabwe-­‐ahead-­‐of-­‐2011-­‐election.html.	  2	  Conflict	  Diamonds,	  United	  Nations	  Department	  of	  Public	  Information,	  March	  21,	  1807,	  accessed	  March	  14,	  2011,	  http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html.	  	  3	  Ian	  Smillie,	  Blood	  on	  the	  Stone:	  Greed,	  Corruption	  and	  War	  in	  the	  Global	  Diamond	  Trade,	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  Anthem	  Press,	  2010),	  2-­‐5.	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before	   ending	   up	   in	   the	   U.S.	   	   However,	   they	   are	   now	   going	   to	   different	  destinations.	   	   Most	   gems	   are	   now	   being	   bought	   in	   large	   quantities	   by	   China,4	  	  which	  has	  dethroned	   the	  US	  and	  Europe	  as	   the	  major	  diamond	   final	   consumer	  market.	   	  The	  exact	  percentage	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  entering	  the	  Chinese	  or	  any	  other	   market	   is	   presently	   unknown	   but	   as	   China	   is	   now	   the	   world’s	   biggest	  consumer	  of	  diamonds,	  it	  seems	  plausible	  to	  hypothesise	  that	  this	  has	  had	  some	  impact	  on	  the	  African	  continent.	  	  	  This	   paper	   will	   show	   the	   link	   between	   conflict	   diamonds	   and	   the	  increased	   Chinese	   demand	   and	   demonstrate	   how	   this	   has	   reshaped	   the	  diamonds	   industry.	   	   It	  also	   focuses	  on	  an	  aspect	  of	  political	  economy	  that	   is	  by	  nature	   difficult	   to	   study:	   black	  market	   operations.	   	   This	   side	   of	   the	   diamonds	  industry	  became	  prominent	   in	   the	   late	  1990s	  when	  human	  rights	  activists	  and	  governments	  throughout	  the	  world	  raised	  the	  issue	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  during	  both	   the	   Angolan	   and	   Sierra	   Leonean	   Civil	   Wars.	   	   With	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   the	  Kimberley	  Process	  (KP)	  and	  the	  formalisation	  of	  certificates	  of	  origins	  (specially	  issued	   documents	   that	   have	   to	   accompany	   diamonds	   traded	   on	   the	   global	  industry),	  there	  has	  been	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  diamonds	  that	  come	  from	  conflict	   zones.	   	   Both	  Angola	   and	   Sierra	   Leone	   have	   been	  making	   their	   back	   to	  formal	  diamond	  mining	  and	  the	  resource	  war	  as	  we	  knew	  it	  was	  halted	  there.	  However,	   in	   recent	   years,	   an	   interesting	   phenomenon	   has	   been	  witnessed.	  	  Three	  countries	  in	  Africa	  –	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (DRC),	  Ivory	  Coast	   and	  Zimbabwe	  –	   keep	  on	  being	   associated	  with	   conflict	   diamonds.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  According	  to	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  statistics,	  China	  has	  imported	  US$	  1.6	  billion	  worth	  of	  diamonds	  in	  2009	  whereas	  the	  USA	  imported	  about	  US$	  337.5	  million	  over	  the	  same	  period.	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Zimbabwe	  has	  gone	  as	   far	  as	  challenging	   the	  KP	  by	  holding	   illegal	   trades	  of	   its	  diamonds	  despite	  formal	  bans	  from	  the	  organisation.	  	  	  The	   main	   focus	   of	   analyses	   of	   how	   diamonds	   are	   responsible	   for	   civil	  wars	  had	  been	  on	  the	  internal	  factors	  that	  lead	  to	  them.5	   	  However,	  no	  one	  has	  tried	   to	  understand	   the	   international	   factors	   that	  have	   led	   the	   issue	  of	   conflict	  diamonds	   to	   make	   a	   comeback.	   	   This	   is	   where	   my	   paper	   comes	   in.	   	   I	   try	   to	  understand	  the	  new	  features	  of	  China’s	  growing	  presence	  in	  Africa	  and	  its	  impact	  on	   global	   trade.	   	   My	   main	   argument	   is	   that	   if	   we	   want	   to	   have	   a	   better	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  civil	  wars	  and	  the	  diamond	  trade,	  we	  have	   to	   consider	   the	   international	  markets	   in	  which	   the	  Chinese	  have	   recently	  become	  heavily	  involved.	  	  	  To	   demonstrate	   this	   connection,	   I	  will	   first	   review	  how	  China	   has	   been	  dealing	  with	  Africa	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  in	  chapter	  2.	   	  By	  focusing	  on	  the	  works	   of	   Sarah	  Raine,6	   I	  will	   sum	  up	   the	   institutions	   set	   up	   by	   the	   Chinese	   to	  improve	  their	  links	  with	  African	  countries.	  	  Once	  that	  is	  accomplished,	  I	  will	  use	  the	   Global	   Production	   Network	   (GPN)	   framework	   to	   explain	   how	   China	   is	  changing	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   diamonds	   industry.	   	   The	   second	   chapter	   will	  conclude	  by	  explaining	  how	  Beijing’s	  expanding	  demand	  is	  definitely	  having	  an	  impact	  on	  Africa,	  the	  latest	  influence	  being	  a	  resurgence	  in	  blood	  diamonds.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  for	  instance	  Michael	  L.	  Ross,	  “How	  Does	  Natural	  Resource	  Wealth	  Influence	  Civil	  War?	  Evidence	  from	  Thirteen	  Cases,”	  International	  Organization	  58(1)	  (2004):	  35-­‐67;	  Michael	  L.	  Ross,	  “What	  Do	  We	  Know	  About	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  Civil	  War?”	  Journal	  of	  Peace	  Research	  41(3)	  (2004):	  337-­‐56.	  	  See	  also	  Paul	  Collier	  and	  Anke	  Hoeffler,	  “On	  the	  Economic	  Causes	  of	  Civil	  War,”	  
Oxford	  Economic	  Papers	  50(4)	  (1998):	  563-­‐73;	  Paul	  Collier	  and	  Anke	  Hoeffler,	  “On	  the	  Incidence	  of	  Civil	  War	  in	  Africa,”	  Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Resolution	  46(1)	  (2002):	  13-­‐28;	  Philippe	  Le	  Billon,	  “Angola's	  Political	  Economy	  of	  War:	  The	  Role	  of	  Oil	  and	  Diamonds	  1975-­‐2000,”	  African	  Affairs	  100(398)	  (2001):	  55-­‐80.	  6	  Sarah	  Raine,	  China’s	  African	  Challenges,	  (London:	  The	  International	  Institute	  for	  Strategic	  Studies,	  2009).	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The	   next	   step	   is	   to	   review	   the	   various	   theses	   about	   the	   connection	  between	  conflict	  diamond	  and	  civil	  war.	  	  In	  chapter	  3,	  I	  will	  conduct	  a	  historical	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  three	  main	  approaches	  linking	  conflict	  diamonds	  and	  civil	  war	  that	  have	  dominated	  this	  field	  since	  the	  1990s.	  	  The	  first	  view	  relied	  on	  the	  predatory	  state	  thesis	   to	  show	  that	   it	  was	  greed	  and	  the	  opportunity	  of	  getting	  money	   from	   resources	   that	   pushed	   people	   to	   rebel	   against	   government.	   	   For	  example,	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler’s	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  the	  availability	  of	  finance	  and	  the	  potential	  of	  primary	  commodity	  exports	  that	  increases	  conflict	  risk,	  because	  they	  give	  rebels	  a	  way	  of	   financing	  their	  skirmishes	  and	  rebels	  are	  also	  attracted	  by	  the	  potential	  riches	  the	  diamonds	  offer.7	  	  	  The	   second	   approach,	   suggested	   by	   Philippe	   Le	   Billon,8	   took	   a	   more	  geological	   approach	   to	   understanding	   why	   conflict	   occurs.	   	   Termed	   the	  ‘lootability’	   explanation	   of	   civil	   wars,	   this	   idea	   maintains	   that	   geology	   can	  determine	  whether	  there	  will	  be	  conflict	  or	  not.	  	  It	  posits	  that	  we	  need	  to	  analyse	  the	   kind	   of	   terrain	   in	   which	   the	   diamonds	   are	   present	   as	   diamonds	   that	   are	  widely	   distributed	   near	   the	   surface	   create	   conflicts.	   	   This	   is	   because	   the	  government	   does	   not	   have	   control	   over	   the	   entire	   territory	   throughout	  which	  these	  resources	  are	  present,	  making	  it	  possible	  for	  other	  parties	  to	  use	  them	  to	  either	   rebel	   or	   secede	   from	   the	   government	   if	   there	   are	   underlying	   causes	  (ethnic	  strife,	  political	  differences,	  etc)	  at	  play.	  	  This	  idea	  is	  linked	  to	  Lujala	  et	  al’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Paul	  Collier	  and	  Anke	  Hoeffler,	  “On	  the	  Economic	  Causes	  of	  Civil	  War,”	  Oxford	  Economic	  Papers,	  50(4)	  (1998):	  563-­‐73;	  Paul	  Collier	  and	  Anke	  Hoeffler,	  “On	  the	  Incidence	  of	  Civil	  War	  in	  Africa,”	  
Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Resolution	  46(1)	  (2002):	  13-­‐28.	  8	  Philippe	  Le	  Billon,	  “Diamond	  Wars?	  Conflict	  Diamonds	  and	  Geographies	  of	  Resource	  Wars,”	  
Annals	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  American	  Geographers	  98(2)	  (2008):	  345-­‐72.	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explanation	  of	  how	  alluvial	  diamonds,	  which	  are	  easier	  to	  loot,	  contribute	  to	  the	  occurrences	  of	  civil	  war	  in	  diamond-­‐rich	  countries.9	  The	   final	   view	   of	   why	   conflicts	   occur	   in	   diamond-­‐rich	   countries	   was	  developed	  by	  Snyder	  and	  Bhavnani.	   	  They	  showed	  that	   if	  rulers	  were	  unable	  to	  forge	   institutions	  of	  extraction	   that	  gave	   them	  control	  of	   revenue	  generated	  by	  lootable	  resources,	  this	  could	  produce	  instability	  in	  two	  ways:	  first,	  by	  causing	  a	  fiscal	  crisis	  that	  renders	  the	  state	  vulnerable	  to	  collapse;	  and	  second,	  by	  making	  it	  easier	  for	  rebels	  to	  organize.10	  Chapter	   4	   reviews	   the	   internal	   causes	   of	   war	   and	   political	   strife	   in	   the	  three	  main	   countries	  where	   conflict	   diamonds	   are	   currently	   known	   to	   occur	   –	  the	  DRC,	  Ivory	  Coast	  and	  Zimbabwe.	  	  By	  using	  a	  foundational	  research	  approach,	  I	   will	   show	   why,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   new	   information	   obtained	   about	   these	   three	  countries,	  the	  reasons	  mentioned	  by	  traditional	  scholarship	  on	  conflict	  diamonds	  only	  partly	  explain	  why	  socio-­‐political	  problems	  occur	  there.	   	  This	  section	  uses	  newspaper	   reports	   and	   journal	   articles	   to	   show	   the	   evolution	   of	   conflicts	   and	  political	  problems	  in	  these	  three	  countries.	  	  	  In	   the	   DRC	   and	   Ivory	   Coast,	   we	   will	   note	   that	   there	   is	   high	   ethnic	  fractionalisation	   which	   makes	   it	   impossible	   for	   either	   the	   rebels	   or	   the	  government	   to	   form	   a	   strong	   coalition.	   	   Additionally,	   the	   incentive	   for	   the	  government	   to	   create	  proper	   institutions	   is	   low	  because	   there	   is	   no	   guarantee	  that	   it	  will	   stay	   in	   power.	   	   This	   chapter	   draws	  on	   the	  work	   of	   Fauvelle-­‐Aymar	  who	  explained	  that	  countries	   facing	   instability	  are	   less	   likely	   to	  set	  up	  efficient	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Päivil	  Lujala,	  et	  al.,	  “A	  Diamond	  Curse?	  Civil	  War	  and	  a	  Lootable	  Resource,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  
Conflict	  Resolution	  49(4)	  (August	  2005):	  538-­‐62.	  10	  Richard	  Snyder	  and	  Ravi	  Bhavnani,	  “Diamonds,	  Blood,	  and	  Taxes:	  A	  Revenue-­‐Centered	  Framework	  for	  Explaining	  Political	  Order,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Conflict	  Resolution	  49(4)	  (August	  2005):	  563-­‐97.	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systems	  to	  buttress	  their	  institutional	  capacity	  as	  the	  leaders	  expect	  their	  reigns	  to	  be	  short-­‐lived.	  	  This	  has	  allowed	  rebels	  to	  keep	  use	  some	  mines	  and	  smuggle	  diamonds	  as	  a	  means	  to	  continue	  financing	  their	  struggle.11	  Zimbabwe	   has	   a	   completely	   different	   socio-­‐political	   atmosphere	   that	   is	  nonetheless	   just	  as	  conducive	   to	  conflict.	   	   I	  will	  use	   the	  veto	  player	   theory12	   to	  explain	   why	   the	   diamond	  mines	   of	   Chiadzwa	   and	  Marange	   are	   the	   sources	   of	  strife	   and	   human	   rights	   abuses.	   	  Mugabe	   and	   his	   cronies	   have	   been	   using	   the	  diamond	  mines	  as	  their	  private	  source	  of	   finance.	   	  However,	  Zimbabwe,	  even	  if	  nominally	   controlled	   by	   Mugabe,	   has	   a	   lot	   of	   different	   powerful	   actors	   –	   the	  military,	   mercenaries	   and	   other	   parties.	   	   These	   actors	   can	   threaten	   the	  government	   and	   hence	   the	   Zimbabwean	   elite	   has	   to	   keep	   them	   in	   check	   to	  prevent	   rebellions.	   	   Thus,	   the	   government	   has	   also	   allowed	   the	   two	   diamond	  mines	  to	  be	  exploited	  by	  the	  military	  for	  their	  own	  profit.	  
	   The	  final	  chapter	  shows	  that	  apart	  from	  the	  internal	  dynamics	  described	  in	   chapter	   3,	   international	   factors	   cause	   the	   continuing	   trade	   in	   conflict	  diamonds	  in	  the	  DRC,	  Ivory	  Coast	  and	  Zimbabwe,	  which	  in	  turn	  feeds	  the	  conflict	  in	   these	   three	   countries.	   	   The	   analysis	   includes	   international	   black	   market	  operations	   and	   transnational	   border	   issues.	   	   I	  will	   start	   by	   explaining	  how	   the	  black	  market	  for	  diamonds	  works	  and	  how,	  despite	  the	  controls	  set	  up	  by	  the	  KP,	  blood	  diamonds	  have	  been	  smuggled	  into	  official	  markets	  like	  Antwerp.	  	  	   My	   argument	   in	   this	   chapter	   is	   that	   the	   rebels,	   diamond	   artisans	   and	  government	   officials	   in	   the	   three	   countries	   trade	   with	   smugglers	   because	   the	  business	   is	   lucrative	   and	   because	   the	   governments	   of	   these	   countries	   lack	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Christine	  Fauvelle-­‐Aymar,	  “The	  Political	  and	  Tax	  Capacity	  of	  Government	  in	  Developing	  Countries,”	  KYKLOS	  52	  (3)	  (1999),	  391-­‐413.	  12	  George	  Tsebelis,	  Veto	  Players:	  How	  Political	  Institutions	  Work,	  (Princeton,	  N.J.:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2002).	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control	   of	   the	   sources	   of	   diamonds.	   	   I	   will	   then	   show	   that	   the	   international	  dimension	   of	   the	   trade	   in	   conflict	   diamonds	   has	   been	   greatly	   revived	   by	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  new	  market	  leader	  –	  China	  –	  and	  how	  it	  has	  kept	  the	  black	  market	  in	  Africa	  operational	  by	  creating	  a	   contest	  with	   India	   to	  get	  access	   to	  diamond	  mines	   that	   are	   not	   controlled	   by	   the	   big	  mining	   concessions	   the	   dominate	   the	  industry.	  	  	   This	  international	  framework	  rests	  on	  three	  main	  ideas.	   	  The	  first	  posits	  that	   diamonds	   have	   become	   an	   economically	   viable	   sector	   in	   China	   and	   hence	  Beijing	  is	  trying	  to	  reshuffle	  the	  GPN	  of	  the	  diamonds	  sector	  so	  that	  it	  becomes	  profitable	  for	  it	  to	  trade	  them.	  	  To	  do	  that,	  it	  is	  focusing	  on	  getting	  access	  to	  new	  sources	  of	  diamonds	  in	  countries	  like	  Zimbabwe.	  	   The	  second	  idea	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  first	  one	  because	  China’s	  actions	  have	  sparked	   a	   competition	  with	   India,	   a	  major	   diamond	   cutting	   and	  polishing	  hub.	  	  Hence,	  despite	  being	  members	  of	   the	  KP,	   these	   two	  giants	  have	  been	   trying	   to	  compete	  for	  access	  to	  diamonds.	  	  Even	  if	  they	  do	  not	  condone	  conflict	  diamonds,	  they	  have	  not	  hesitated	  to	  deal	  with	  Mugabe’s	  regime.	  	  	   The	  third	  idea	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  how	  the	  black	  market	  manages	  to	   penetrate	   formal	   diamond	   trading	   hubs	   like	   Antwerp.	   	   This	   in	   turn	   allows	  access	  to	  the	  newly	  established	  Shanghai	  Diamond	  Exchange	  (SDE)	  which	  is	  the	  official	   platform	   for	   trading	   diamonds	   in	   China	   and	   other	   diamond	   trading	  centres	  across	  the	  world.	  	   The	   essay’s	   main	   conclusion	   is	   that	   one	   should	   consider	   international	  factors	   when	   talking	   of	   the	   connection	   between	   conflict	   diamonds	   and	   wars.	  	  However,	  we	  have	  to	  be	  careful	  because	  a	  simple	  statistical	  analysis	  would	  show	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that	   there	   is	   correlation	  as	  a	   rise	   in	   the	  demand	   for	  diamonds	   leads	   to	  a	  more	  conflicts.	  	  But	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  causation	  is	  a	  totally	  different	  matter.	  Before	   proceeding	  with	   the	   analysis,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   that	  although	  the	  persistence	  of	  a	  trade	  in	  conflict	  diamonds	  is	  connected	  to	  Chinese	  imports,	   I	   do	  not	  believe	   that	  China	   is	  directly	   responsible	   for	   the	   existence	  of	  conflict	  diamonds.	   	  Rather,	   the	  status	  of	   the	   international	  diamond	  market	  and	  transnational	   factors	   between	   African	   countries	   and	   the	   way	   black	   market	  operate,	   are	   jointly	   responsible	   for	   the	   persistent	   conflicts	   in	   those	   African	  countries	  with	  diamond	  mines.	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Chapter	  2:	  China,	  Africa	  and	  the	  diamond	  link	  	  
Redefining	  China’s	  Involvement	  in	  Africa	  If	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  China’s	  role	  in	  the	  African	  continent	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	   expressions	   like	   ‘the	  hungry	  dragon’,	   ‘the	  dragon	  and	   the	  ostrich’13	   or	  ‘the	  neo-­‐colonial	  power’	  which	  portray	  China	  as	  greedy	  and	  threatening	  must	  be	  avoided.	   	   It	   is	   true	   that	  Beijing	   seems	   to	   covet	  Africa’s	   resources	   to	   sustain	   its	  long-­‐term	   growth	   and	   hence	   portraying	   it	   as	   a	   self-­‐interested	   actor	   is	   normal.	  	  However,	  if	  we	  limit	  ourselves	  to	  such	  pejorative	  terms	  proves,	  we	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  succumbing	  to	  sensationalist	  terminology	  which	  prevents	  us	  from	  seeing	  the	  bigger	  picture	  behind	  China’s	  move	  into	  Africa	  -­‐	  a	  reshuffling	  of	  GPNs.	  The	   Fourth	   Forum	   on	   China	   Africa	   Cooperation	   (FOCAC)	   in	   Shamm	   El-­‐Sheikh,	   Egypt	   shows	   exactly	   how	   GPNs	   are	   expected	   to	   change	   over	   the	   next	  couple	  of	  years	  due	  to	  China’s	  new	  policies	  in	  Africa.	  	  It	  gave	  rise	  to	  an	  ambitious	  idea	   called	   Action	   Plan	   2010-­‐2012.14	   	   The	   plan	   aims	   at	   promoting	   high-­‐level	  exchanges,	   regional	   peace,	   improved	   Chinese	   links	   with	   African	   sub-­‐regional	  organisations,	  a	  common	  commitment	  to	  achieving	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  (MDGs),	  co-­‐operation	  on	  climate	  change,	  and	  co-­‐ordination	   in	  addressing	  global	   trade	   and	   financial	   issues.	   	   Pursuing	   it,	   Beijing	   is	   setting	   up	   new	  institutions	  for	  Sino-­‐African	  relations	  on	  an	  almost	  daily	  basis.	  My	   argument	   is	   partly	   based	   on	   Sarah	   Raine’s	   work	   in	   her	   innovative	  book	  on	  China’s	  challenges	  in	  Africa.15	   	  When	  we	  start	  undertaking	  a	  sector-­‐by-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Adama	  Gaye,	  Le	  Dragon	  et	  L'Autruche:	  Essai	  D'analyse	  de	  L'évolution	  Contrastée	  des	  Relations	  
Sino-­Africaines	  :	  Sainte	  ou	  Impie	  Alliance	  du	  XXIème	  Siècle?,	  (Paris:	  L'Harmattan,	  2006).	  14	  Press	  conference	  on	  FOCAC’s	  website:	  http://www.focac.org/eng/dsjbzjhy/t626205.htm.	  	  15	  Sarah	  Raine,	  China’s	  African	  Challenges.	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sector	  analysis	  of	  China’s	  involvement	  in	  Africa,	  we	  find	  very	  interesting	  patterns	  of	   interactions	   between	   China	   and	   African	   countries.	   	   It	   is	   against	   this	  background	   that	   I	   would	   like	   to	   use	   the	   diamond	   industry	   as	   a	   case	   study	   to	  show	   how	   China’s	   economic	   interests	   can	   indirectly	   affect	   the	   African	   socio-­‐political	   scene	   and	   act	   as	   an	   important	   independent	   variable	   in	   explaining	   the	  connection	  between	  war	  and	  conflict	  diamonds	  in	  Africa.	  Understanding	  the	  impact	  of	  Chinese	  investment	  and	  demand	  on	  African	  commodities	   and	   especially	   on	   a	   product	   like	   diamonds	   requires	   the	  consideration	  of	  mechanisms	  that	  make	  Sino-­‐African	  investment	  work.	   	  China’s	  growing	  presence	  in	  Africa	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  has	  involved	  setting	  up	  a	  string	  of	   institutional	   networks	   to	   manage	   its	   relationships	   there.	   	   It	   has	   also	   been	  encouraging	   its	   businesses	   to	   operate	   in	   Africa	   while	   opening	   its	   market	   to	  African	  firms.	  	  	  	  
Why	  the	  Global	  Production	  Network	  Framework?	  Before	   further	   examining	   Chinese	   investment	   in	   Africa	   and	   how	   the	   diamond	  industry	   has	   evolved	   in	   China,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   why	   the	   GPN	  network	  provides	   the	  best	  analysis	  of	  Sino-­‐African	  relations.	   	  Beijing	  has	  made	  clear	  over	  the	  years	  that	  it	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  interfering	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  Africa	  but	   favours	   mutual	   economic	   cooperation	   instead.	   	   Yet,	   even	   if	   China	   is	   not	  directly	   interfering	   in	   African	   politics,	   it	   is	   doing	   so	   indirectly.	   	   To	   see	   this	  indirect	  impact,	  a	  GPN	  framework	  will	  be	  helpful.	  	  Let	   us	   first	   review	   the	   standard	   definition	   of	   GPN.	   	   Most	   political	  economists	  agree	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  networks	  is	  useful	  to	  explain	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  global	  economy.	  	  Far	  from	  being	  a	  new	  concept,	  GPNs	  reflect	  the	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structural	   and	   relational	   organisation	   of	   the	   production,	   distribution	   and	  consumption	  of	  goods	  and	  services.16	  	  Usually,	   when	   considering	   the	   GPN	   network,	   what	  most	   analysts	   try	   to	  understand	  is	  how	  value	  is	  created	  through	  “the	  transformation	  of	  material	  and	  non-­‐material	   inputs	   into	  demanded	  goods	  and	  services.”17	   	  This	  suggests	  that	  a	  linear	   relationship	   is	   to	   be	   expected	   between	   the	   production	   of	   commodities,	  their	   distribution	   and	   their	   final	   consumption.	   	   Coe	   et	   al.	   explained	   that	   this	  framework	   is	   appropriate	   for	  mining	   because	   this	   type	   of	   relationship	   usually	  occurs	  in	  that	  sector.	  	  	  The	   approach	   advocated	   by	   Coe	   et	   al.	   is	   related	   to	   Hall	   and	   Soskice’s	  account	  of	  the	  types	  of	  relationship	  that	  exist	  in	  the	  globalised	  world.	  	  Their	  main	  argument	   is	   that	   “national	   political	   economies	   are	   systems	   that	   experience	  external	   shocks	   emanating	   from	   a	  world	   economy	  with	   technologies,	   products	  and	   changing	   tastes.	   	   These	   shocks	   perturb	   the	   equilibria	   on	   which	   economic	  actors	  coordinate	  and	  challenge	  the	  practices	  of	  firms.”18	  	  Hence,	  firms	  alter	  their	  practices	   to	   sustain	   their	   competitive	   advantages	   by	   calling	   on	   the	   existing	  institutional	  structures	  supporting	  coordination	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  	  	  However,	   if	  we	  limit	  ourselves	  to	  this	  approach,	  we	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  relationship	  works	  in	  a	  sector	  as	  wide	  and	  secretive	  as	  the	  diamond	  industry	  and	  we	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  see	  China’s	  role	  in	  that	  sector.	  As	   we	   make	   our	   move	   into	   the	   complex	   analysis	   of	   networks	   and	  economic	   geography	   in	   the	   diamonds	   industry,	   we	   need	   a	   multi-­‐dimensional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Neil	  M.	  Coe,	  Peter	  Dicken	  and	  Martin	  Hess,	  “Global	  Production	  Networks:	  Realizing	  the	  Potential,”	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Geography	  8	  (2008):	  271.	  17	  Ibid.:273.	  18	  Peter	  A.	  Hall	  and	  David	  W.	  Soskice,	  “An	  introduction	  to	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism”,	  in	  Varieties	  of	  
Capitalism:	  The	  Institutional	  Foundations	  of	  Comparative	  Advantage,	  eds.,	  Peter	  A.	  Hall	  and	  David	  W.	  Soskice,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  62-­‐63.	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analysis	   of	   production	   networks	  which	   also	   considers	   the	   different	   layers	   that	  are	   involved	   between	   production	   and	   consumption	   processes.19	   	   For	   the	  extraction	  sector,	  there	  are	  two	  works	  that	  use	  the	  GPN	  in	  their	  analysis.	   	  First,	  the	   extensive	   work	   by	   Richard	   Auty	   on	   extractive	   economies	   focuses	   on	   the	  organisational	   and	   spatial	   rigidities	   in	   the	   sector	   and	   also	   the	   temporal	   and	  spatial	   variation	   in	   corporate/state	   relations	   and	   the	   implications	   of	   these	  characteristics	   for	   development.20	   	   Like	   Auty,	   I	   believe	   that	   if	   we	   want	   to	  understand	  how	  firms,	  states	  and	  other	  actors	   interact	   in	   the	  extractive	  sector,	  we	  ought	  to	  consider	  the	  different	  parts	  within	  the	  diamonds	  industry	  and	  this	  ranges	  from	  the	  mining	  to	  the	  retailing	  side.	  	  Second,	   Bridge	   is	   convinced	   that	   although	   production	   is	   organised	   via	  inter-­‐firm	   networks	   which	   reach	   beyond	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   nation–state,	  existing	   analyses	   of	   the	  mining	   industry	   are	   not	   “time	   and	   space	   sensitive”	   in	  ways	  that	  reflect	   the	   fact.21	   	  This	  sensitivity	  to	  time	  and	  space	   is	  exactly	  what	  I	  will	   try	   to	  create	  by	  reviewing	   the	   timeline	  and	  geographical	   space	  of	  both	   the	  diamond	  mining	  and	  producing	  countries.	  The	  diamonds	  industry	   involves	  the	  processes	  of	  mining,	  sorting,	  cutting	  
and	  polishing,	  manufacturing	  and	  retail.22	   	  Each	  sector	  employs	  different	  actors.	  At	  the	  mining	   level,	  companies	   like	  South	  African	  company	  DeBeers,	  Australian	  conglomerate	  Argyle	  and	  Britain-­‐based	  Petra	  diamonds	  are	  big	  players	  that	  have	  projects	  throughout	  Africa.	  	  Entering	  the	  mining	  and	  sorting	  business	  is	  difficult	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Adrian	  Smith	  et	  al.,	  “Networks	  of	  Value,	  Commodities	  and	  Regions:	  Reworking	  Divisions	  of	  Labour	  in	  Macro-­‐Regional	  Economies,”	  Progress	  in	  Human	  Geography,	  26	  (2002):	  41–63.	  20	  Richard	  M.	  Auty,	  Sustaining	  Development	  in	  Mineral	  Economies:	  The	  Resource	  Curse	  Thesis,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993),	  3-­‐9.	  21	  Gavin	  Bridge,	  “Global	  Production	  Networks	  and	  the	  Extractive	  Sector:	  Governing	  Resource-­‐Based	  Development”,	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  Geography,	  8	  (2008):	  389-­‐419.	  22	  See	  Appendix	  A	  for	  more	  information	  on	  the	  operations	  involved	  in	  the	  diamonds	  industry.	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because	   these	   aforementioned	   businesses	   are	   very	   well	   established.	   	   On	   the	  cutting	  and	  polishing	  side,	  however,	   it	   is	  more	  competitive	  as	  there	  are	  a	   lot	  of	  different	   companies.	   	   Many	   of	   them	   are	   from	   Belgium	   but	   nowadays	   a	   lot	   of	  Indian	   companies	   are	   amongst	   the	   world’s	   finest	   cutting	   and	   polishing	   firms.	  	  However,	   it	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   the	   big	   players	   in	   this	   industry	   have	  branches	  all	  over	  the	  world	  –	  in	  Belgium,	  India	  and	  most	  recently,	  China.	  	  	  	  With	  all	   this	   in	  mind,	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  different	  sectors	   involved	  is	  important	   if	   we	   are	   to	   understand	   the	   two	   main	   shocks	   that	   are	   currently	  rocking	   the	  diamonds	   industry:	   the	  rise	  of	  China	  as	  a	  potential	   trading,	  market	  and	   polishing	   hub	   for	   diamonds	   and	   the	   return	   of	   the	   iniquitous	   ‘conflict	  diamonds’	   that	   have	   plagued	   the	   industry	   for.	   	   Hence,	   “as	   the	   geographical	  extensiveness	   and	   complexity	   of	   GPNs	   increases,	   the	   nature	   of	   this	  embeddedness	  also	  becomes	   far	  more	   complex”23	   and	  a	  proper	   scrutiny	  of	   the	  overall	  picture	  must	  be	  undertaken.	  	  	  The	   GPN	   framework	   brings	  major	   advantages	   for	   the	   understanding	   of	  the	   complexities	   of	   the	   global	   diamond	   trade.	   	   It	   also	   allows	   us	   to	   bear	   the	  sensitivities	  to	  time	  and	  space	  in	  mind	  for	  the	  analysis	  and	  it	  is	  beneficial	  in	  three	  main	   ways.	   	   First,	   it	   helps	   us	   to	   appreciate	   how	   extractive	   economies	   can	   be	  problematic	   for	   some	   countries	   and	   how	   the	   global	   market	   responds	   to	   the	  problems	   that	   can	   arise	   in	   the	   extraction	   industry.	   	   If	   we	   follow	   the	   resource	  curse	   literature,	   we	   will	   focus	   primarily	   on	   issues	   of	   national	   state	   capacity,	  because	  the	  resource	  curse	  thesis	  posits	  that	  natural	  resources	  can,	  in	  worst	  case	  scenarios,	   provoke	   conflicts	   within	   societies	   as	   different	   groups	   and	   factions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Coe	  et	  al.,	  “Global	  production	  networks:	  realizing	  the	  potential”:	  280.	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fight	   for	   their	   share24	  or	  produce	  worse	  development	  outcomes	   than	  countries	  with	   fewer	  natural	  resources.	   In	  contrast,	   the	  GPN	  perspective	  concentrates	  on	  relational	   production	   networks	   made	   up	   of	   multiple	   firms,	   states	   and	   other	  actors	  (formal	  or	  informal)	  in	  the	  diamonds	  sector.	  	  	  Second,	   the	  GPN	  allows	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  “socio-­‐spatial	  contexts”25	   into	  which	   the	   diamond	   industry	   operates.	   	   This	   includes	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  geological	   and	   societal	   differences	   that	   exists	   between	   communities	   in	   African	  countries.	  	  This	  is	  an	  extremely	  important	  point	  because	  when	  there	  are	  artisans,	  who	   are	   small	   diamond	  miners,	   it	   usually	  means	   that	   the	   geological	   access	   to	  diamonds	  is	  easy,	  readily	  leading	  to	  militarisation	  of	  diamond	  mines	  and	  access	  to	   black	   market	   operations	   if	   the	   country	   faces	   political	   strife	   because	   rebel	  groups	  are	  trying	  to	  access	  the	  diamonds	  to	  expand	  their	  operations.26	  Third,	  with	  such	  a	   framework,	  we	  will	  be	  able	   to	  understand	   the	  power	  relationships	   that	   exist	   in	   the	   diamonds	   sector	   and	   how	   states,	   firms	   and	   the	  informal	   sector	  heavily	   influence	   governmental	   organisations.	   	  Hence,	   the	  GPN	  framework	   encourages	   the	   separation	   in	   the	   network	   of	   any	   industry	   (in	   this	  case,	  the	  diamonds	  sector)	  of	  the	  point	  where	  value	  is	  created	  in	  the	  commodity	  from	  the	  points	  where	  it	  is	  enhanced	  and	  sorted.	  	  	  	  
Chinese	  Investment	  Strategies	  in	  Africa	  	  China’s	  partnerships	  in	  Africa	  are	  not	  based	  on	  normal	  investor-­‐client	  relations.	  	  There	   are	   unique	   aspects	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   governments	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Paul	  Collier,	  “Natural	  Resources,	  Development	  and	  Conflict:	  Channels	  of	  causation	  and	  Policy	  Interventions,”	  World	  Bank	  2003,	  accessed	  June	  24,	  2009,	  http://www.gdnet.org/CMS/pdf2/online_journals/cerdi/2004_3/Collier.pdf.	  25	  Coe	  et	  al.,	  “Global	  production	  networks:	  realizing	  the	  potential”:	  288.	  26	  Stretching	  from	  Angola	  to	  Ivory	  Coast,	  the	  militarisation	  of	  mines	  or	  occupation	  by	  rebels	  was	  common	  in	  most	  cases	  where	  there	  were	  political	  conflict	  or	  civil	  wars.	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businesses	  of	  Africa	  and	  that	  of	  China,	  for	  example,	  payment	  in	  kind	  rather	  than	  cash;	   or	   contributions	   by	   the	   Chinese	   to	   the	   development	   of	   African	  infrastructure.	  	  The	  mining	  sector	  is	  an	  example	  of	  these	  interesting	  institutional	  networks.	  	  Professionals	  in	  the	  mining	  sector	  described	  it	  as	  a	  unique	  symbiotic	  relationship	   at	   the	   Mining	   Indaba	   conference	   in	   February	   2009.27	   	   Two	   main	  concepts	   came	   out	   of	   the	   industry	   specialists’	   comments	   on	   Chinese	   Overseas	  Direct	   Investment	   (ODI):	   (1)	   “the	   coupling	   of	   African	   and	   Chinese	   growth	   and	  development”28	   and	   (2)	   the	   belief	   that	   the	   institutional	   strategies	   and	  aggressiveness	   of	   Chinese	   companies	   have	   created	   a	   new	   type	   of	   relationship	  between	  China	  and	  Africa.	  The	  coupling	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   first	   concept	  becomes	  visible	  only	  when	  we	   consider	   how	   intertwined	   the	   fates	   of	   these	   two	   regions	   have	   become.	  	  	  	  While	  Africa	  is	  dependent	  on	  China’s	  tremendous	  demand	  for	  natural	  resources	  to	   sustain	   its	   rising	   economic	   growth,	   Davies	   has	   argued	   that	   Chinese	   GDP	  growth	   is	   similarly	  dependent	  on	  Africa’s	  ability	   to	  supply	  such	  resources.29	   	   If	  the	  ability	  to	  supply	  is	  knotty,	  China	  comes	  up	  with	  infrastructural	  and	  economic	  marvels	  to	  get	  the	  supply	  line	  running	  swiftly.	   	  This	  creates	  a	  very	  high	  level	  of	  Chinese	   engagement	   in	   Africa.	   	   Chinese	   growth	   in	   business	   activities	   has	   even	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Mining	  Indaba	  LLC	  has	  hosted	  the	  annual	  Investing	  in	  African	  Mining	  Indaba	  for	  nearly	  20	  years.	  	  It	  attracts	  mining	  analysts,	  fund	  managers,	  investment	  specialists	  and	  financiers	  from	  around	  the	  world.	  Corporate	  presentations	  on	  the	  newest	  and	  most	  successful	  projects	  provide	  the	  foundation	  for	  institutional	  portfolio	  growth	  and	  asset	  diversification.	  Government	  and	  agency	  presentations	  update	  policies	  for	  potential	  partners.	  More	  information	  on	  http://www.miningindaba.com/Pages/AboutUs.aspx.	  28	  This	  concept	  was	  developed	  by	  Dr.	  Martyn	  Davies,	  CEO	  of	  Frontier	  Advisory	  (Pty)	  Ltd.	  at	  the	  Indaba.	  	  Refer	  to	  Jade	  Davenport,	  “Africa,	  China	  economic	  growth	  intertwined”,	  Mining	  Weekly,	  February	  27,	  2009,	  accessed	  September	  25,	  2009,	  http://www.miningweekly.com/article/africa-­‐china-­‐economic-­‐growth-­‐intertwined-­‐2009-­‐02-­‐27.	  29	  Ibid.	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spread	  to	  high-­‐risk	  countries	  like	  Sudan,	  Zimbabwe,	  and	  the	  DRC.30	  	  The	  Chinese	  government	   has	   set	   up	   the	   China-­‐Africa	   Development	   Fund,	   a	   Venture	   Capital	  fund	   for	   Chinese	   companies	   doing	   business	   in	   Africa.	   	   These	   companies	   are	  encouraged	   to	   enter	   into	   Joint	   Ventures	   with	   African	   countries	   and	   work	   in	  Special	   Economic	   Zones	   (SEZs)	   in	   African	   countries.	   	   To	   date	   there	   are	   40	  projects	  in	  the	  pipeline	  with	  about	  US$400	  million	  having	  been	  spent	  so	  far.31	  Second,	  Chinese	  ODI	  has	  become	  more	  aggressive	  over	  the	  years.	   	   It	  has	  expanded	  quickly	  and	  displaced	  Western	  investment	  in	  Africa.	  	  The	  Chinese	  have	  carefully	  planned	  their	  investment	  in	  the	  international	  markets	  and	  especially	  in	  Africa	  by	  setting	  up	  a	  panoply	  of	   institutions	  that	   facilitates	   the	   involvement	  of	  Chinese	  firms	  in	  Africa,	  especially	  for	  the	  mining	  of	  certain	  resources.	  So	   far,	  most	   analyses	   of	   Sino-­‐African	   relations	  have	   focused	  on	   the	   top-­‐down	  relationships	  between	  China	  and	  Africa.	   	  For	   instance,	  Edward	  Friedman	  compared	   China’s	   presence	   in	   Africa	   to	   the	   flying	   goose	   model	   proposed	   by	  Kaname	  Akamatsu	  when	  analysing	  how	  Japan’s	  presence	   in	  Asia	  helped	  propel	  many	  other	  economies.	  	  He	  made	  an	  important	  comparison	  by	  stating	  that	  “this	  flying	   goose	   networking	   reaching	   out	   to	   Africa	   under	   China’s	   aegis,	   made	  possible	   by	   recent	   revolutions	   in	   communication	   and	   transportation	   has	   the	  potential	  to	  ignite	  rapid	  growth	  in	  Africa	  tomorrow	  as	  it	  did	  under	  Japan’s	  aegis	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  yesterday.”32	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  China	  could	  be	  introducing	  a	  new	  risk	  model	  for	  Africa	  and	  this	  remains	  an	  important	  part	  that	  scholarship	  should	  consider	  exploring.	  	  Normally	  firms	  are	  expected	  to	  prefer	  low	  risks	  investment	  over	  high-­‐risks	  ones	  but	  Chinese	  companies	  seem	  to	  have	  ignored	  that.	  31	  Jade	  Davenport,	  “Africa,	  China	  economic	  growth	  intertwined.”	  32	  Edward	  Friedman,	  “How	  Economic	  Superpower	  China	  Could	  Transform	  Africa,”	  Journal	  of	  
Chinese	  Political	  Science	  14(1)	  (2009):	  14.	  	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the	  flying	  geese	  model,	  refer	  to	  Kaname	  Akamatsu,	  “A	  Historical	  Pattern	  of	  Economic	  Growth	  in	  Developing	  Countries,”	  Journal	  
of	  Developing	  Economies	  1(1)	  (1962):	  3-­‐25.	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An	  overview	  of	   the	   institutions	   that	  have	  been	   set	  up	  by	   the	  Chinese	   to	  cater	  for	  their	  expanding	  relationship	  with	  Africa	  shows	  that	  Friedman’s	  analysis	  is	   not	   only	   insufficient	   but	   also	   outdates	   as	   China’s	   relationship	  with	   Africa	   is	  based	  on	  multilevel	  institutions	  that	  interact	  among	  each	  other	  not	  necessarily	  in	  a	  top-­‐down	  approach.	  	  Instead,	  Raine	  showed	  that	  Chinese	  institutions	  operating	  in	   Africa	   consist	   of	   three	  main	   inter-­‐related	   levels	   –	   state-­‐level,	   economic	   and	  political.	  	  These	  institutions,	  summed	  up	  in	  table	  2.1,	  give	  a	  good	  overview	  of	  the	  main	  actors	  that	  form	  the	  Chinese	  part	  of	  the	  complex	  Afro-­‐Chinese	  relationship.	  	  The	   Chinese	   have	   created	   “dynamically	   inter-­‐connected	   and	   simultaneous	  processes	  within	   asymmetries	   of	   power”	   that	   has	   remodeled	   the	   landscape	   of	  multilateral	  agreements.33	  	  	  Biggeri	  and	  Sanfilippo	  maintain	  that	  Chinese	  FDI	  in	  Africa	  is	  aimed	  at	  the	  “exploitation	  of	  natural	  resources	  [and]	  the	  opportunity	  of	  gaining	  new	  markets	  for	   low-­‐cost	   natural	   exports.”34	   	   This	   is	   obvious,	   as	   China	   has	   linked	   aid	   to	  monetary	   and	   infrastructural	   channels	   through	   these	   institutions,	   for	   example,	  by	   building	   hospitals	   while	   providing	   cash	   payments	   in	   many	   countries	   and	  other	  social	  projects.	   	  China	  has	  also	  pledged	  to	  assist	  Africa,	  without	   imposing	  political	   conditions,	   in	   both	   agricultural	   and	   infrastructural	   projects	   and	   has	  been	   lending	   US$10	   billion	   since	   2009	   to	   its	   African	   counterparts.	   	   This	   “no-­‐strings-­‐attached	   foreign	   aid”	   has	   been	   widely	   welcomed	   by	   African	  governments.35	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Coe	  et	  al.,	  “Global	  production	  networks:	  realizing	  the	  potential,”:	  273-­‐274.	  34	  Mario	  Biggeri	  and	  Marco	  Sanfilippo,	  “Understanding	  China's	  Move	  into	  Africa:	  An	  Empirical	  Analysis”,	  Journal	  of	  Chinese	  Economic	  and	  Business	  Studies	  7(1)	  (2009):	  34.	  35	  Joe	  Weisenthal,	  “China	  will	  do	  What	  Western	  Do-­‐Gooders	  failed	  to	  do:	  Save	  Africa,”	  Business	  
Insider,	  November	  10,	  2009,	  accessed	  March	  5,	  2010,	  http://www.businessinsider.com/after-­‐years-­‐of-­‐failure-­‐from-­‐western-­‐do-­‐gooders-­‐china-­‐will-­‐be-­‐the-­‐savior-­‐of-­‐africa-­‐2009-­‐11.	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Table	  2.1:	  Chinese	  Institutions	  with	  involvement	  in	  Africa36	  












	  Funded	  and	  managed	  by	  the	  CDB	  to	  buttress	  Chinese	  companies	  venturing	  into	  Africa.	  	  It	  focuses	  on	  resource	  exploitation	  and	  infrastructure.	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The	  Chinese	  media	  reveals	  Sino-­‐African	  relations	  and	  covers	  all	  the	  important	  Chinese	  deals	  that	  occur	  in	  Africa.	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Ranging	   from	  the	  state	   to	  politico-­‐economic	   levels,	   it	   is	  obvious	   that	   the	  complex	   processes	   occurring	   between	   these	   institutions,	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	   and	  between	  them	  and	  African	  institutions,	  on	  the	  other,	  are	  shaping	  and	  reshaping	  the	   Sino-­‐African	   relationship	   and	   the	   global	   economy.37	   	   Understanding	   this	  complex	   relationship	   requires	   a	   GPN	   analysis	   as	   it	   “focuses	   upon	   the	   inter-­‐related	   actions	   of	   the	   sets	   of	   actors	   …	   which	   are,	   embedded	   in	   the	   broader	  structures	  of	  the	  global	  economy.”38	  China’s	  economic	  and	  political	  capacity	  is	  greatly	  enhanced	  by	  these	  three	  layers	   of	   institutions.	   	   Through	   them,	   Beijing	   has	   been	   offering	   African	   states	  resource-­‐backed	  development	   loans,	   “an	   initiative	   inspired	  by	   its	  experience	  at	  home”	   as	   in	   the	   late	   1970s,	   China	   leveraged	   its	   natural	   resources	   -­‐-­‐	   ample	  supplies	  of	  oil,	  coal,	  and	  other	  minerals	  –	  “to	  attract	  [about]	  $10	  billion	  loan	  from	  Japan.”39	  	  	  Let	  us	   consider	   some	  examples	   to	   illustrate	  how	   these	   institutions	  have	  operated	   as	   China	  made	   its	  way	   into	   the	  African	   continent.	   	   Reconstruction	   in	  war-­‐battered	   Angola	   has	   been	   helped	   by	   three	   oil-­‐backed	   loans	   from	   Beijing,	  under	   which	   Chinese	   companies	   have	   built	   roads,	   railways,	   hospitals,	   schools,	  and	   water	   systems.	   	   Additionally,	   as	   remarked	   by	   former	   Angolan	   Finance	  Minister	   José	   Pedro	   de	   Morais	   a	   new	   benchmark	   has	   been	   set	   up	   after	   a	  	   $2	  billion	  loan	  from	  China	  Eximbank	  in	  2004	  helped	  Angola	  negotiate	  better	  terms	  for	  other	  commercial	  loans.40	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Coe	  et	  al.,	  “Global	  production	  networks:	  realizing	  the	  potential”,	  pp.	  273-­‐274.	  38	  Ibid.	  39	  Deborah	  Brautigam,	  “Africa’s	  Eastern	  Promise:	  What	  the	  West	  Can	  Learn	  From	  Chinese	  Investment	  in	  Africa,”	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  January	  5,	  2010,	  accessed	  January	  5,	  2010	  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65916/deborah-­‐brautigam/africa%E2%80%99s-­‐eastern-­‐promise?page=2.	  40	  Ibid.	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Nigeria	   took	   out	   two	   similar	   loans	   to	   finance	   projects	   that	   use	   gas	   to	  generate	  electricity.	  Chinese	   teams	  are	  building	  one	  hydropower	  project	   in	   the	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  (to	  be	  repaid	  in	  oil)	  and	  another	  in	  Ghana	  (to	  be	  repaid	  in	  cocoa	   beans).	   	   The	   DRC	  will	   receive	   a	   $3	   billion	   copper-­‐backed	   loan	   from	   the	  Chinese	   government,	   which	   will	   help	   finance	   railways,	   roads,	   hospitals,	   and	  universities.41	  	  The	   Chinese	   have	   not	   only	   focused	   on	   loans	   and	   infrastructural	  development	   in	   Africa.	   	   They	   are	   also	   trying	   to	   replicate	   their	   own	   model	   of	  development	   there.	   	   Special	   Economic	   Zones	   (SEZs)	   have	   been	   an	   important	  feature	   of	   China's	   development,	   and	   provide	   promising	   strategies	   for	  industrialisation	  and	  development	  to	  African	  countries.	  	  SEZs	  allow	  countries	  to	  improve	   poor	   infrastructure,	   inadequate	   services,	   and	   weak	   institutions	   and	  provide	   low	   taxation	   and	   labour	   and	   environmental	   regulations	   by	   focusing	  efforts	  on	  a	  limited	  geographical	  area.42	  	  The	   pattern	   of	   production	   networks	   definitely	   changes	   when	   such	  projects	  are	  undertaken	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  African	  interests	  and	  their	  Chinese	   counterparts	   become	  more	   dynamic	   and	   embedded.	   	   However,	   “many	  SEZs	   around	   the	   world	   are	   dysfunctional	   [as]	   they	   fail	   to	   attract	   a	   sufficient	  number	   of	   firms	   to	   realise	   cluster	   economies	   and,	   in	   many	   cases,	   they	   offer	  excessive	   subsidies	   to	   the	   few	   firms	   that	   they	   succeed	   in	   attracting.”43	   	   The	  Chinese	  government	  is	  mindful	  that	  these	  zones	  must	  be	  sustainable	  and	  hence	  Chinese	  companies	  are	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  designing	  and	  building	  the	  zones	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Ibid.	  42	  Paul	  Collier	  and	  John	  Page,	  “Breaking	  In	  and	  Moving	  Up:	  New	  Industrial	  Challenges	  for	  the	  Bottom	  Billion	  and	  the	  Middle-­‐Income	  Countries”,	  United	  Nations	  Industrial	  Development	  
Organization,	  2009,	  accessed	  December	  13,	  2009,	  http://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Publications/IDR/2009/IDR_2009_print.PDF.	  43	  Ibid.	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and	  then	  managing	  them	  as	  businesses.	  	  Beijing	  has	  subsidised	  part	  of	  the	  start-­‐up	   costs	   that	   Chinese	   companies	   incur	   by	   moving	   overseas.	   	   Many	   agencies	  involved	   in	   China's	   own	   successful	   zones	   are	   investing	   in	   projects	   in	   Africa.	  China's	   venture-­‐capital	   fund	   for	   Africa	   has	   equity	   shares	   in	   three	   of	   the	   seven	  planned	   zones	   while	   official	   investment	   has	   started	   major	   construction	   in	   six	  other	  projects	  as	  illustrated	  in	  table	  2.2.44	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  	  Thomas	  Farole,	  Tang	  Xiaoyang	  and	  Deborah	  Brautigam,	  “China’s	  Investment	  in	  African	  Special	  Economic	  Zones:	  Prospects,	  Challenges,	  and	  Opportunities”,	  Economic	  Premise	  5	  (March	  2010):	  1-­‐6,	  accessed	  May	  11,	  2010,	  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Internal-­‐Training/287823-­‐1229467556379/BBL_China_Africa_Jan6_10_Brautigam_Tang.pdf.	  	  




Investment	   Size	  
(Sq	  Km)	  
Status	   Chinese	  Developers	   Industry	  Focus	  	  Zambia,	  Chambishi	   	  US$410m	   	  11.58	  	   	  In	  operation	  and	  Construction	  
	  China	  Nonferrous	  Metal	  Mining	  Group	  	  
	  Copper	  and	  copper	  mining–	  related	  industries	  	  	  Zambia,	  Lusaka	   	  Subzone	   	  5	   	  Construction	   	  China	  Nonferrous	  Metals	  Corporation	   	  Garment,	  food,	  appliances,	  tobacco,	  and	  electronics	  	  	  Nigeria,	  Lekki	   	  US$369m	   	  30	   	  Construction	   	  China	  Civil	  Engineering	  Construction,	  Jiangning	  Development	  Corp.,	  Nanjing	  Beyond,	  China	  Railway	  	  
	  Transportation	  equipment,	  textile	  and	  light	  industries,	  home	  appliances,	  and	  telecommunications	  	  Nigeria,	  Ogun	   	  US$500m	   	  20	   	  Construction	   	  Guangdong	  Xinguang,	  South	  China	  Developing	  Group	   	  Construction	  materials	  and	  ceramics,	  ironware,	  furniture,	  wood	  processing,	  medicine,	  computers,	  and	  lighting	  	  	  Mauritius,	  Jinfei	   	  US$720m	   	  2.11	   	  Construction	   	  Shanxi-­‐Tianli	  Group,	  Shanxi	  Coking	  Coal	  Group,	  Taiyuan	  Iron	  and	  Steel	  Company	  
	  Manufacturing	  (textile,	  garment,	  machinery,	  high-­‐	  tech),	  trade,	  and	  living	  and	  service	  (tourism,	  finance)	  	  	  Ethiopia,	  Oriental	  (eastern)	  
	  US$101m	   	  10	   	  Construction	   	  Qiyuan	  Group,	  Jianglian	  International	  Trade,	  Yangyang	  Asset	  Manage-­‐	  ment,	  Zhangjiagang	  Free	  Trade	  Zone	  	  
	  Electric	  machinery,	  steel	  and	  metallurgy,	  and	  construction	  materials	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Underneath	  the	  Big	  Projects	  The	  analysis	  provided	  so	  far	  is	  important	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  China	  has	  changed	   Africa,	   but	   is	   incomplete	   because	   as	   it	   stands	   China	   affects	   Africa	   in	  more	  subtle	  ways	  that	  can	  even	  lead	  to	  potential	  conflicts.	  	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  show	  how	  China	  is	  affecting	  the	  resurgence	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  in	  Africa.	  	  To	   accomplish	   this,	   I	   will	   need	   to	   use	   the	   GPN	   framework	   to	   explain	  why	   the	  Chinese	   demand	   for	   diamonds	   should	   be	   a	   concern	   for	   the	   KP	   as	   it	   can	   cause	  conflicts	   and	  human	  rights	  abuses	   to	  occur	   in	  diamond-­‐rich	   countries.	   	   China’s	  first	   major	   diamond	   concession	   in	   Africa	   might	   have	   arisen	   in	   Zimbabwe.	   	   A	  report	   by	   the	   Antwerp	   Facets	   reveals	   that	   “a	   diamond	   license	   in	   the	  controversial	   Marange	   diamond	   fields	   has	   been	   granted	   to	   Sino-­‐Zimbabwe,	   a	  joint	  venture	  between	  the	  Chinese	  government	  and	  Zimbabwe.”46	  	  	  Before	   considering	   how	   conflict	   diamonds	   are	   caused	   by	   international	  factors	   due	   to	   China’s	   demand,	   let	   us	   turn	   back	   briefly	   to	   table	   2.2.	   	  With	   the	  astronomical	   amount	   of	   money	   that	   China	   has	   invested	   in	   these	   sectors,	   the	  value	   of	   the	   products	   into	  which	   the	   Chinese	   have	   pumped	   all	   the	  money	   has	  inevitably	  increased.47	  	  By	  helping	  African	  countries	  to	  develop	  SEZs,	  these	  same	  African	   countries	   will	   acquire	   a	   larger	   share	   in	   the	   various	   global	   markets.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  	  Ibid,	  2.	  46	  It	  is	  very	  hard	  to	  verify	  what	  exactly	  is	  happening	  in	  Zimbabwe	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  governments	  of	  China	  and	  Zimbabwe	  reveal	  very	  little	  information.	  	  “Three	  more	  Diamond	  Mining	  Concessions	  issued	  in	  Marange,	  says	  Zimbabwe	  Minister,”	  Antwerp	  Facets,	  November	  10,	  2010,	  accessed	  April	  18,	  2011,	  http://www.antwerpfacetsonline.be/nc/articles/single/article/three-­‐more-­‐diamond-­‐mining-­‐concessions-­‐issued-­‐in-­‐marange-­‐says-­‐zimbabwe-­‐minister/	  47	  China’s	  copper	  buying	  and	  its	  investment	  across	  copper	  mines	  have	  turned	  copper	  into	  “one	  of	  the	  best	  performing	  commodities	  in	  2009,	  with	  its	  price	  up	  more	  than	  80%.”	  	  See	  Elliot	  Blair	  Smith	  and	  Matthew	  Craze,	  “Copper	  Prices	  Jump	  as	  China	  Doubles	  Usage,”	  Business	  Week,	  November	  3,	  2010,	  accessed	  December	  7,	  2010,	  http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/nov2010/gb2010113_306255.htm.	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Therefore,	  the	  GPN	  framework	  helps	  us	  consider	  how	  the	  value	  of	  the	  different	  materials	   –	   copper,	   timber,	   food,	   steels	   and	   metallurgy,	   etc	   –	   increases	   with	  Chinese	  involvement.	  	  	  However,	   if	   we	   try	   to	  make	   a	   similar	   analysis	   of	   China’s	   investment	   in	  Africa’s	  diamonds	  sector,	  the	  results	  will	  be	  less	  than	  impressive.	  	  Officially,	  there	  are	  actually	  no	  diamond	  mining	  projects	  where	  China	  has	  been	  able	  to	  make	  an	  investment	  yet.	  	  China	  does	  not	  lack	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  such	  an	  investment	  and	  this	   deficiency	   in	   investment	   is	   simply	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   companies	   like	   De	  Beers	  and	  other	  mining	  giants	  have	   form	  control	  over	   the	  mining	  sector	  of	   the	  diamonds	  industry.	  China	   is	   however	   having	   an	   impact	   on	   the	   diamonds	   industry	   in	   the	  polishing	   and	   cutting	   sector	   and	   in	   the	   selling	   and	   trading	  of	   diamonds	  on	   the	  world	   market.	   	   Since	   the	   early	   2000s,	   several	   diamond	   cutting	   and	   polishing	  firms	  have	  set	  up	  branches	  in	  Guangdong	  and	  some	  Chinese	  investors	  have	  also	  set	  up	   their	  own	  businesses.	   	  Through	  China’s	  access	   to	  African	  markets,	   these	  companies	  have	  been	  able	  to	  set	  up	  polishing	  factories	  in	  Africa.	  	  This	  has	  had	  a	  dramatic	   impact	  on	  the	  world	  diamonds	  market	  as	  more	  stones	  started	  to	  flow	  towards	  China.	  	   	  
Why	  does	  China	  want	  Diamonds?	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  China	  and	  Africa	  and	   that	  we	  have	  understood	   the	   importance	  of	   adopting	  a	  GPN	   framework	   to	  review	   this	   relationship,	   let	   us	   move	   to	   the	   crux	   of	   this	   paper	   which	   tries	   to	  understand	   how	   China’s	   actions	   in	   the	   diamonds	   industry	   have	   altered	   in	   the	  diamond	   industry	   and	   are	   causing	   conflict	   diamonds	   to	   make	   an	   unwanted	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comeback.	   	   “Two	   decades	   ago	   in	   China	   there	   was	   no	   diamond	   acquisition	  culture,”	  said	  Gareth	  Penny,	  the	  ex-­‐Chairman	  of	  DeBeers	  in	  an	  official	  statement.	  	  He	   added	   that	   “currently,	   China	   represents	   about	   8%	   of	   the	   global	   diamond	  market”,	  with	  a	  possibility	  of	  hitting	  16%	  by	  2015.48	  	  	  Indeed,	   exports	   of	   polished	  diamonds	   from	  Antwerp,	   Europe's	   diamond	  capital	   to	  China,	   including	  Hong	  Kong,	   increased	  by	  55%	  to	  $737	  million	  in	  the	  first	   three	  months	   of	   2010,	   the	   Antwerp	  World	   Diamond	   Centre	   said	   in	   April	  2010.49	  	  This	  propelled	  China	  to	  the	  rank	  of	  the	  world’s	  top	  diamonds	  importer,	  overtaking	   the	  US	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	  history.	   	  Therefore,	  one	  question	  should	  remain	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   our	   analysis:	   why	   does	   China	   want	   diamonds?	   	   After	  reviewing	  the	  reports	  and	  news	  from	  2009	  and	  2010,	  we	  can	  come	  up	  with	  three	  main	  hypotheses:	  	  
(1)	  The	  diamonds	  market	  is	  bound	  to	  grow	  in	  size	  and	  importance	  worldwide	  After	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2009,	  the	  diamond	  industry	  was	  in	  tatters,	  as	  the	   EU	   and	   the	   US,	   two	   major	   buyers,	   felt	   the	   brunt	   of	   the	   recession.	   	   The	  industry’s	   sparkle	   remained	  only	  because	  of	   the	  economic	  powerhouses,	  China	  and	   India.	   	  However,	  markets	   recovered	   rapidly.	   	   De	  Beers’	  managing	   director	  Gareth	   Penny	   said	   that	   “2010	   has	   started	   off	   extremely	   positively,	   diamond	  prices	  are	  now	  back	   to	  where	   they	  were	  pre-­‐crisis.”50	   	  He	  also	  added	   that	   “the	  potential	  of	  China	  to	  be	  a	  major	  diamond	  acquisition	  market	  is	  enormous.	  Today	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Garry	  White,	  “Rough	  Year	  for	  Diamonds	  Is	  Over	  as	  Producers	  Look	  to	  Asia,”	  Telegraph.co.uk,	  February	  21,	  2010,	  accessed	  March	  23rd,	  2010,	  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/mining/7286181/Rough-­‐year-­‐for-­‐diamonds-­‐is-­‐over-­‐as-­‐producers-­‐look-­‐to-­‐Asia.html.	  49	  John	  W.	  Miller,	  “China	  Takes	  Lead	  in	  Buying	  Belgian	  Diamonds,”	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  Business,	  April	  14,	  2010,	  accessed	  April	  14,	  2010,	  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304604204575181883346211998.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_sections_world.	  50	  Richard	  Milne,	  “View	  From	  the	  Top:	  Gareth	  Penny,	  Chief	  executive,	  De	  Beers,”	  Financial	  Times,	  June	  21,	  2010,	  accessed	  June	  22,	  2010,	  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/230f581a-­‐7ccb-­‐11df-­‐8b74-­‐00144feabdc0.html.	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on	   the	   eastern	   seaboard	   -­‐	   Beijing,	   Shanghai,	   Guangzhou	   areas	   -­‐	   nearly	   50%	  of	  brides	   get	   a	   diamond	   engagement	   ring.”51	   	   This	   demand	   is	   making	   diamond	  likely	   to	  become	  the	  next	  hot	  commodity	   like	  gold,	  palladium	  and	  silver	  now.52	  	  DeBeers	  used	  to	  control	  the	  price	  of	  diamonds	  by	  limiting	  supply	  but	  this	  cartel	  has	   lost	   power	   as	   the	   demand	   from	   China	   and	   India	   now	   has	   a	   much	   bigger	  impact	  on	  the	  price	  of	  the	  stone.53	  	   	  With	  the	  diamonds	  industry	  becoming	  bigger	  in	  China	  due	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  demand	  from	  the	  middle	  class,	  the	  central	  government	  in	  Beijing	  has	  become	  increasingly	   involved.	   	  Over	   the	  past	   five	  years,	  China	  has	   started	   to	  develop	  a	  competitive	  domestic	  cutting	  and	  polishing	  industry.	  	  Though	  China	  cannot	  take	  on	  the	  diamond	  cutting	  and	  polishing	  acumen	  of	  India’s	  skilled	  workers	  as	  yet,	  it	  “is	  making	   fast	   inroads	   into	  African	  nations	   to	   secure	   rough	  supplies.”54	   	   If	   the	  Chinese	  government	  is	  successful	  in	  its	  efforts,	  then	  many	  countries	  will	  have	  to	  depend	  on	  them	  for	  their	  supply	  of	  finished	  diamonds.	  	   Forecasts	  indicate	  that	  China’s	  market	  share	  will	  double	  and	  that	  demand	  from	   India	   should	  grow	   to	  10	  percent	  by	  2015,	  whereby	   those	  export	  markets	  “will	  help	  turn	  a	  new	  page”.55	  	  Last	  year,	  China	  became	  the	  top	  buyer	  of	  Angolan	  diamond	   production,	   overtaking	   the	   United	   States.	   	   The	   increase	   in	   diamond	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Ibid.	  52	  The	  price	  of	  gold	  and	  silver	  has	  been	  rising	  in	  the	  year	  2010	  and	  this	  is	  expected	  to	  continue	  for	  the	  first	  half	  of	  2011.	  	  Palladium	  is	  the	  new	  metal	  that	  many	  investors	  have	  been	  monitoring	  because	  its	  price	  could	  increase	  within	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2011.	  	  See	  James	  Campbell,	  “Precious	  Metals:	  Gold	  Down	  As	  Palladium	  Hits	  10-­‐Year	  High,”	  Dow	  Jones	  Newswires,	  January	  13,	  2011,	  accessed	  January	  13,	  2011,	  http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-­‐CO-­‐20110113-­‐702240.html.	  	  	  53	  Gao	  Xiaohui,	  “China	  Denies	  Hogging	  Diamond	  Trade	  in	  Africa,”	  Global	  Times,	  World	  Business,	  April	  29,,	  2010,	  accessed	  May	  1,	  2010,	  http://business.globaltimes.cn/world/2010-­‐04/527033.html.	  	  See	  also	  James	  Lamont,	  Geoff	  Dyer	  and	  William	  MacNamara,	  “India	  diamond	  cutters	  aim	  to	  stave	  off	  China,”	  Financial	  Times,	  Asia-­‐Pacific,	  April	  27,	  2010,	  accessed	  April	  28,	  2010,	  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/289d4000-­‐5226-­‐11df-­‐8b09-­‐00144feab49a,s01=1.html.	  54	  Melvyn	  Thomas,	  “Help	  Us	  By	  Investing	  in	  African	  Mines:	  Diamantaires	  to	  Govt,”	  The	  Times	  of	  
India,	  June	  13,	  2010,	  accessed	  June	  14,	  2010,	  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/surat/-­‐Help-­‐us-­‐by-­‐investing-­‐in-­‐African-­‐mines-­‐Diamantaires-­‐to-­‐govt/articleshow/6025244.cms.	  55	  “Chinese	  Demand	  helping	  Angolan	  Diamond	  Industry”,	  MacauHub,	  May	  24,	  2010,	  accessed	  June	  2,	  2010,	  http://www.macauhub.com.mo/en/news.php?ID=9471.	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sales	   to	   China	   is	   largely	   due	   to	   their	   use	   in	   barter	   transactions	   (diamonds	   in	  exchange	   for	   goods)	   or	   for	   amortising	   Angola’s	   debt,	   according	   to	   the	   Africa	  Monitor	  newsletter.56	  	  	  Big	  players	   in	   the	  diamonds	  mining	   sector	  have	  also	   recognised	  China’s	  importance.	   	  “De	  Beers’	  Forever	  mark	  diamond	  brand,	  which	  currently	  has	  289	  doors	   across	  China,	  Hong	  Kong	   and	   Japan,	  will	   expand	  beyond	   the	  10	   cities	   in	  mainland	   China,	   where,	   according	   to	   De	   Beers,	   it	   experiences	   most	   of	   its	  growth.”57	  This	  growth	  is	  credited	  to	  strong	  demand	  from	  the	  domestic	  diamond	  jewellery	  consumption	  market	  and	  the	  continual	   improvement	   in	   the	  country’s	  diamond	  taxation	  policy.58	  	  
(2)	  A	  race	  for	  diamonds	  China’s	   move	   to	   capture	   rough	   diamonds	   worldwide	   has	   sparked	   a	   new	   race	  between	   China	   and	   India.	   	   In	   Palanpuri,	   India,	   producers	   want	   the	   Indian	  government	   to	   play	   China’s	   own	   game	   by	   considering	   barter	   transactions	   for	  diamonds.	   	   	   India	  has	   a	   lot	   at	   stake	   as	   its	   $26	  billion	  diamond	   industry,	  which	  handles	  some	  60%	  of	  the	  world’s	  diamond	  cutting	  and	  polishing,	  now	  faces	  stiff	  competition59	   	   “The	   Indian	   diamond	   industry	   leads	   the	   world	   in	   cutting	   and	  polishing	   the	  precious	   stones	  and	  says	  China	   is	   locking	  up	   the	  supply	  of	   rough	  diamonds	  by	  direct	  deals	  with	  African	  governments.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  “Ibid.	  57	  “De	  Beers:	  ‘Strong	  Recovery	  in	  H1	  with	  Diamond	  Production	  more	  than	  Doubling,”	  Diamonds	  
Intelligence	  Briefs,	  July	  25,	  2010,	  accessed	  July	  26,	  2010,	  http://www.diamondintelligence.com/magazine/magazine.aspx?id=8858.	  58	  The	  Diamond	  Administration	  of	  China	  (DAC)	  reduced	  the	  VAT	  on	  imported	  diamonds	  from	  17	  percent	  to	  4	  percent	  in	  2006.	  	  The	  aim	  was	  to	  encourage	  diamond	  cutting	  companies	  in	  China	  to	  import	  more	  diamonds.	  59	  “And	  now,	  a	  race	  for	  diamonds,”	  LiveMint,	  May	  8,	  2010,	  accessed	  May	  8,	  2010,	  http://www.livemint.com/2010/05/03192917/And-­‐now-­‐a-­‐race-­‐for-­‐diamonds.html?h=B.	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The	   scramble	   for	   African	   diamonds	   reflects	   intensifying	   competition	  between	   the	   world’s	   fastest-­‐growing	   economies	   for	   natural	   resources,	  particularly	   energy,	  minerals	   and	   land.	   	   China	  wants	   to	   develop	   a	   competitive	  cutting	  and	  polishing	  industry	  as	  domestic	  demand	  expands	  while	  India	  wants	  to	  retain	  its	  reputation	  as	  the	  hub	  of	  diamond	  cutting	  and	  polishing.	  	  Both	  countries	  know	  that	  the	  benefit	  that	  can	  be	  accrued	  from	  the	  diamond	  industry	  should	  not	  be	  neglected.	   	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  employ	  a	  lot	  of	  people	  (with	  1	  million	  employed	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  in	  the	  diamond	  industry	  in	  India)	  but	  it	  also	  contributes	  to	  the	  GDP	  of	  both	  countries.	  	  Polished	  diamond	  import	  turnover	  amounted	  to	  $699	  million	   in	   2009,	   a	   30.7%	   increase	   year-­‐on-­‐year,	   according	   to	   the	   Diamond	  Administration	  of	  China	  (DAC).	  Additionally,	  Chinese	  entrepreneurs	  have	  worked	  hard	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  the	  source	  of	  diamonds	  and	   in	   July	  2010	   their	  efforts	  started	   to	  pay	  off	  as	  a	  major	  Sino-­‐African	  company	  was	  opened	  in	  the	  Eastern	  Cape	  in	  South	  Africa,	  which	  had	  had	  an	  underdeveloped	  diamond	   cutting	   industry	  until	   recently.	   	   “While	   South	  Africa	  remains	  a	  leading	  diamond	  producer,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  local	  polishing	  of	  rough	  stones.	  	  Bulks	  of	  these	  are	  exported	  for	  further	  polishing	  in	  countries	  such	  as	   India	   and	   China,”	   said	   Mcebisi	   Jonas,	   MEC	   for	   Economic	   Development	   and	  Environmental	   Affairs	   in	   the	   Eastern	   Cape.60	   	   He	   added	   that	   the	   new	   Matla	  Diamond	   Polishing	   plant,	   which	   is	   a	   partnership	   between	   South	   African	   and	  Chinese	   technical	   partners,	   would	   go	   a	   long	   way	   in	   increasing	   South	   Africa’s	  competitiveness	   in	   the	   diamond	   polishing	   industry.	   	   The	   cost	   of	   diamonds	  polishing	  varies	  from	  US$10	  per	  carat	  in	  polishing	  and	  cutting	  diamonds	  in	  India	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  “New	  Plant	  to	  Introduce	  Production	  Capacity	  for	  Diamond	  Polishing	  Industry,”	  SMG	  Africa,	  accessed	  July	  29,	  2010,	  http://www.pitchengine.com/new-­‐plant-­‐to-­‐introduce-­‐production-­‐capacity-­‐for-­‐diamond-­‐polishing-­‐industry/78589/.	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to	   US$17	   per	   carat	   in	   China	   and	   US$60	   in	   Africa.61	   	   The	   new	   Chinese	  entrepreneurs	   are	   attempting	   to	   reduce	  Africa’s	   costs	   in	   the	  next	   five	   years	   so	  that	  African	  producers	  can	  derive	  greater	  benefit	  from	  the	  global	  market.62	  Eurostar	  diamonds,	   a	   leading	   international	  diamond	   cutting	   firm,	  which	  has	   centres	   in	   many	   countries	   including	   India	   and	   China,	   began	   cutting	   and	  polishing	   diamonds	   in	   Botswana	   since	   2007.63	   	   The	   company	   has	   invested	  heavily	   in	  training	  and	  transferring	  skills	  and	  is	  exporting	  diamonds	  to	  Eastern	  markets	  at	  a	   lower	  price.	   	  Such	   initiatives,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  big	  markets	   like	  India	   and	   China	   are	   bound	   to	   reshuffle	   the	   prices	   of	   diamonds.	   	   The	   main	  question	  now	  is	  which	  country,	  India	  or	  China,	  will	  get	  more	  from	  these	  private	  manufacturers.	  	  
(3)	  The	  emerging	  investment	  market	  for	  diamonds	  The	  expectation	  for	  the	  coming	  years	  is	  that	  the	  diamond	  market	  is	  going	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  dynamic	  commodity	  markets	  in	  the	  world.	   	  This	  is	  because	  the	  emergence	  of	   a	   large	  Asian	   and	  African	  middle	   class	   is	   going	   to	   create	   a	   large,	  new	  market	  of	  potential	  first-­‐time	  diamond	  buyers	  who	  will	  boost	  the	  value	  for	  diamond	   jewellery	   globally.	   Countries	   exporting	   polished	   diamonds	   will	  potentially	  benefit	  from	  this	  budding	  market.	  	  Hence,	  Chinese	  involvement	  in	  the	  diamond	  market	  will	  have	  a	   long-­‐lasting	   impact	  on	  global	  diamond	  supply	  and	  demand	  and	  also	  on	  countries	  that	  import	  these	  precious	  stones.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  This	  huge	  disparity	  in	  price	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  labour	  in	  China	  and	  India	  are	  much	  cheaper	  than	  in	  Africa	  and	  also	  more	  productive.	  	  Even	  the	  diamantaires	  of	  Belgium	  or	  New	  York	  cannot	  compete	  with	  that	  low	  cost	  of	  production	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  62	  Ibid.	  63	  “Polishing	  Botswana's	  Rough	  Diamonds,”	  Forbes.com,	  March	  18,	  2008,	  accessed	  June	  19,	  2009,	  http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2008/03/18/afx4790830.html%20rel=nofollow,.	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Up	   to	   the	   1970s,	   diamond	   prices	   were	   relatively	   stable,	   although	   the	  trend	  was	  upwards.	  	  In	  the	  mid-­‐70s,	  they	  soared	  in	  value	  due	  to	  global	  inflation	  and	  became	  a	  profitable	  investment.	   	  Some	  analysts	  wonder	  whether	  the	  rising	  demand	   from	   China	   and	   India	   is	   going	   to	   propel	   prices	   up	   again.	   	   If	   they	   do,	  diamonds	  might	   once	  more	   represent	   a	   highly	   profitable	   commodity	   to	   invest	  in.64	  China	  has	  prepared	  its	  domestic	  market	  for	  this	  possibility	  by	  setting	  up	  the	  Shanghai	  Diamond	  Exchange	   (SDE),	   China’s	  main	   diamond	   trader.	   	   The	   SDE	   is	  supervised	  by	  the	  government-­‐backed	  DAC,65	  an	  institution	  that	  remains	  central	  to	   China’s	   dealings	   on	   the	   international	   diamonds	   market.	   	   The	   DAC	   inspects	  diamond	   imports	   and	   exports	   under	   normal	   trade,	   examines	   the	   SDE’s	  constitution,	  and	  passes	  laws	  over	  transaction	  procedures.	  	  	  
Why	  China	  has	  changed	  its	  Behaviour	  in	  the	  Diamond	  Market	  Now	   that	   we	   have	   established	   the	   reasons	   behind	   China’s	   desire	   to	   enter	   the	  diamond	   market,	   let	   us	   consider	   the	   issues	   that	   will	   be	   under	   scrutiny.	   	   For	  resources	   that	   are	   vital	   for	   China’s	   energy	   security	   like	   oil,	   bauxite,	   iron	   ores,	  uranium,	   etc.	   China	   has	   sought	   control	   over	  mining	   operations,	  mimicking	   the	  French	  presence	  in	  northern	  African.	  	  Experts	  have	  observed	  that	  	  “one	  hundred	  and	  eleven	  Chinese	  enterprises	  own	  exploration	  licenses	  to	  dig	  up	  Botswana	  for	  Uranium	  and	  other	  raw	  materials.”66	  	  Most	  Chinese	  companies	  prefer	  to	  hold	  100	  percent	   equity	   in	   the	   local	   company	   and	   would	   rather	   own	   the	   exploration	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Brett	  Arends,	  “Diamonds	  aren’t	  an	  Investor’s	  Best	  Friend”,	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  accessed	  March	  12	  2010,	  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704337004575059723597630174.html?mod=WSJ_Stocks_LEFTCarousel.	  65	  This	  government	  institution	  is	  co-­‐sponsored	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce,	  the	  Customs	  General	  Administration,	  the	  Foreign	  Exchange	  General	  Administration,	  the	  Industrial	  &	  Commercial	  General	  Administration	  and	  the	  Quality	  Supervision	  General	  Administration.	  66	  Konye	  Obaji	  Ori,	  “Japan	  and	  China	  in	  Botswana	  follow	  French	  Example	  in	  Niger?”	  Afrik.com,	  June,	  20,	  2009,	  accessed	  November	  19,	  2009,	  http://en.afrik.com/article15849.html.	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license	   themselves.	   Even	   if	   they	   bought	   into	   an	   existing	   company,	   they	  would	  want	  to	  take	  it	  over.	  For	  the	  diamond	  market	  the	  Chinese	  are	  unfolding	  a	  whole	  new	  strategy.	  	  Instead	   of	   going	   into	   the	   mining	   business	   for	   diamonds,	   the	   Chinese	   are	  interested	   in	   opening	   their	   market	   to	   purchase	   as	   many	   rough	   diamonds	   as	  Africa	  has	  to	  offer.	  	  It	  is	  also	  encouraging	  firms	  that	  have	  branches	  in	  China	  to	  set	  up	  subdivisions	  in	  Africa.	  	  As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  this	  is	  simply	  because	  the	  major	  diamond	   concessions	   (De	   Beers,	   etc.)	   have	   control	   over	   the	   diamond	   mining	  business	   and	   trying	   to	   enter	   that	   market	   represents	   a	   major	   challenge	   for	  Chinese	  entrepreneurs.	  	  For	  instance	  the	  Diamond	  Trading	  Company	  (DTC),	  the	  rough	  diamond	  sales	  and	  distribution	  arm	  of	  the	  De	  Beers	  Family,	  sorts,	  values	  and	  sells	  approximately	  40%	  of	  the	  world’s	  rough	  diamonds.	  	  	  Hence,	   the	   emergence	   of	   China	   as	   a	   diamond-­‐manufacturing	   centre	  depends	   on	   big	   producers	   such	   as	   De	   Beers	   agreeing	   supply	   contracts	   with	  Chinese	  companies.	   	  De	  Beers,	  and	  Alrosa,	  the	  Russian	  supplier,	  which	  together	  control	   a	   majority	   of	   the	   world’s	   rough	   diamond	   sales,	   strictly	   limit	   who	   is	  allowed	  to	  buy	  their	  diamonds	  to	  ensure	  quality	  and	  value	  along	  the	  production	  chain.	   	   Two	   of	   De	   Beers’	   seventy-­‐nine	   select	   customers	   or	   “sightholders”	   are	  Chinese.	   	   Other	   sightholders	   have	   operations	   in	   China	   from	   diamond	  manufacturing	  to	  jewellery	  retailing.67	   	  Therefore,	  we	  need	  a	  careful	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Beijing	  and	  the	  different	  international	  diamond	  centres	  to	   see	   the	   willingness	   and	   ability	   of	   Chinese	   investors	   and	   importers	   to	  cooperate	  and	  obtain	  more	  favourable	  institutions	  and	  regimes	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  Lamont,	  et	  al.,	  “India	  diamond	  cutters	  aim	  to	  stave	  off	  China”.	  
	   38	  
Another	  reasons	  why	  China	  has	  to	  act	  differently	  in	  the	  diamond	  market	  than	  in	  other	  commodities	  market	  is	  that	  the	  diamond	  industry	  has	  been	  under	  strict	  scrutiny	  since	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  “blood	  diamonds”	  became	  prominent	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  	  By	  establishing	  the	  KP,68	  governments,	  and	  diamond	  producers	  alike	  have	   decided	   to	   set	   up	   protocols	   that	   will	   prevent	   the	   issue	   of	   trafficked	  diamonds.69	  	  This	  would	  make	  it	  very	  controversial	  for	  Chinese	  interests	  if	  they	  are	   caught	   trading	   conflict	   diamonds	   by	   damaging	   the	   way	   outsiders	   see	   the	  Chinese	  presence	  on	  the	  African	  continent.	  	  This	  raises	  several	  questions	  that	  the	  next	  three	  chapters	  are	  set	  to	  answer.	  	  First,	  what	  exactly	  is	  meant	  when	  talking	  of	  conflict	  diamond	  about	  and	  how	  has	  this	  phenomenon	  has	  changed	  over	  time	  with	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   KP?	   As	   we	   will	   be	   talking	   about	   conflict	  diamonds,	   it	   is	  certain	  that	  there	  is	  some	  smuggling	  of	  diamonds	  that	  occurs	  in	  countries	  that	  still	  have	  the	  problem	  of	  blood	  diamonds.	  	  Chapters	  three	  and	  four	  will	  try	  to	  depict	  how	  scholars	  have	  understood	  conflict	  diamonds	  and	  how	  the	  black	  market	  for	  diamonds	  works	  and	  how	  this	  has	  changed	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  KP.	  	  The	   final	   observation	   we	   can	   make	   is	   that	   the	   Chinese	   trade	   in	   the	  diamond	   industry	   has	   been	   going	   through	   a	   particular	   set	   of	   the	   institutions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  The	  Kimberley	  process	  is	  a	  joint	  country,	  industry	  and	  civil	  society	  initiative	  to	  prevent	  the	  flow	  of	  conflict	  diamonds.	  	  It	  began	  when	  some	  diamond-­‐producing	  countries	  met	  in	  Kimberley,	  South	  Africa,	  in	  May	  2000,	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  stop	  the	  trade	  of	  blood	  diamonds	  and	  ensure	  that	  diamond	  trading	  were	  not	  funding	  violence	  or	  terrorism	  activities.	  	  In	  December	  2000,	  it	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  UN	  resolution	  that	  promoted	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  international	  certification	  scheme	  for	  rough	  diamonds.	  	  By	  November	  2002,	  negotiations	  resulted	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  Certification	  Scheme	  (KPCS).	  The	  KPCS,	  which	  came	  into	  effect	  in	  2003,	  governs	  the	  requirements	  for	  controlling	  rough	  diamond	  production	  and	  trade.	  	  Appendix	  B	  lists	  the	  48	  members	  representing	  74	  countries	  (EU	  being	  counted	  as	  one	  member)	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  KP.	  69	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  diamonds	  have	  special	  characteristics	  –	  they	  are	  what	  Richard	  Snyder	  among	  others	  call	  ‘lootable’	  meaning	  that	  they	  can	  easily	  be	  mined	  and	  traded	  on	  the	  black	  market	  by	  violent	  rebels	  or	  “shadow	  states”.	  	  See	  Richard	  Snyder,	  “Does	  Lootable	  Wealth	  Breed	  Disorder?	  A	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Extraction	  Framework,”	  Comparative	  Political	  
Studies	  39(8)	  (2006):	  943-­‐68.	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within	  China	  itself.	  The	  setting	  up	  of	  the	  SDE	  and	  the	  DAC	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  second	  important	   question	   that	  will	   be	   tackled	   in	   chapter	   5:	  How	   should	  we	   perceive	  this	  rise	  in	  Chinese	  investment	  and	  trade	  of	  diamonds?	  	  The	  U.S,	  Israel,	  Belgium,	  Japan	   and	   other	   actors	   have	   been	   actively	   involved	   in	   diamond	   trading	   for	  decades	  and	  with	  the	  new	  entrance	  of	  China	  in	  this	  market,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  new	  revolution	  that	  has	  been	  both	  beneficial	  and	  detrimental	   to	  the	  world	  diamond	  market.	  	  	  Now	  that	  we	  know	  what	  contemporary	  scholars	  have	  said	  about	  China’s	  effect	  on	  Africa,	  it	  is	  time	  to	  see	  how	  China’s	  actions	  in	  the	  diamonds	  industry	  are	  causing	  undesirable	  effects.	   	   Instead	  of	   repeating	  what	  has	  been	  endlessly	   said	  about	  China’s	  presence	  in	  Africa:	  that	  it	  is	  a	  neo-­‐colonialist	  power,	  or	  that	  is	  has	  done	   controversial	   deals	   with	   shadow	   states,	   I	   will	   attempt	   to	   provide	   new	  insight	   into	   how	   shifting	   market	   leadership	   can	   have	   socio-­‐political	  repercussions.	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Chapter	  3:	  Blood	  Diamonds	  
Blood	   diamonds	   are	   illegally	   traded	   diamonds	   that	   fund	   conflicts	   in	   war-­‐torn	  areas	   or	   rebellions	   against	   governments.70	   	   The	   diamonds	   are	   used	   to	   finance	  corrupt	  practices	  and	  the	  people	  working	   in	  these	  diamond	  fields	  are	  forced	  to	  work	   against	   their	   will	   under	   inhumane	   conditions.	   	   In	   the	   early	   1990s,	   this	  phenomenon	   was	   common	   in	   African	   countries	   ranging	   from	   Angola	   to	   Côte	  D’Ivoire.	  	  	  This	  side	  of	  the	  African	  resource	  curse	  caused	  great	  public	  outcry	  and	  in	  2000,	  the	  global	  diamond	  industry	  began	  trying	  to	  eradicate	  the	  trade	  in	  conflict	  diamonds	   by	   working	   with	   the	   U.N.,	   governments,	   and	   non-­‐governmental	  organizations	   (NGOs)	   to	   create	   the	   Kimberley	   Process	   Certification	   System	  (KPCS).71	   	   Adopted	   in	   2003,	   The	   KPCS	   imposed	   extensive	   requirements	   on	   its	  members	  to	  enable	  them	  to	  attest	  that	  shipments	  of	  rough	  diamonds,	  which	  has	  gone	   through	   a	   strict	   certification	   process,	   were	   ‘conflict-­‐free’	   and	   to	   prevent	  conflict	  diamonds	  from	  entering	  the	   legitimate	  trade.	   	  Participating	  states	  must	  put	  in	  place	  legislation,	  institutions,	  and	  controls	  if	  they	  want	  to	  trade	  diamonds	  on	  the	  world	  market.	  They	  must	  also	  commit	  to	  transparency	  and	  the	  exchange	  of	  statistical	  data.	  The	   KPCS	   has	   been	   partly	   successful	   in	   reducing	   wars	   in	   Angola	   and	  Sierra	  Leone.	   	  For	   instance,	  some	  $125	  million	  worth	  of	  diamonds	  were	   legally	  exported	  from	  Sierra	  Leone	  in	  2006,	  compared	  to	  almost	  none	  in	  the	  late	  1990s.	  	  However,	   Alfred	   L.	   Brownell	   claims	   that	   the	   KCPS	   has	   failed	   to	   eradicate	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  UN	  Definition	  of	  Conflict	  Diamonds.	  	  See	  http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html.	  71	  See	  http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/	  for	  more	  details.	  	  Appendix	  C	  outlines	  the	  major	  features	  of	  the	  Kimberley	  Process.	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problem	   of	   conflict	   diamonds.	   	   He	   added	   that	   “for	  many	   years,	   [governments]	  have	  claimed	  that	  the	  KP	  covers	  99%	  of	  the	  global	  trade	  in	  rough	  diamonds.	  This	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  case.”72	  	  He	  further	  added	  that	  between	  4%	  and	  5%	  of	  the	  global	  trade	  is	  either	  circumventing	  or	  defrauding	  KP	  channels	  contrary	  to	  the	  1%	  that	  is	  officially	  admitted	  to	  by	  the	  World	  Diamond	  Council	  (WDC).	  	  	  For	   Campbell	   the	   problem	   is	   worse:	   “some	   of	   the	   countries	   in	   the	  diamond	  business,	  such	  as	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Angola	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  cannot	  yet	  account	  for	  where	  as	  many	  as	  50%	  of	  their	  diamond	  exports	  originate,	  making	  their	  status	  as	  clean	  gems	  highly	  questionable.”73	  	  For	  him,	  not	  only	   does	   the	   KP	   seems	   powerless	   to	   stop	   conflict	   diamonds,	   but	   its	   policies	  “may	   even	   be	   encouraging	   the	   illegal	   trade	   to	   flourish”74	   because	   the	   public	  seems	  to	  think	  that	  blood	  diamonds	  are	  a	  closed	  case.	  	   This	  chapter	  reviews	  how	  the	  issue	  of	  blood	  diamonds	  has	  been	  explained	  by	   contemporary	   scholarship	   and	   the	   lacunas	   that	   these	   studies	   have.	   In	  traditional	   discussions,	   three	   main	   factors	   in	   Africa’s	   diamond	   minefields	   are	  thought	   to	   stimulate	   conflict	   -­‐	   motivation,	   opportunity	   and	   identity.75	   	   This	  classification	  has	  been	  shared	  by	  scholars	  like	  Michael	  Ross.	  	  However,	  he	  argued	  instead	  that	  the	  main	  factor	  explaining	  the	  presence	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  is	  the	  opportunity	  given	  to	  rebel	  groups	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  ‘lootable’	  diamonds.76	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  “Trade	  in	  Conflict	  Diamonds	  escalates,”	  Daily	  Observer,	  International	  News	  Section,	  November	  18,	  2009,	  accessed	  December	  27,	  2009,	  	  http://www.liberianobserver.com/node/3017.	  	  73	  Greg	  Campbell,	  “Blood	  Diamonds	  Are	  Back,”	  Foreign	  Policy,	  December	  24,	  2009,	  accessed	  December	  27,	  2009,	  	  http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/22/blood_diamonds_are_back?page=0,0	  	  74	  Ibid.	  	  75	  Lujala	  et	  al.,	  “A	  Diamond	  Curse?	  Civil	  War	  and	  a	  Lootable	  Resource”:	  539.	  	  76	  Ross,	  “How	  Does	  Natural	  Resource	  Wealth	  Influence	  Civil	  War?	  Evidence	  from	  Thirteen	  Cases,”;	  Ross,	  “What	  Do	  We	  Know	  About	  Natural	  Resources	  and	  Civil	  War?:.	  	  See	  also	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler,	  “On	  the	  Economic	  Causes	  of	  Civil	  War”;	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler,	  “On	  the	  Incidence	  of	  Civil	  War	  in	  Africa”;	  Le	  Billon,	  “Angola's	  Political	  Economy	  of	  War”.	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The	  most	  recent	  explanation	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  is	  thus	  the	   lack	   of	   control	   that	   governments	   have	   over	   the	   revenue	   that	   can	   be	  generated	   from	   precious	   stones.	   	   Snyder	   and	   Bhavnani	   explain	   that	   civil	   wars	  have	   occurred	   in	   diamond-­‐rich	   countries	   because	   governments	   have	   lost	   the	  ability	   to	   tax	   and	   control	   that	   sector	   over	   time.	   	   This	   in	   turn	   causes	   the	  governments’	   institutional	   and	   political	   capacity	   to	   decay	   and	   thus	   rebellions	  eventually	  occur	  or	  incentives	  are	  created	  to	  oppose	  the	  government.77	  	  	  I	  argue	  that	  these	  explanations	  are	  inadequate	  by	  themselves	  if	  we	  want	  to	   understand	   the	   link	   between	   illegal	   diamonds	   and	   conflict.	   	   With	   China’s	  entrance	  in	  the	  diamonds	  market	  and	  with	  it	  surpassing	  the	  USA	  as	  the	  number	  one	  diamond	  buyer	   in	   the	  world	   capital	   of	   diamonds,	   there	   is	   an	   international	  dimension	   to	   the	   explanation	   of	   why	   the	   scourge	   of	   blood	   diamonds	   is	   still	  present.	  	  The	  exports	  of	  polished	  diamonds	  from	  Belgium	  to	  China	  have	  swelled	  to	  55%	  ($737	  million)	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  2010.78	  	  For	  Antwerp,	  this	  provided	  a	  welcoming	  antidote	  to	  slipping	  sales	  during	  the	  last	  global	  meltdown;	  but	  the	  main	   interest	   lies	   in	  what	   is	  happening	   in	  countries	  where	   these	  diamonds	  are	  mined.	   	   If	   5%	   of	   diamonds	   now	   in	   circulation	   are	   from	   conflict	   regions,	   how	  much	  of	  that	  percentage	  is	  going	  to	  China?	  This	  question	  is	  particularly	  pertinent	  since	  many	  experts	  forecast	  that	  China	  will	  become	  the	  world's	  largest	  diamond	  market	  very	  soon.79	  	  	  In	   addition,	   the	   Belgian	   diamond	   capital	   is	   not	   the	   only	   one	   supplying	  diamonds	   to	   China.	   India	   sold	   $6.6	   billion	   and	   Israel	   $2.2	   billion	   worth	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Snyder	  and	  Bhavnani,	  “Diamonds,	  Blood,	  and	  Taxes.”	  78	  Miller,	  “China	  Takes	  Lead	  in	  Buying	  Belgian	  Diamonds.”	  79	  Ibid.	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diamonds	   to	   China	   in	   2009.80	   	   With	   Africa	   supplying	   more	   than	   50%	   of	   the	  world’s	   diamonds	   and	   the	   issue	   of	   conflict	   diamonds	   unsolved,	   we	   can	  hypothesise	   that	   China’s	   growing	   import	   of	   diamonds	   to	   satisfy	   its	   rapidly	  expanding	  middle	  class	  is	  keeping	  the	  curse	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  alive.	  	  It	  might	  explain	   why	   some	   scholars	   and	   human	   rights	   activists	   see	   the	   KP	   as	   an	  institution	  that	  might	  never	  stop	  the	  problem	  of	  conflict	  diamonds.	  	  
The	  Causal	  Links	  Between	  Civil	  Wars	  and	  Conflict	  Diamonds	  If	  one	  is	  to	  understand	  why	  conflict	  diamonds	  have	  not	  been	  eliminated	  yet,	  one	  should	   try	   to	   understand	   how	   resources	   are	   turned	   from	   potential	   sources	   of	  economic	   development	   to	   stones	   of	   death.	   	   The	   first	   attempts	   to	   explain	   the	  phenomenon	  of	  blood	  diamonds	  which	  emerged	  in	  the	  1990s	  used	  the	  Angolan	  civil	  war	  as	  a	  case	  study.	  	  This	  war,	  which	  lasted	  27	  years,	  was	  initially	  triggered	  by	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  But	  in	  the	  1990s,	  it	  became	  more	  violent	  with	  the	  exploitation	  of	   diamond	   mines	   that	   were	   used	   by	   rebels,	   particularly,	   UNITA	   which	   sold	  diamonds	   to	   finance	   its	   war	   against	   the	   government.	   	   Three	   different	  frameworks	  were	  used	  to	  explain	  it.	  	  
1.	  The	  psychological	  framework	  Most	   of	   the	   initial	   studies	   on	   the	   link	   between	   civil	   wars	   and	   diamonds	  were	  based	   on	   an	   analysis	   of	   economic	   agendas	   versus	   the	   role	   of	   political	  “grievances”	   in	   the	   initiation	   or	   fueling	   of	   war.81	   	   In	   both	   cases,	   it	   was	   firmly	  believed	   that	   the	  availability	  of	   finance	  deeply	   influenced	   the	  opportunities	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Ibid.	  	  81	  Ingrid	  Tamm,	  “Dangerous	  Appetites:	  Human	  Rights	  Activism	  and	  Conflict	  Commodities,”	  
Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  26	  (2004):	  687-­‐88.	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rebellion	   and	   that	   this	   explained	   why	   conflicts	   often	   occur	   in	   resource-­‐rich	  countries	  where	  parts	  of	  the	  population	  do	  not	  see	  the	  government	  as	  legitimate.	  	  This	   suggested	   that	   civil	  war	   research	  on	  natural	   resources	   should	  be	   situated	  within	  the	  predatory	  theory	  approach	  to	  state	  building.	  	  This	  theory	  allowed	  us	  to	   simultaneously	   consider	   state	   rulers,	   their	   subject	   populations	   (including	  rebels),	  and	  resource	  extraction.	  	  The	  activity	  of	  internal	  rivals	  is	  one	  of	  the	  main	  factors	   affecting	   bargaining	   power	   and	   transaction	   costs	   of	   rulers	  who	   do	   not	  fully	  control	  military,	  economic,	  and	  political	  resources.82	  Hence,	   according	   to	   this	   framework,	   it	   is	   the	   possibility	   of	   financing	   a	  rebellion	   and	   challenging	   government	   supremacy	   that	   created	   the	   ‘greed’	   of	  certain	   groups	   and	   fanned	   the	   ‘grievances’	   of	   others.	   	   These	   in	   turn	   were	   the	  opportunities	   that	   different	   interest	   groups	   needed	   to	   funnel	   ethnic	   hatred	   or	  opposition	  to	  government.	  	  In	  other	  cases,	  there	  were	  mixed	  motivations	  where	  political	  grievances	  eventually	  turned	  to	  greed	  once	  the	  goal	  cannot	  be	  achieved.	  	  	  This	   explanation	   actually	  did	   fit	   the	  Angolan	   civil	  war	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	  quite	   well.	   	   Collier	   and	   Hoeffler	   wrote	   extensively	   on	   these	   factors	   and	   their	  conclusions	   are	   unambiguous:	   “one	   factor	   influencing	   the	   opportunity	   for	  rebellion	  is	  the	  availability	  of	  finance…primary	  commodity	  exports	  substantially	  increase	   conflict	   risk.	   	   [This	   is]	   due	   to	   the	   opportunities	   such	   commodities	  provide	  for	  extortion,	  making	  rebellion	  feasible	  and	  perhaps	  even	  attractive.”83	  	   Collier	   and	   Hoeffler	   have	   been	   criticised	   for	   ignoring	   other	   important	  factors	   that	   also	   contribute	   to	   resource-­‐induced	   conflicts.	   	   However,	   they	  represent	  an	  important	  starting	  point,	  because	  they	  do	  show	  how	  psychological	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  Margaret	  Levi,	  Of	  Rule	  and	  Revenue,	  (Berkeley,	  CA:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1988).	  83	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler,	  “Greed	  and	  grievance	  in	  Civil	  War”:	  588.	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factors	   are	   affected	  by	  politico-­‐economic	   conditions,	   thus	   leading	   to	   civil	  wars.	  	  This	   is	   important	   because	   the	   notion	   that	   under-­‐developed	   countries	   with	  natural	   resources	   will	   automatically	   be	   afflicted	   by	   the	   ‘resource	   curse’84	   and	  experience	   civil	  wars	   is	  wrong.	   	   It	   is	   because	   of	   Collier	   and	  Hoeffler’s	   analysis	  that	  other	  scholars	  started	  to	  offer	  new	  interpretations	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  civil	  war	  in	  resource-­‐rich	  countries.	  	  
2.	  The	  ‘Lootability’	  Framework	  The	  next	  major	   innovation	   in	   the	   revision	  of	   the	   resource	  curse	   thesis	  was	   the	  argument	  that	  opportunity	  coupled	  with	  certain	  geographical	  factors	  would	  lead	  to	   different	   types	   of	   dissensions.	   	   	   Le	   Billon	   came	   up	   with	   an	   interesting	  conceptualisation	  of	  how	  geographical	   factors	  motivated	  political	  opportunities	  for	  rebellion.85	   	  For	  him,	  the	  psychological	   factors	  were	  one	  side	  of	  explanation	  for	  the	  causes	  of	  resource-­‐led	  civil	  wars.	   	   Instead,	  one	  had	  to	  consider	  whether	  resources	   were	   proximate	   or	   distant	   and	   what	   their	   concentrations	   were	   –	  whether	  the	  resources	  were	  available	  at	  one	  point	  or	  whether	  they	  were	  diffused	  over	  an	  extensive	  area.	  	  This	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  in	  the	  following	  matrix:	  	  	  	  
Table	   3.1:	   The	   Different	   Types	   of	   Conflicts	   that	   occur	   due	   to	   Geological	  
Distribution	  of	  Resources	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Auty,	  Sustaining	  Development	  in	  Mineral	  Economies.	  	  The	  resource	  curse	  thesis	  was	  first	  used	  by	  Auty	  to	  describe	  how	  countries	  rich	  in	  natural	  resources	  were	  unable	  to	  use	  that	  wealth	  to	  boost	  their	  economies	  and	  how,	  counter-­‐intuitively,	  these	  countries	  had	  lower	  economic	  growth	  than	  countries	  without	  an	  abundance	  of	  natural	  resources.	  	  Collier	  and	  Hoeffler	  later	  adopted	  this	  thesis	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  presence	  of	  resources	  in	  some	  countries	  that	  has	  weak	  political	  structure	  could	  lead	  to	  conflict	  and	  hence	  represented	  a	  curse.	  85	  Le	  Billon,	  “Diamond	  Wars?	  Conflict	  diamonds	  and	  geographies	  of	  resource	  wars”.	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  If	  resources	  are	  available	  at	  one	  particular	  point	  and	  they	  are	  close	  to	  the	  centre	  where	   governments	   are	   in	   control,	   there	   is	   a	   high	   risk	   that	   the	   conflicts	   that	  occur	  will	   lead	  to	  a	  coup.	   	  Alternatively,	   if	  the	  resources	  are	  at	  one	  point	  but	  in	  distant	  locations	  then	  governments	  have	  trouble	  controlling	  them	  and	  there	  is	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  warlordism.	  When	  considering	  the	  geographical	  concentration	  of	  resources,	  Le	  Billon	  revealed	  important	  features	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  civil	  wars	  and	  resources:	  (1)	  opportunity	  is	  not	  the	  only	  factor	  that	  should	  be	  considered	  when	  trying	  to	  find	  out	  how	  resources	  cause	  political	  strife;	  (2)	  not	  all	  conflicts	  lead	  to	  rebellion;	  (3)	  governments	   do	   not	   have	   perfect	   control	   of	   resources;	   (4)	   lootability	   is	   an	  important	  factor	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  when	  talking	  of	  the	  resources	  and	  civil	  wars.	  	  	  It	   was	   this	   final	   observation	   that	   has	   changed	   the	   development	   of	   the	  literature	   on	   diamonds	   and	   conflicts	   over	   the	   past	   five	   years.	   	   Le	   Billon’s	  geographical	  analysis	  rightly	  pushed	  scholars	  to	  consider	  the	  geological	  features	  and	   how	   these	   could	   in	   turn	   impact	   on	   diamonds.	   	   Lujala	   et	   al.	   showed	   that	  different	   types	   of	   diamonds	   had	   different	   effects	   on	   the	   possibility	   of	   causing	  conflicts.	  	  They	  explained	  that	  there	  were	  two	  types	  of	  diamonds	  –	  primary	  and	  secondary	  ones.	  	  	  Primary	   (Kimberlite)	   diamonds	   –	  which	  occur	   in	   the	   earth’s	   crust	   –	   are	  very	   hard	   to	   extract	   and	   hence	   did	   not	   give	   any	   opportunity	   to	   rebels	   as	   they	  could	   not	   extract	   these	   to	   obtain	   finance	   for	   their	   opposition	   to	   governments.	  	  Secondary	  deposits	   (non-­‐Kimberlite)	  on	   the	  other	  hand	   “can	  be	  exploited	  with	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artisanal	   tools	   such	  as	  a	   shovel	   and	  a	   sieve”.86	   	  Most	  non-­‐Kimberlite	  diamonds	  are	   alluvial	   in	   nature.	   They	   are	   diamonds	   that	   have	   been	   removed	   from	   the	  Kimberlite	   by	   natural	   erosion	   and	   deposited	   in	   a	   new	   environment	   such	   as	   a	  riverbed,	  an	  ocean	  floor,	  or	  a	  shoreline.	  Alluvial	  diamonds	  and	  diamonds	  that	  are	  distributed	  over	  a	  large	  area	  are	  usually	   harder	   to	   control	   by	   governmental	   factions	   and	   are	   hence	   more	  accessible	   to	   rebel	   forces	   during	   conflicts.	   	   According	   to	   a	   report	   by	   the	  WDC	  only	   three	   countries	   –	   Angola,	   Ghana	   and	   South	   Africa	   –	   have	   formal	   alluvial	  diamonds	  sectors	  while	  many	  other	  countries	  like	  the	  DRC,	  Cote	  d’Ivoire,	  Liberia	  and	  Sierra	  Leone	  have	  unregulated,	  small-­‐scale,	  alluvial	  diamond	  sectors.	  	  Hence	  Lujala	   et	   al.	   explain	   that	   “a	   country	   that	  produces	   secondary	  diamonds	   faces	   a	  higher	   risk	   of	   conflict	   onset”	   as	   they	   are	   more	   readily	   extracted	   without	  regulation.87	  Collier	   and	  Hoeffler’s	   also	   believed	   that	   large	   populations	   coupled	  with	  high	   ethno-­‐linguistic	   fractionalisation	   (ELF)	   could	   lead	   to	   ethnically	  motivated	  civil	  wars.	   	  “The	  presence	  of	  secondary	  diamonds	  [can	  be]	  positively	  associated	  with	  the	  onset	  and	  incidence	  of	  civil	  war	  in	  countries	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  ethnic	  fractionalisation”	   as	   they	   give	   ethnic	   groups	   autonomy	   from	   the	   state	   as	   they	  have	   the	   ability	   to	   finance	   their	   own	   regions	  without	   the	   need	   for	   the	   state.88	  	  This	  magnifies	  the	  effect	  of	  secondary	  diamond	  mining	  on	  the	  risk	  of	  civil	  war	  in	  those	   countries	   that	   do	   not	   have	   ethnic	   harmony.89	   	   In	  Africa,	   Ivory	   Coast,	   the	  DRC	  and	  most	  recently	  Sudan	  has	  been	  facing	  such	  problems.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Lujala	  et	  al.,	  “A	  Diamond	  Curse?	  Civil	  War	  and	  a	  Lootable	  Resource”:	  543.	  87	  Ibid.:	  544.	  88	  Ibid.:	  545.	  89	  Ibid.	  	  See	  also	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3.	  The	  Revenue-­centered	  framework	  Geographical	  concentration	  and	  types	  of	  diamond	  deposits	  are	  the	  main	  factors	  that	   contribute	   to	   what	   Snyder	   and	   Bhavnani	   termed	   a	   “revenue-­‐centered	  framework	   for	   explaining	   political	   order	   [and	   disorder].”90	   	   This	   framework	  shifts	  the	  focus	  from	  rebels	  to	  rulers	  and	  states	  and	  maintains	  that	  the	  political	  consequences	   of	   lootable	   wealth	   are	   a	   result	   of	   institutional	   failures	   by	   the	  rulers.91	  	  	  Political	   disorder	   occurs	   when	   three	   main	   factors	   are	   present:	   (1)	   The	  lack	   of	   nonlootable	   resources	   for	   rulers;	   (2)	   the	   inexistence	   or	   decay	   of	   the	  government’s	  capacity	  to	  tax;	  and	  (3)	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  government	  spends	  its	  revenue	  to	  strengthen	  state	  capacity.	  	  Snyder	  and	  Bhavnani	  came	  up	  with	  a	  very	  interesting	   framework	   to	   explain	   state	   collapse,	   summarise	   in	   the	   following	  table:	  
Table	  3.2:	  Revenue	  Opportunity	  Structure	  and	  the	  Risk	  of	  State	  Collapse92	  
	  The	   cells	   denote	   the	   risk	   of	   state	   collapse:	   high,	   medium,	   or	   low.	   	   Artisanal	  extraction	  of	  non-­‐lootable	   resources	   (for	  example,	  bauxite)	   is	   so	   rare	   that	   they	  do	  not	  include	  it.	  	  Figure	  3.2	  reflects	  the	  use	  of	  various	  previous	  assumptions	  that	  we	   have	   considered	   previously	   in	   this	   paper.	   	   I	   believe	   that	   Snyder	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Snyder	  and	  Bhavnani,	  “Diamonds,	  Blood,	  and	  Taxes”:	  563-­‐597.	  91	  Ibid.:	  564-­‐565.	  	  Snyder	  and	  Bhavnani	  show	  that	  considering	  revenues	  is	  very	  important	  when	  trying	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  presence	  of	  diamonds	  can	  lead	  to	  civil	  wars.	  	  They	  argue	  that	  “revenue	  forms	  the	  ‘sinews’	  of	  the	  state	  and	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  revenue	  increases	  the	  risk	  of	  state	  collapse,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  increases	  the	  risk	  of	  civil	  war.”	  92	  Ibid.:	  570.	  
	   Industrial	  Extraction	   Artisanal	  Extraction	  Lootable	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  Non-­‐Lootable	   Low	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Bhavnani’s	   framework	   is	   among	   the	   most	   realistic	   analysis	   so	   far	   that	   links	  resources	  to	  civil	  war.	  	  	  Their	   empirical	   analyses	   show	   that	   there	   is	   a	  high	   risk	  of	   state	   collapse	  when	  countries	  with	  lootable	  resources	  lose	  the	  capacity	  to	  control	  and	  provide	  industrial	   extraction	  and	  hence	   lose	   a	  wide	   revenue	   framework.	   	  They	  analyse	  producers	   of	   alluvial	   diamonds	   (highly	   lootable	  diamonds),	   giving	   them	   scores	  across	  seven	  key	  variables	  shown	  by	  previous	  studies	  to	  be	  significant	  correlates	  of	  civil	  war:	  per	  capita	  income,	  population,	  rough	  terrain,	  petroleum,	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  is	  a	  new	  state,	  political	  instability,	  and	  the	  level	  of	  democracy.93	  Considering	   the	   cases	   of	   alluvial	   diamond	   producers,	   Snyder	   and	  Bhavnani	  find	  that	  three	  (Ghana,	  Guinea	  and	  Sierra	  Leone)	  were	  very	  similar	  in	  the	  1990s.	   	  Their	  analysis	  showed	  that	  all	  three	  faced	  similar	  levels	  of	  civil	  war	  risk.	   	   These	   three	   countries	   had	   low	   per	   capita	   incomes,	   a	   factor	   that	   existing	  studies	  show	  has	  a	  significant	  statistical	  association	  with	  civil	  war.	  	  Yet	  the	  three	  countries	   had	   no	   other	   risk	   factors:	   all	   had	   small	   populations,	   lacked	   rough	  terrain,	  petroleum,	  and	  political	   instability,	  and	  were	  neither	  new	  states	  nor	   in	  democratic	  transition.94	  This	   changed	   in	   1990	   when	   Ghana	   and	   Guinea	   both	   developed	   the	  required	   conditions	   for	   civil	   wars	   to	   occur:	   they	   were	   semi-­‐democracies	   and	  experienced	   political	   instability	   in	   addition	   to	   having	   low	   per	   capita	   income.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  James	  D.	  Fearon	  and	  David	  D.	  Laitin,	  “Weak	  States,	  Rough	  Terrain,	  and	  Large-­‐Scale	  Ethnic	  Violence	  Since	  1945,”	  (Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  1999	  Annual	  Meetings	  of	  the	  American	  Political	  Science	  Association,	  Atlanta,	  GA,	  USA,	  September	  2-­‐5,	  1999).	  	  	  94	  Fearon	  and	  Laitin	  show	  that	  these	  factors	  are	  highly	  correlated	  to	  civil	  wars.	  	  Larger	  populations	  and	  rough	  terrains	  tend	  to	  isolate	  the	  people	  in	  some	  countries	  and	  cause	  some	  form	  of	  fractionalisation.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  petroleum	  has	  also	  often	  been	  associated	  with	  causing	  civil	  wars	  given	  that	  they	  give	  strong	  revenue	  bases	  to	  rebels	  who	  can	  exploit	  them	  as	  a	  source	  of	  income.	  	  Semi	  democracies	  are	  somewhat	  repressive	  and	  hence	  tend	  to	  breed	  rebellions,	  riots	  and	  much	  political	  instability.	  	  Refer	  to	  James	  D.	  Fearon	  and	  David	  D.	  Laitin,	  “Ethnicity,	  Insurgency,	  and	  Civil	  War,”	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review	  97(1)	  (2003):	  75–90.	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Sierra	   Leone	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   only	   showed	   the	   presence	   of	   one	   relevant	  variable,	   higher	   per	   capita	   income.	   	   Yet,	   it	   was	   Sierra	   Leone	   that	   had	   to	   bear	  eleven	   years	   of	   civil	   war,	   while	   Ghana	   and	   Guinea	   eventually	   improved	   their	  economic	  performance.	  Additionally,	   the	   three	  countries	  have	   the	  same	  type	  of	  terrain	   and	   resource	   base,	   but	   only	   Sierra	   Leone	   experienced	   civil	  war.	   	   	   This	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  other	  factors	  were	  missing	  in	  previous	  analyses.	  Taking	   the	   case	   of	   Sierra	   Leone,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   see	   how	   lack	   of	  government	  institutional	  capacity	  led	  to	  civil	  war.	  	  Sierra	  Leone	  had	  no	  civil	  war	  in	   the	   past	   despite	   being	   a	   country	   that	   had	   lootable	   diamonds,	   political	  instability,	  and	  low	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  because	  in	  the	  pre-­‐1985	  era,	  under	  the	  rule	  of	   Siaka	   Stevens,	   there	   was	   better	   government	   control	   over	   alluvial	   diamond	  production.	   	   Stevens	  gave	  a	  group	  of	  Lebanese	  dealers	  exclusive	   control	  of	   the	  country’s	   alluvial	   diamonds.	   	   He	   believed	   that	   as	   they	   were	   foreigners,	   they	  would	   have	   less	   success	   in	   overthrowing	   his	   government.	   	   Moreover,	   they	  provided	   vital	   sources	   of	   taxation	   for	   the	   government	   and	   they	   turned	   the	  alluvial	   diamond	   sector	   into	   a	   quasi-­‐industrial	   one,	   thus	   reducing	   the	   risks	   for	  conflicts.	  	  	  With	   time,	   the	   Lebanese	   dealers	   grew	   stronger	   due	   to	   acquired	  wealth	  and	   stopped	   relying	   on	   Stevens	   for	   protection.	   	   Hence,	   the	   Sierra	   Leonean	  government	  started	  losing	  its	  taxing	  capacity,	  and	  its	  military	  suffered	  a	  big	  blow	  when	  Stevens	  reduced	  the	  manpower	  to	  only	  2,000	  soldiers	  to	  prevent	  a	  military	  coup.	   	  When	   Joseph	  Momoh,	   Stevens’	   successor,	   was	   in	   power,	   he	   was	   at	   the	  head	   of	   a	   weak	  military	   and	   his	   ability	   to	   tax	   the	   Lebanese	   dealers	   was	   non-­‐existent.	  	  Sierra	  Leone	  was	  cash	  hungry	  and	  defenseless	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  when	  the	   Revolutionary	   United	   Front	   (RUF),	   a	   Liberian	   rebel	   group	   commanded	   by	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Charles	  Taylor,	  invaded	  Sierra	  Leone,	  it	  was	  able	  to	  wage	  a	  civil	  war	  that	  lasted	  11	   years,	   decimated	   the	   population,	   and	   added	   new	   levels	   of	   savagery	   to	   the	  problems	  of	  blood	  diamonds.95	  	  
Contextualising	  the	  Issue:	  Towards	  an	  International	  Framework	  to	  Explain	  
Resource-­‐Motivated	  Conflicts	  
	  While	  the	  psychological,	   lootablity,	  and	  revenue-­‐centered	  frameworks	  explain	  a	  major	   part	   of	   why	   conflict	   occur	   they	   do	   not	   explain	   the	   resilience	   and	  contemporary	  resurgence	  of	  blood	  diamonds.	  	  If	  the	  WDC	  is	  to	  try	  to	  tackle	  this	  problem,	   it	   needs	   to	   understand	   the	   dynamics	   that	   I	  will	   outline	   in	   chapter	   4.	  	  Before	   proceeding	   with	   this	   section	   of	   my	   research,	   however,	   I	   would	   like	   to	  explain	  the	  problems	  with	  the	  research	  that	  has	  been	  discussed	  so	  far.	  The	   explanations	   given	   so	   far	   by	   scholars	   of	   civil	   war	   and	   resources	   is	  highly	  deterministic.	  	  First,	  the	  psychological	  framework	  as	  we	  saw	  does	  portray	  the	  character	  of	  some	  leaders	  or	  rebel	  groups	  who	  have	  used	  conflict	  diamonds	  for	   their	   private	   gains.	   	   Leaders	   like	   Liberia’s	   Charles	   Taylor	   then	   and	   Robert	  Mugabe	  now	  have	  militarised	  diamond	  mines	  for	  their	  own	  private	  benefits.	  	  The	  former	  now	  faces	   trials	  at	  The	  Hague	  while	  Mugabe	   is	  still	   the	  head	  of	  a	  major	  diamond	   trafficking	   activity	   in	   Zimbabwe.	   	   However,	   basing	   the	   analysis	   of	  conflicts	   on	   greed	   and	   grievance	   is	   not	   enough	   as	   there	   are	   more	   factors	   to	  consider.	  	  Such	  factors	  include	  government	  capacity	  and	  geological	  features.	  Second,	   if	   we	   claim	   that	   countries	   producing	   most	   alluvial	   diamonds,	  without	  a	  preexisting	  “strong”	  state	  or	  with	  high	  ethnic	  diversity	  are	  likely	  to	  see	  conflicts,	   then	   we	   are	   limiting	   ourselves	   to	   a	   structural,	   economic	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Snyder	  and	  Bhavnani,	  “Diamonds,	  Blood,	  and	  Taxes”:	  579.	  	  See	  also	  	  William	  Reno,	  Corruption	  
and	  State	  Politics	  in	  Sierra	  Leone,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  79-­‐92.	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geographical	  explanation.	  	  While	  this	  explanation	  may	  be	  appealing	  and	  could	  be	  a	   component	   of	   a	   bigger	   framework	   it	   is	   insufficient	   as	   diamonds	   –	   whether	  primary	  or	  secondary	  –	  consist	  of	  different	  actors	  and	  looking	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	   them	  as	  a	   top-­‐down	  relationship	   is	  a	  problematic	  notion.	   	  One	  should	  consider	  Catherine	  Boone’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  that	  exist	  between	  government	  and	  elites	   in	   the	  different	  African	  societies.	   	   	  Boone	  explained	   that	  the	  central	  rulers’	  strategic	  choices	  are	  shaped	  by	  regional	  and	  local	  differences	  in	  rural	  social	  structure	  and	  agrarian	  property	  relations.	  	  The	  centre's	  strategy	  in	  any	   particular	   region	   is	   highly	   sensitive	   to	   the	   internal	   configuration	   of	   rural	  interests,	   resources	   and	   bargaining	   power.96	   	   For	   instance,	   in	   socially	  hierarchical	   regions,	   existing	   elites	   must	   be	   reckoned	   with,	   either	   as	  collaborators	  or	  rivals,	  and	  this	   leads	  the	  centre	  to	  establish	  dense	  networks	  of	  local-­‐level	  institutions.	  	  	  According	   to	   Boone,	   four	   possible	   outcomes	   usually	   occur	   under	   such	  settings:	   power-­‐sharing	   (where	   rural	   society	   is	   hierarchical	   and	   elites	   are	  dependent	   on	   the	   state);	   usurpation	   (where	   there	   is	   hierarchy,	   but	   elites	   are	  more	  able	  to	  extract	  rural	  surpluses	  without	  state	  mediation);	  non-­‐incorporation	  (little	   hierarchy	   and	   little	   engagement	   with	   the	   state);	   and	   administrative	  occupation	  (little	  hierarchy	  and	  yet	  of	  economic	  interest	  to	  the	  state).97	  	   	  Boone	  adds	  that	   ‘powersharing’	   is	  more	   likely	  to	  prevail	   if	  rural	  elites	  already	  depend	  on	   the	   centre	   for	   their	   privileged	   position	   within	   the	   region,	   making	   them	  reliable	   collaborators;	   while	   ‘usurpation’	   is	   more	   likely	   if	   elites	   enjoy	   a	   more	  autonomous	  regional	  power	  base,	  making	  them	  potentially	  dangerous	  rivals.	  	  As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Catherine	  Boone,	  Political	  Topographies	  of	  the	  African	  State:	  Territorial	  Authority	  and	  
Institutional	  Choice,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  97	  Ibid.,	  23.	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I	  show	  in	  chapter	  4	  this	  could	  be	  a	  likely	  cause	  for	  civil	  wars	  and	  relying	  on	  the	  ‘lootablity’	   thesis	   is	   not	   totally	   justified	   as	   we	   have	   to	   try	   to	   understand	   such	  relationships	  and	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  changes	  occurring	  in	  the	  global	  market	  for	  diamonds	  as	  what	  is	  mined	  eventually	  makes	  it	  overseas.	  Third,	  for	  the	  revenue-­‐centered	  framework,	  as	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  strong	  states	   and	   weak	   states	   and	   their	   tax	   capacities,	   we	   need	   to	   come	   up	   with	   a	  concrete	  definition	  of	  what	  strong	  states	  are.	  	  While	  Snyder	  and	  Bhavnani	  focus	  on	  tax	  capacities	  and	  they	  build	  their	  argument	  on	  the	  rentier	  state	  literature,98	  there	   are	   other	   capacities	   at	   play.	   	   Such	   capacities	   include	   border	   control,	  domestic	   and	   international	   regulatory	   standards	   (certification,	   monitoring),	  domestic	  interstate	  commerce,	  market	  order	  –	  or	  disorder	  –	  that	  the	  Sino-­‐Indian	  rivalry	   in	   the	   diamond	   market	   is	   creating.	   	   Hence,	   the	   revenue-­‐centered	  framework	  is	  just	  the	  tip	  of	  the	  iceberg	  and	  is	  inadequate	  for	  a	  final	  explanatory	  framework.	  	  	  New	  activities	  that	  have	  been	  triggered	  by	  China’s	  entrance	  in	  this	  market	  also	  need	  deliberation	  because	  they	  represent	  whole	  new	  demand	  dynamics	  as	  compared	   to	   when	   the	   USA	   and	   Europe	   were	   the	   main	   buyers	   of	   diamonds.	  	  Other	  factors	  that	  I	  propose	  to	  look	  at	  are	  industrial	  self-­‐governance	  and	  private-­‐public	   sector	   partnership	   (as	   some	   infrastructure	   are	   built	   by	   state-­‐owned	  enterprises	   –	   like	   in	   Zimbabwe).	   	   Finally,	   it	   will	   be	   important	   to	   review	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  See	  Kiren	  Aziz	  Chaudhry,	  “The	  Price	  of	  Wealth:	  Business	  and	  State	  in	  Labor	  Remittance	  and	  Oil	  Economies,”	  International	  Organization	  43(1)	  (Winter,	  1989):	  101-­‐145.	  	  Chaudhry	  explained	  that	  despite	  being	  more	  powerful	  than	  the	  Yemeni	  state,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  lost	  its	  tax	  capacity	  and	  institutional	  power	  during	  the	  recession	  of	  the	  1980s	  because	  during	  the	  boom	  years,	  it	  created	  institutions	  that	  grew	  independent	  of	  state	  control	  and	  hence,	  were	  unable	  to	  properly	  tax	  these	  institutions	  because	  they	  had	  an	  informal	  network	  that	  could	  oppose	  any	  austerity	  measures.	  	  Alternatively,	  in	  Yemen,	  during	  the	  boom	  time,	  the	  private	  sector	  elites	  and	  bureaucrats	  were	  separated	  affording	  the	  state	  the	  corporate	  cohesion	  and	  the	  political	  will	  to	  implement	  stringent	  austerity	  programs	  in	  the	  recession.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  divided	  the	  bureaucracy	  and	  the	  private	  sector	  along	  sectarian	  distinctions	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  historical	  differences	  and	  this	  lack	  of	  cohesion	  allowed	  the	  government	  to	  easily	  tax	  these	  parties.	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democratic	  political	   regime	  and	   the	  history	  of	  political	  stability.	   	  How	  the	  DRC,	  Côte	  d’Ivoire	  and	  Zimbabwe	  differ	  because	  of	  their	  political	  regimes	  necessitates	  some	  discussion	  of	  veto	  players,	   legislative	  processes	  and	  even	  a	  review	  of	   the	  redistributive	  logic	  of	  autocracies.	  	   Additionally,	   when	   diamonds	   are	   added	   to	   the	   equation,	   the	   situation	  becomes	  even	  messier.	   	  The	   international	  diamond	  market	   indirectly	   facilitates	  the	  trade	  of	  blood	  diamonds	  but	  it	  becomes	  harder	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  elites	  do	  not	   cooperate	  with	   the	   government	  because	   it	  would	  be	  more	   lucrative	   for	  the	  society	  to	  trade	  on	  the	  global	  market.	   	  Why	  do	  the	  parties	  continue	  fighting	  when	   greater	   legitimate	   profits	   are	   available	   and	   could	   ameliorate	   societal	  development?	   	   In	   a	   case	   like	   Zimbabwe,	  why	  has	   the	   government	   not	   adopted	  according	   to	   a	   power-­‐sharing	   deal	   with	   elites	   and	   instead	   went	   for	   military	  control	  of	  diamond	  mines	  that	  are	  currently	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  much	  controversy?	  	  All	  these	  points	  will	  be	  expanded	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  It	  will	  therefore	  be	  vital	  to	  review	  the	  diamond	  industry	  and	  understand	  the	  new	  mechanisms	   that	  have	  been	   introduced	  by	   the	  Kimberley	  Process	  and	  the	   diamantaires	   all	   over	   the	   world.	   	   However,	   as	   mentioned	   previously,	   the	  industry	   is	   highly	   secretive	   and	   sometimes	   I	   will	   have	   to	   refer	   to	   works	   that	  touches	  on	  the	  black	  market	  and	  how	  it	  operates	  because	  the	  transactions	  that	  I	  want	  to	  analyse	  often	  occur	  there.	  	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  literature	  on	  this	  subject,	  and	  in	  particular	  on	   its	   connection	  with	   resurgences	   in	   conflicts	   and	   political	   dissent	   in	   certain	  diamond-­‐rich	   countries,	   is	   almost	   non-­‐existent	   because	   it	   is	   an	   extremely	  sensitive	   topic	   and	   data	   is	   not	   readily	   available.	   However,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	  that	  we	   cannot	  make	   certain	   observations	   about	   the	   impact	   that	   international	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institutions,	   international	   trade	   and	   private	   actors	   have	   had	   on	   civil	  wars	   that	  occur	  due	  to	  the	  availability	  of	  resources.	  	  	  	  
The	  Main	  Assumptions	  and	  their	  Aims	  I	  would	   now	   like	   to	   expand	   two	   assumptions	   that	   I	  will	  make	   throughout	   the	  remainder	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  These	  assumptions	  allow	  us	  to	  keep	  the	  project	  focused	  on	  our	  question:	   ‘Does	  the	  Chinese	  entrance	  into	  the	  diamond	  market	  decrease	  or	  increase	  conflicts	  in	  countries	  that	  are	  afflicted	  by	  blood	  diamonds?’	  	  
(1)	  Corrupt	  leaders	  and	  rebel	  groups	  are	  not	  the	  only	  ones	  responsible	  for	  conflicts	  
in	  diamond-­rich	  countries.	  Some	  scholars	  and	   journalists	   attribute	   the	  problems	  occurring	   in	   some	  African	   countries	   solely	   to	   their	   leaders.	   	   They	   exclaim	   that	   such	   leaders	   are	  ruthless	  and	  selfish	  and	  do	  not	  consider	  their	  people’s	  well-­‐being.99	  	  While	  this	  is	  not	   totally	   unfounded,	   it	   claims	   to	   show	   that	   the	   resource-­‐curse	   trend	   occurs	  because	   abundant	   resources	   breed	   “stationary	   bandits”100	  who	   create	   conflicts	  by	   setting	  up	  particular	   institutions	   that	  will	  keep	   the	  conflict	  going	  because	   it	  suits	  their	  interests	  to	  do	  so.	  	  	  However,	  after	  considering	  the	  diamonds	  industry,	  my	  view	  is	  that	  conflicts	  are	   provoked	   within	   societies	   as	   different	   groups	   and	   factions	   fight	   for	   their	  share	  in	  benefiting	  from	  the	  discovery	  of	  resources.	  	  Resource-­‐rich	  countries	  are	  faced	   with	   particular	   economic	   conditions	   that	   encourage	   conflicts	   not	   only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  William	  Reno,	  “Shadow	  States	  and	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  Wars”,	  in	  Greed	  and	  Grievance:	  
Economic	  Agendas	  in	  Civil	  Wars,	  eds.	  Mats	  Berdal	  and	  David	  M.	  Malone,	  (Colorado:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers	  Inc,	  2000),	  43-­‐68.	  100	  Mancur	  Olson,	  Power	  and	  Prosperity:	  Outgrowing	  Communist	  and	  Capitalist	  Dictatorships,	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000).	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because	   they	   are	   ruled	   by	   selfish,	   ruthless	   leaders	   but	   because	   at	   the	   societal	  level,	   conflicts	   are	   bred	   if	   there	   are	   no	   formal	   state	   institutions	   to	   distribute	  resources	  properly.	  	  
(2)	  States	  with	  civil	  wars	  and	  conflicts	  are	  not	  necessarily	  failed	  states.	  	  	  The	  presence	  of	  conflict	   in	  countries	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  failed	  state.	  The	  state	  apparatus	  may	  in	  fact	  continue	  to	  co-­‐exist	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  dissension.	  	  Regarding	  Sino-­‐Africa	  relations,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  when	  Chinese	  companies	  want	  to	  invest	  in	  Africa	  or	  trade	  with	  African	  countries,	  they	  still	   deal	   with	   the	   parties	   in	   power.	   	   For	   instance,	   any	   Chinese	   investment	   in	  Sudan	  during	  the	  civil	  war	  was	  done	  by	  consulting	  the	  Sudanese	  government.101	  	  These	   assumptions	   are	   beneficial	   firstly,	   because	   they	   ensure	   we	   do	   not	   miss	  essential	  parts	  of	   the	  effect	   that	   the	  Chinese	  purchase	  of	  diamonds	  has	  had	  on	  diamond-­‐related	  conflicts	   in	  Africa.	   	  To	  show	  how	  this	   is	  easily	  done,	   let’s	   take	  the	  example	  of	  a	   few	  scholars	   that	  analyse	  Chinese	  FDI	   in	  Africa.	   	  As	  explained	  earlier,	  William	  Reno	  is	  convinced	  that	  it	  is	  the	  leaders	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  “shadow	  states”102	   who	   perpetuate	   conflicts.	   When	   he	   considers	   Ugandan	   officers,	  Zimbabwean	   politicians,	   and	   Rwanda’s	   leaders	   during	   their	   civil	   wars,	   for	  example,	   he	   claims	   that	   they	   were	   all	   seeking	   “routes	   to	   quick	   riches	   in	  warfare.”103	   	   However,	   Reno	   ignored	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   leaders	   often	   cannot	  control	  events	  during	  conflicts,	  such	  as	  the	  emergence	  of	  rebel	  groups.	  These	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  For	  more	  information,	  see	  Peter	  S.	  Goodman,	  “China	  Invests	  Heavily	  In	  Sudan's	  Oil	  Industry,”	  
The	  Washington	  Post,	  December	  23,	  2004,	  accessed	  May	  5,	  2007	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-­‐dyn/articles/A21143-­‐2004Dec22.html.	  	  102	  Reno,	  “Shadow	  States	  and	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Civil	  Wars”,	  43-­‐68.	  103	  Ibid.,	  63.	  	  Similar	  claims	  were	  made	  by	  Jimi	  Peters.	  	  See	  Jimi	  Peters,	  The	  Nigerian	  Military	  and	  
the	  State,	  (London:	  I.	  B.	  Tauris	  Publishers,	  1997).	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emerge	  not	  because	  they	  directly	  oppose	  the	  leadership	  as	  such,	  but	  because	  the	  presence	  of	  resources	  offers	  them	  the	  prospect	  of	  autonomy	  and	  independence.	  	  This	   is	   exactly	  what	   is	   going	   on	   in	   Nigeria	   in	   the	  Niger	   Delta	   and	   in	   the	   Chad	  where	  rebels	  are	  contesting	  with	  the	  state	  over	  resources.	  	   The	  second	  benefit	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  assumptions	  is	  that	  they	  allow	  us	   to	   isolate	   the	   causes	   of	   conflict	   in	   Africa	   while	   assessing	   whether	   Chinese	  demand	  for	  diamonds	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  exacerbating	  them.	  	  By	  expanding	  ideas	  that	  claim	  that	  resource	  wars	  are	  either	  caused	  by	  “greed	  or	  grievance”104,	  I	  am	  able	  to	   add	   new	   factors	   and	   assumptions	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   internal	   state	  discord.	   	   If	   Chinese	  ODI	   increases	   the	  occurrence	  of	   conflicts	   in	   countries	  with	  lootable	   resources,	   it	   might	   mean	   that	   rebels	   are	   more	   autonomous	   than	   in	  countries	  with	  other	  types	  of	  resources.	  But	  what	  if	  conflicts	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  less	  frequent	   when	   investment	   occurs	   in	   non-­‐lootable	   resources?	   Is	   it	   mere	  coincidence	   or	   have	   scholars	   of	   the	   resource-­‐curse	   thesis	   missed	   something	  important?	  Ultimately,	  research	  using	  these	  assumptions	  will	  allow	  me	  to	  understand	  how	   the	   “informal	   networks”105	   in	   the	  diamonds	  market	  work	   and	  how	  China,	  shortly	  to	  become	  the	  biggest	  buyer	  of	  diamonds,	  is	  dealing	  with	  these	  networks.	  	  	  It	   also	   offers	   us	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   how	   informal	   networks	   trading	  diamonds	  illegally	  operate	  in	  the	  growing	  market.	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Chapter	  4:	  Internal	  Causes	  of	  Conflict	  in	  Diamond-­‐Rich	  
Countries	  
	  As	   explained	   in	   chapter	   3,	   if	   we	   want	   to	   understand	   why	   conflicts	   are	   still	  present	  in	  diamond-­‐rich	  countries,	  we	  cannot	  be	  satisfied	  with	  the	  argument	  that	  conflicts	  occur	  simply	  because	  states	  have	  little	  institutional	  capacity	  and	  cannot	  collect	   revenues	   properly	   from	   the	   population.	   	   I	   maintain	   that	   states	   are	   not	  organised	  around	  simple	  dichotomies,	   like	  centre	  vs.	  periphery,	  but	   instead	  are	  composed	   of	   “a	   mélange	   of	   social	   organisations,”106	   including	   ethnic	   groups,	  villages,	   religious	   groups,	   families	   and	   economic	   institutions	   and	   any	   other	  organisation	   that	   influences	   society.	   The	   state	   is	   only	   one	   institution	   among	  many	  that	  competes	  to	  exert	  control	  over	  society.	  	  	  Both	   weak	   and	   strong	   states	   create	   distortions	   in	   the	   allocation	   of	  resources,	   and	   consequently,	   both	   excessively	   weak	   and	   excessively	   strong	  states	   are	   likely	   to	   act	   as	   impediments	   to	   economic	   development	   even	   if	   they	  have	  resources.107	   	  While	  strong	  states	   tend	  to	   impose	  high	  taxes,	  discouraging	  investment	  and	  entrepreneurial	  effort	  by	  the	  citizens,	  weak	  states	  fail	  to	  invest	  in	  public	  goods	  such	  as	  infrastructure,	  roads,	   legal	  rules	  for	  contract	  enforcement,	  etc.	   	  Weak	   states	   under-­‐invest	   in	   public	   goods	   because	   self-­‐interested	   political	  elites	  undertake	  investments	  only	  when	  they	  expect	  future	  private	  rewards,	  and	  when	  the	  state	  is	  weak,	  they	  can	  appropriate	  fewer	  rewards	  in	  the	  future.108	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So,	  apart	  from	  the	  most	  recent	  explanation	  of	  the	  incidence	  of	  conflict	  in	  mineral-­‐rich	   African	   states,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   use	   Catherine	   Boone’s	   analysis	   to	  explain	  the	   internal	  dynamics	  of	  conflicts	   in	  such	  countries.	   	  Boone	  argues	  that	  “politics	  [is]	  configured	  at	  the	  local	  level”109	  and	  the	  governing	  strategies	  used	  in	  the	  countryside	  must	  also	  be	  properly	  understood.	   	  We	  have	  seen	   in	  chapter	  3	  that	   according	   to	   her,	   the	   interplay	   between	   levels	   of	   social	   hierarchy	   and	   of	  economic	  independence	  enjoyed	  by	  rural	  elites	  yields	  four	  possible	  outcomes	  –	  power-­‐sharing,	  usurpation,	  non-­‐incorporation	  and	  administrative	  occupation.110	  	  	  These	  observations	  suggest	  that	  no	  matter	  how	  states	  function	  and	  how	  efficient	  they	  are,	  everything	  depends	  on	  what	  kind	  of	   regional	   relationships	  have	  been	  forged.	  	  Most	  theories	  of	  civil	  war	  have	  not	  considered	  this	  factor.	  	  One	  of	  the	  few	  arguments	   that	   succinctly	   shows	   the	   regional	   dynamics	   that	   occur	   during	  resource-­‐led	  wars	   is	  put	  forward	  by	  Silberfein.	   	  Taking	  the	  Sierra	  Leonean	  civil	  war	  as	  a	  case	  study,	  she	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  the	  “series	  of	  nested	  relationships”	  in	  the	  Mano	  River	  Union	  (MRU)111	  that	  has	  led	  to	  the	  “endemic	  warfare	  that	  has	  come	  to	  prevail	  in	  the	  area.”112	  	  Silberfein	  showed	  that	  within	  Sierra	  Leone,	  there	  was	  a	  “geopolitical	   logic”	   that	   emerged	   when	   marginalised	   groups	   and	   diamond	  diggers	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  set	  up	  an	  illegal	  trade	  between	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Liberia’s	  porous	   border.	   	   These	   groups	   expressed	   anti-­‐government	   sentiments	   and	  preferred	  dealing	  with	  the	  RUF.	   	  The	  latter,	  led	  by	  Liberia’s	  Charles	  Taylor,	  saw	  this	  as	  an	  opportunity	   to	   invade	  a	  region	  to	  which	   it	  had	  a	   long	  standing	  claim	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resulting	   in	   the	   massacre	   that	   we	   witnessed	   in	   the	   1990s.113	   	   To	   this	  understanding	  of	  how	  regional	  factors	  affect	  resource-­‐related	  conflicts	  in	  Africa,	  I	  would	   like	  to	  add	  a	  consideration	  of	  how	  power	  in	  rural	  areas	  competes	  with	  (or,	  interestingly,	  sometimes	  reinforces)	  power	  at	  the	  center.	  Most	  importantly,	  I	  will	   try	   to	   show	   how	   inter-­‐regional	   factors	   shape	   this	   struggle.	   	   As	   Boone	  remarked,	  “there	  are	  significant	  regional	  (sub	  national)	  variations	  in	  the	  political	  capacities	   and	   interests	   of	   rural	   societies	   and	   rural	   notables,	   and	  much	   of	   the	  variation	   we	   observe	   in	   regimes’	   strategies	   in	   governing	   the	   countryside	   is	  attributable	  to	  this	  fact.”114	  	  This	   chapter	   will	   thus	   enlarge	   our	   understanding	   of	   civil	   wars	   in	  resource-­‐rich	   countries	   by	   shining	   new	   light	   on	   recent	   developments	   in	  diamond-­‐rich	  countries.	   	  I	  will	  consider	  three	  case	  studies	  that	  review	  the	  DRC,	  Zimbabwe	   and	   Ivory	   Coast.	   	   According	   to	   the	   WDC,	   they	   are	   the	   three	   most	  problematic	   regions	   regarding	   the	   issue	   of	   conflict	   diamonds.	   	   Despite	   the	  Kimberley	   Process’	   attempts	   at	   reducing	   the	   illegal	   trade	   of	   diamonds,	   these	  countries	  are	  still	  the	  top	  three	  on	  the	  list.	  	  Yet,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  the	  reasons	  why	  conflicts	  occur	  are	  different	  in	  each	  case.	  	  
Internal	  Causes	  of	  Civil	  Wars	  in	  Resource-­‐Rich	  Countries	  Chapter	   3	   showed	   that	   the	   received	   view	   of	   civil	   war	   and	   the	   resource	   curse	  asserts	  that	  diamond-­‐rich	  states	  that	  experience	  a	  collapse	  of	  politico-­‐economic	  institutions	  face	  a	  fiscal	  crisis	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  war.	  	  However,	  many	  authors	  are	  critical	  of	  this	  view.	  	  Thies	  believes	  that	  state	  capacity	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  onset	  of	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civil	  war	   but	   rather	   it	   is	   that	   onset	   of	   civil	  war	   that	   significantly	   reduces	   state	  capacity.	   	  Additionally,	  he	  is	  convinced	  that	  primary	  commodities	  do	  not	  play	  a	  direct	  role	  in	  the	  onset	  of	  civil	  war	  onset	  but	  instead	  have	  direct	  effect	  on	  state	  capacity.115	  	  This	  idea	  was	  first	  brought	  forward	  by	  Morrison	  who	  suggested	  that	  natural	   resource	   rents	   have	   stabilising	   effects	   on	   all	   regime	   types.116	   	   He	  demonstrates	   that	   autocratic	   rulers	   use	   non-­‐tax	   revenues	   to	   increase	   social	  spending	  that	  benefits	  the	  lower	  class,	  which	  is	  usually	  the	  group	  that	  poses	  the	  largest	  challenge	  and	  is	  paradoxically	  the	  easiest	  to	  pacify.	  	  	  However,	   when	   state	   institutions	   weaken,	   autocratic	   leaders	   lose	   these	  social	   spending	   abilities	   and	   their	   rules	   are	   challenged.	   	   Although	   this	   is	   not	   a	  complete	   explanatory	   framework	   for	   civil	   war,	   weak	   state	   institutions	   are	   a	  factor	   that	   is	  worth	   considering.	   	   If	  we	   examine	   the	   situation	   in	   countries	   like	  Zimbabwe,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   institutional	   decay	   has	   forced	   Robert	   Mugabe’s	  government	   to	   use	   repression	   to	   remain	   in	   power	   but	  we	   need	   to	   understand	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case	  and	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  DRC	  and	  Ivory	  Coast.	  	  I	   believe	   we	   should	   focus	   on	   other	   types	   of	   relationships,	   notably	   that	  between	  rebels	  and	  authoritarian	  rulers.117	  	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  see	  what	  type	  of	   relations	   exist	   between	   the	   elites	   present	   in	   society.	   	   Despite	   a	   plethora	   of	  mechanisms	   linking	   natural	   resources	   to	   civil	  war	   onset	   via	   rebel	   incentives,	   I	  suggest	  that	  we	  need	  to	  consider	  what	  type	  of	  coalitions	  are	  formed	  within	  these	  diamond-­‐rich	   societies.	   	   Second,	   we	   must	   review	   exactly	   what	   a	   strong	   state	  exactly	   means.	   	   Snyder	   et	   al.	   explain	   that	   a	   weak	   state	   cannot	   set	   up	   proper	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institutions	  that	  can	  channel	  funds	  from	  diamonds	  to	  buttress	   its	  tax	  capacities	  and	  in	  their	  opinion	  a	  strong	  state	  can	  carry	  out	  such	  activities.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  other	  factors	  that	  also	  need	  highlighting.	  	  	  The	  overall	   aim	  of	   this	   chapter	  will	   be	   to	   show	   that	   the	   internal	   factors	  advocated	  by	  different	  analysts	  of	  civil	  war	  are	  insufficient	  and	  that	  we	  also	  need	  to	  consider	  transnational	  factors.	   	  These	  can	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  resources	  raises	  the	  risk	  of	  civil	  war	  independently	  of	  state	  capacity.	  	  	  
The	  Causes	  of	  Conflict	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  Ivory	  Coast	  and	  
Zimbabwe	  
	  
The	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  The	  DRC’s	   post-­‐independence	   history	   has	   been	   one	   of	   civil	  war	   ever	   since	   the	  mineral-­‐rich	  province	  of	  Katanga	  made	  an	  attempt	  at	  secession	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  rebel	  forces	  first	  gained	  control	  of	  some	  of	  the	  diamond	  mining	  areas,	  selling	  the	  rough	  stones	   illegally	   to	   finance	   insurgent	  activities.	   	  This	  ended	  when	  Mobutu	  came	  in	  power	  as	  he	  heavily	  repressed	  secessionists	  activities	  and	  had	  a	  highly	  centralised	   system	  of	   governance.	   	  More	   than	   forty	   years	   after	  Mobutu	   gained	  power,	  the	  conflict	  in	  DRC	  is	  far	  from	  over.	  	  To	  gain	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  Congolese	   ongoing	   conflict	   and	   the	   government’s	   institutional	   capacity,	   I	  consider	   the	   events	   that	   have	   occurred	   there	   since	   the	   Lusaka	   peace	   accord	  signed	   in	   1999	   and	   the	   main	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	   geostrategic	   space	   of	   the	  DRC.118	  	   There	   are	   six	   main	   actors	   in	   the	   DRC’s	   conflict.	   	   The	   main	   one	   is	   the	  Congolese	   Armed	   Forces	   (FARDC)	   that	   was	   created	   in	   2003	   after	   some	   rebel	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1072684.stm	  accessed	  November	  23,	  2010.	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groups	  decided	   to	   integrate	  within	   the	  Congolese	  Army	  after	   the	  Lusaka	  Peace	  Process.	   	   The	   latest	   integration	   occurred	   in	   2009,	   swelling	   the	   ranks	   of	   the	  FARDC	  to	  approximately	  120,000	  soldiers.	  	  The	  other	  major	  party	  is	  a	  Rwandan-­‐backed	  rebel	  group,	  the	  National	  Congress	  for	  the	  Defense	  of	  the	  People	  (CNDP),	  which	   recently	   joined	   the	   FARDC	   but	   remains	   a	   strong	   outside	   party	  representing	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Tutsis	  living	  in	  the	  DRC.	  	  The	  Democratic	  Forces	  for	   the	   Liberation	   of	   Rwanda	   (FDLR)	   is	   the	   third	  most	   important	   group.	   	   The	  FDLR	   is	   a	   Rwandan	   Hutu	   militia	   in	   Eastern	   Congo	   and	   some	   of	   its	   leaders	  participated	   in	   the	  Rwandan	  genocide	  of	  1994.	   	  The	  group’s	  main	  agenda	   is	   to	  overthrow	  the	  current	  Tutsi	  government	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  has	  taken	  hold	  of	  some	  mines	   in	   the	  North	  and	  South	  Kivu.	   	  To	   increase	   the	  stability	   in	   the	  region,	   the	  FARDC	  and	   the	  Rwandan	  government	  have	  been	   trying	   to	  put	   the	  FDLR	  out	  of	  commission	  but	  the	  attempts	  have	  been	  futile	  as	  the	  FDLR	  is	  very	  well	  organised.	  	   There	  are	  three	  more	  minor	  groups.	  	  The	  Mai	  Mai	  militia	  which	  integrated	  the	   FARDC,	   the	   Coalition	   of	   Congolese	   Patriotic	   Resistance	   (PARECO)	   and	   the	  Patriotic	   Alliance	   for	   a	   Free	   and	   Sovereign	   Congo	   (APCLS)	   are	   a	   mixture	   of	  ethnic-­‐based	  militia	  groups	  that	  have	  their	  own	  issues.	  	  The	  APCLS	  is	  allied	  with	  the	   FDLR	   and	  would	   like	   to	   see	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   CNDP.	   	   The	   APCLS	   consists	  mainly	  of	  the	  Hunde	  ethnic	  group	  who	  are	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  Hutus	  in	  the	  DRC.	  	  The	  APCLS	  is	  allied	  to	  the	  larger	  PARECO	  militia	  which	  is	  made	  up	  of	  Hunde,	   Congolese	   Hutu	   and	  Nande	   ethnic	   groups.	   	   PARECO	   has	   been	  working	  closely	  with	  the	  FDLR	  and	  have	  been	  battling	  the	  CNDP.	  	  These	  skirmishes	  in	  the	  DRC	  have	  been	  regular	  and	  have	  threatened	  the	  peace	  between	  Rwanda	  and	  the	  DRC	  at	   various	   times.	   	  The	  main	   issue	   that	   is	   relevant	  here	   is	   that	  most	  of	   the	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rebels	   have	   been	   able	   to	   re-­‐arm	   and	   sustain	   their	   war	   efforts	   by	   controlling	  mines	  –	  including	  diamonds	  mines.	  The	  presence	  of	  so	  many	  different	  shows	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  DRC	  is	  a	  hotchpotch	   of	   ethnic	   groups	   with	   different	   agendas.	   	   The	   challenge	   for	   the	  government	  is	  to	  integrate	  all	  these	  groups	  in	  its	  politico-­‐economic	  schemes.	  	  It	  is	   important	  to	  note,	  given	  the	  received	  view	  of	  civil	  war	  noted	  above,	  that	  it	   is	  very	  difficult	  in	  such	  circumstances	  to	  say	  what	  the	  revenue	  collection	  ability	  of	  the	  government	  actually	  is,	  as	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  not	  all	  mineral	  mines	  are	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  state,	  some	  fall	  under	  the	  control	  of	  rebels,	  and	  the	  different	  rebel	  groups	  have	  an	  agenda	  that	  does	  not	  necessarily	   involve	  taking	  over	  control	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Congo,	  but	  rather	  secession	  from	  the	  DRC	  or	  taking	  over	  states	  in	  neighbouring	  countries.	  	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  FDLR	  is	  launching	  attacks	  from	  the	  Congo	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Rwandan	  government	  in	  an	  ethnic	  conflict	  that	  has	  not	  been	  totally	  resolved	  yet.	   	   The	   simple	   model	   of	   a	   centralised	   state	   more	   or	   less	   able	   to	   extract	  resources	   is	   incapable	   of	   capturing	   the	   complex	   dynamics	   of	   this	   situation.	  	  Instead,	   trying	   to	   understand	   what	   type	   of	   relationship	   occurs	   between	   the	  government	   and	   these	   different	   groups	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   help	   us	   comprehend	  what	  is	  really	  going	  on.	  	   After	   suffering	   periods	   of	   conflict	   punctuated	   by	   repeated	   signings	   of	  short-­‐lived	  peace	  accords	  signed	  the	  government	  and	  rebel	  groups,	  the	  DRC	  still	  faces	   many	   unresolved	   issues.	   	   Since	   Joseph	   Kabila	   won	   the	   presidential	  elections	   in	   2006,	   there	   have	   been	   major	   clashes	   with	   opposition	   leader	   Jean	  Pierre	  Bemba	  and	  with	  the	  ex-­‐general	  of	  the	  DRC	  army	  General	  Laurent	  Nkunda.	  	  The	  latter	  controlled	  major	  parts	  of	  the	  North	  Kivu	  province	  and	  many	  mineral	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mines,	   including	   diamond	  mines,	   were	   under	   his	   group’s	   control.	   	   Even	   since	  both	  were	  arrested,	  rebels	  have	  remained	  active	  in	  the	  North	  Kivu	  province	  and	  other	   parts	   of	   the	   region.	   	   The	  most	   recent	   conflicts	   displacing	   90,000	   people	  occurred	  in	  June	  and	  August	  2010.	  	   In	   the	   North	   Kivu	   province,	   the	   main	   battleground	   is	   in	   Masisi	   where	  there	  are	  major	  herds	  of	  cows	  and	  some	  mineral	  deposits.	  	  The	  main	  opposition	  comes	  from	  former	  Mai-­‐Mai	  warriors	  led	  by	  General	  Janvier	  Buingo	  Karairi	  who	  believe	  that	  Kabila	  has	  deliberately	  ceded	  control	  of	  the	  Kivu	  area	  to	  Rwanda	  and	  the	  Tutsi	   army,	   the	  CNDP.	   	  The	   situation	   there	  has	  been	  escalating	   throughout	  2010	  and	  is	  under	  close	  watch	  by	  the	  UN.119	  	  The	  rebels	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  sustain	  their	  war	  efforts	  against	  the	  government	  simply	  because	  they	  have	  access	  to	  the	  minerals	  in	  the	  region	  and	  diamonds	  are	  a	  major	  part	  of	  that.	  	  	  Despite	  these	  conflicts,	  diamond	  production	  from	  the	  DRC	  continues.	  	  The	  last	   reliable	   figures	   estimate	   that	   19.7	   Million	   Carat	   (Mct)	   were	   produced	   in	  2001.	  	  So	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  assume	  the	  DRC	  remains	  of	  Africa's	  largest	  producers	  of	  diamonds	  after	  Botswana.	  Artisanal	  production	  contributes	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  DRC's	  output	  and	  usually	   the	  ability	   to	  conduct	  artisanal	  production	  allows	  rebels	   to	   sustain	   their	   war	   efforts	   because	   that	   part	   of	   the	   industry	   is	   highly	  labour	  intensive.120	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  Report,	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  Artisanal	  mining	  of	  diamond	  deposits	  in	  the	  DRC	  takes	  place	  along	  the	  Bushimaïe	  and	  Lubilash	  tributaries	  to	  the	  Sankuru	  River	  (Bakwanga	  Mine)	  near	  the	  town	  of	  Mbuji-­‐Maye	  (formerly	  Bakwanga)	  in	  the	  Kasaï-­‐Oriental	  province	  of	  southern-­‐central	  DRC,	  and	  along	  the	  Tshikapa	  River	  (Forminière	  Diamond	  Mine)	  in	  the	  Kasaï-­‐Occidental	  province.	  After	  a	  wave	  of	  Luba	  tribesmen	  flooded	  into	  the	  Kasaï	  province	  for	  mining	  work,	  the	  region	  seceded	  from	  the	  Congo,	  becoming	  the	  independent	  'Mining	  State	  of	  South	  Kasaï,'	  between	  1960	  and	  1962.	  Although	  the	  DRC	  is	  Africa's	  largest	  diamond	  producer,	  production	  details	  remain	  sketchy.	  Most	  of	  the	  DRC's	  production	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  informal	  sector.	  	  See	  http://www.allaboutgemstones.com/conflict-­‐diamonds_congo_droc.html	  for	  more	  details.	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   This	   artisanal	   production	   cripples	   government’s	   ability	   to	   control	   the	  resources	  in	  the	  area	  or	  to	  use	  the	  funds	  to	  buttress	  its	  institutional	  and	  political	  capacity.	   	  Additionally,	  as	  discussed	  earlier	  usurpation	   takes	  place	  as	  elites	  are	  able	   to	   extract	   resources	   without	   state	   mediation	   because	   the	   state	   does	   not	  have	   the	   ability	   to	   control	   them	   but	  most	   importantly,	   because	   they	   have	   the	  legitimacy	   to	  do	   so	   in	   their	  own	  ethnic	   groups.	   	  Given	   the	  nature	  of	  Congolese	  society,	   it	   is	   highly	   unlikely	   that	   the	   government	   will	   be	   able	   to	   find	   a	   quick	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  conflict	  minerals.	  	  	  It	   is	  estimated	   that	   roughly	  a	   third	  of	   the	  DRC's	  production	   is	   smuggled	  out	   of	   the	   country	   every	   year.	   Canadian	   Wye	   Resources	   have	   some	   alluvial	  diamond	  concessions	  in	  the	  Kasai	  Occidental	  Province.	  The	  country	  currently	  has	  700	   000	   artisanal	   diamond	   miners	   and	   the	   exact	   ethnicity	   and	   political	  affiliations	   of	   these	   artisans	   are	   hard	   to	   estimate.	   	   No	   reliable	   data	   has	   been	  gathered	  on	  them	  due	  to	  the	  risks.121	  The	   state	   has	   however	   managed	   to	   get	   some	   control	   of	   the	   Kimberlite	  diamonds	  in	  the	  DRC.	  	  These	  are	  controlled	  by	  the	  Miniere	  de	  Bakwange	  (MIBA),	  a	   joint	   venture	   between	   Belgian	   company	   Sibeka	   and	   the	   DRC	   government,	  which	  owns	  80%.	  De	  Beers	   holds	   a	   20%	  stake	   in	   Sibeka	   (Belgian	  Umicore	   the	  remaining	  80%),	  and	  markets	  about	  one	  third	  of	  the	  country's	  diamonds.122	  	  The	  company	  owns	   the	  only	   functioning	  mine	   in	   the	  country.	   	  But	  even	  here,	  MIBA	  has	   struggled	   to	   keep	   production	   levels	   constant	   due	   to	   problems	   in	   locating	  suitable	   buyers	   and	   markets.	   	   The	   company	   is	   also	   facing	   depleted	   alluvial	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  Tristan	  McConnell,	  “Cell	  Phone	  Minerals	  fuel	  Deadly	  Congo	  Conflict”,	  Global	  Post,	  January	  19,	  2010,	  accessed	  November	  12,	  2010,	  http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/kenya/100118/congo-­‐conflict-­‐minerals-­‐mining.	  122	  “Diamond	  Mining	  in	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  The	  Congo	  –	  Overview,”	  accessed	  March	  12,	  2010,	  http://www.mbendi.com/indy/ming/dmnd/af/zr/p0005.htm	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reserves	  and	  has	  lost	  some	  of	  these	  to	  rebels.	  	  Moreover	  there	  is	  limited	  funding	  to	   evaluate	   and	   exploit	   existing	   kimberlite	   resources.	   MIBA	   produced	  approximately	   9	  Mct	   in	   2000,	   although	   these	   figures	   are	   expected	   to	   fluctuate	  due	  political	  tension	  in	  the	  Kasai	  region.123	  The	   political	   map	   of	   the	   DRC	   in	   figure	   4.1	   shows	   that	   the	   country	   is	  divided	   in	   several	   big	   districts	   and	   the	   main	   problem	   areas	   have	   been	   in	   the	  North	  and	  South	  Kivu	  that	  are	  very	  close	  to	  Rwanda.	  	  These	  two	  areas	  and	  other	  in	   the	   Kasai	   province	   are	   where	   some	   of	   the	   diamond	   mines	   are	   and	   the	  government	   only	   controls	   part	   of	   them	   while	   the	   rebels	   have	   their	   hands	   on	  some	  mines	  too.	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  Ibid.	  
	  
Figure	  4.1:	  The	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  	  
	  
Source:	  UN	  Maps124	  
	   68	  
	  
Why	  is	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  DRC	  unchanged?	  If	  Snyder	  and	  Bhavnani	  were	  to	  analyse	  this	  case,	  they	  would	  simply	  claim	  that	  the	  government	   lacks	   the	  political	   capacity	   to	   tax	   the	  minerals	   sector	  properly	  and	   hence	   has	   lost	   the	   ability	   to	   control	   the	   producers	   and	   society	   itself.	  	  However,	  given	  the	  political	  history	  of	  the	  DRC	  just	  outlined,	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  the	  government’s	  inability	  to	  regulate	  the	  flow	  of	  conflict	  diamond	  in	  the	  DRC,	  than	  just	  the	  lack	  of	  political	  capacity	  to	  tax.	  	   One	   of	   the	   main	   reasons	   for	   the	   lack	   of	   any	   restructuring	   of	   MIBA	   to	  extend	   government	   control	   of	   the	  mines	   is	   explained	   by	   Fauvelle-­‐Aymar.	   	   She	  claims	  that	  governments	  that	  do	  not	  expect	  to	  stay	  long	  in	  power	  are	  unwilling	  to	  reform	   the	   tax	   system	   and	   by	   extension	   institutions	   that	   have	   powers	   of	  taxation.125	   	   Instead,	   they	   strategically	   choose	   to	   maintain	   ineffective	   systems	  because	  these	  act	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  their	  successors’	  ability	  to	  collect	  revenue.	  	  Her	  conclusion	  is	  that	  countries	  with	  higher	  chances	  of	  government	  change	  will	  have	  more	  inefficient	  tax	  systems	  and	  this	  is	  part	  of	  the	  story	  in	  the	  DRC.126	  	   Second,	  even	   if	  state	  enterprises	   like	  MIBA	  could	  be	  restructured	  by	   the	  government,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   diamond	   artisans	  would	   simply	   agree	   to	  work	   for	   the	   government.	   	   There	   is	   no	   incentive	   to	   do	   so	   because	   trading	  diamonds	  over	  the	  black	  market	  is	  more	  profitable.	  	  Hence	  it	  makes	  more	  sense	  for	   the	   artisans	   to	   avoid	   cooperation.	   	   In	   their	   eyes,	   the	   government	   does	   not	  have	   legitimacy	  and	  the	   less	  the	  government	   is	  regarded	  as	   legitimate,	  efficient	  and	  credible,	  the	  lower	  its	  political	  capacity	  to	  ensure	  compliance.	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  “The	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  Government	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  Developing	  Countries,”	  394.	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A	   legitimate	   government	   can	   count	   on	   willing	   compliance	   and	   the	  capacity	  of	  the	  government	  to	  provide	  taxpayers	  (in	  that	  case	  diamond	  artisans)	  with	  the	  benefits	  they	  expect	  in	  return	  for	  their	  tax	  payments	  and	  contributions	  to	  the	  government’s	  budget.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  DRC,	  the	  return	  would	  be	  political	  protection	  but	  given	  the	  high	  ethnic	  diversity	  of	  the	  country	  and	  the	  unresolved	  issues	  between	  the	  different	  groups,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  the	  government	  to	  find	  a	  coalition	  that	  is	  strong	  enough.127	   	  In	  addition,	  the	  people	  of	  the	  DRC	  themselves	  are	  not	  trying	  to	  change	  the	  situation.	   	  The	  high	  prices	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  conflict	  minerals	  “lure	  trained	  professionals	  such	  as	  teachers	  to	  the	  mines”	  and	  these	  valuable	  minds	  “are	  being	  wasted”	  making	  it	  harder	  for	  the	  government	  to	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  enforce	  a	  solution.128	  	  
Zimbabwe	  The	   most	   recent	   issue	   surrounding	   conflict	   diamonds	   came	   back	   with	   a	  vengeance	   after	   the	   2008	   elections.	   	   It	   was	   during	   that	   period	   that	   the	  Zimbabwean	   government,	   led	   by	   Robert	   Mugabe,	   was	   accused	   by	   the	   KP	   of	  trading	   diamonds	   of	   dubious	   origin.	   	   In	   order	   to	   examine	   why	   conflict	   and	  human	  rights	  violations	  are	  present	  in	  the	  country	  and	  how	  this	  has	  lead	  to	  the	  KP	   to	   impose	   bans	   on	   diamonds	   from	   Zimbabwe,	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   review	   the	  events	  of	  the	  past	  five	  years.	  Ever	   since	   targeting	   the	  opposition	  during	   the	  2001	  and	  2005	  elections	  and	  starting	  a	   land	  conflict	   that	  caused	  massive	   injustices	   in	  Zimbabwe,	  ZANU-­‐PF,	  which	  has	  been	  in	  power	  since	  Zimbabwe’s	  independence	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	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  “Guns,	  Sweat	  and	  Tears	  in	  North	  Kivu’s	  Tin	  Ore	  Mines”,	  The	  Africa	  Report	  (13)	  (October-­‐November	  2008),	  accessed	  November	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  2010,	  http://www.resourceglobal.co.uk/documents/TAR13_4.pdf.	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has	   used	   every	   trick	   in	   the	   book	   to	   remain	   in	   power.	   	   This	   included	  strengthening	  its	  military	   in	  preparation	  for	  the	  2005	  elections.	   	  The	  army	  was	  then	  used	  to	  deal	  out	  savage	  treatment	  of	  opposition	  members	  and	  the	  general	  population.	  	   On	   29	   March	   2008,	   Zimbabwe	   held	   combined	   presidential	   and	  parliamentary	   elections,	   but	   ZANU-­‐PF	   had	   already	   engaged	   in	   major	   pre-­‐poll	  manipulation.	   	  Morgan	  Tsvangirai,	   the	  opposition	   leader,	   had	  managed	   to	  hold	  large	   rallies	   and	   the	   results	   of	   the	   poll	   signaled	   that	   for	   the	   first	   time,	  Zimbabweans	   accepted	   the	   opposition’s	   case.	   	   Electoral	   officials	   finally	  announced	  results:	  Tsvangirai	  received	  47.9%	  against	  Mugabe’s	  43.2%	  and	  this	  warranted	   a	   run-­‐off	   that	   would	   create	   unprecedented	   suffering	   on	   the	   whole	  country.	   	   The	   ZANU-­‐PF	   launched	   countrywide	   campaign	   of	   violence	   and	  intimidation	  with	  over	  2,000	  detained	  and	  200,000	  displaced	  in	  June	  2008.	  The	   Presidential	   run-­‐off	   on	   27	   June	   2008	   was	   won	   by	   Mugabe	   after	  Tsvangirai	   was	   arrested	   5	   times	   during	   that	   month.	   	   Eventually,	   Mugabe	   and	  Tsvangirai	   agreed	   to	   hold	   talks	   that	   culminated	   with	   a	   power	   sharing	   deal	  [Global	  Political	  Agreement	  (GPA)]	  signed	  on	  15	  September	  2008,	  where	  Mugabe	  retained	   the	  position	  of	  President	  and	  Tsvangirai	  became	  Prime	  Minister;	  both	  were	  to	  lead	  cabinet	  bodies	  with	  the	  MDC	  receiving	  a	  slight	  majority.	  	  Yet	  power-­‐sharing	   in	   government	   remains	   strained,	   repression	   against	   Movement	   for	  Democratic	   Change	   (MDC)	   members	   continues,	   and	   Mugabe	   unilaterally	  appoints	  cabinet	  members	  and	  schedules	  meetings.	   	  MDC	  withdrew	  from	  unity	  government	  for	  3	  weeks	  in	  October	  2009	  over	  stalled	  implementation	  of	  GPA.	  	  	  All	   these	   political	   squabbles	   caused	   major	   problems,	   including	   food	  shortages	  and	  collapse	  of	  vital	  services.	  	  Annual	  inflation	  stood	  at	  over	  165,000%	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when	   the	   government	   temporarily	   suspended	   the	   Zimbabwean	   dollar	   and	  replaced	  it	  with	  foreign	  currency	  on	  12	  April	  2009,	   initially	   for	  one	  year.	   	  With	  mounting	  pressure	   from	  Western	  governments,	   the	  UN	  and	  other	  aid	  agencies,	  the	  Zimbabwean	   elite	   seemed	   to	  have	   come	  up	  with	   another	   solution	   to	   allow	  themselves	  to	  continue	  filling	  their	  pockets	  and	  avoiding	  an	  army	  rebellion:	  the	  diamond	   mines	   of	   Chiadzwa	   and	   Marange.	   	   These	   two	   mines	   have	   been	   the	  centre	   of	   most	   of	   the	   recent	   controversy	   in	   the	   diamonds	   industry	   as	   it	   is	  believed	  that	  the	  gems	  are	  being	  mined	  by	  forced	  labour	  workers	  who	  are	  forced	  to	  dig	  or	  die	  by	  security	  forces	  who	  are	  also	  involved	  in	  systematic	  smuggling.129	  	  Diamonds	  from	  these	  fields	  cannot	  be	  exported	  legally	  from	  Zimbabwe	  because	  they	  have	  not	  yet	  met	  the	  KP	  standard	  showing	  that	  proceeds	  from	  sales	  are	  not	  used	   to	   finance	   conflict	   and	  most	   importantly,	   KP	   inspectors	   are	   aware	   of	   the	  dreadful	  conditions	  through	  which	  the	  diamonds	  there	  are	  being	  mined.130	  This	   has	   introduced	   a	   new	   twist	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   conflict	   diamonds.	  	  According	   to	   Smillie,	  while	   the	  Kimberley	  Process	   is	   in	   the	  business	  of	   conflict	  prevention,	   it	  has	   failed	   to	  keep	  up	  with	   the	   times.	  Today,	   the	   trade	   in	   conflict	  diamonds	  is	  no	  longer	  run	  by	  rebel	  groups	  like	  UNITA,	  but	  is	  institutionalised	  by	  ‘legitimate’	   governments,	   as	   is	   the	   case	   in	   Zimbabwe.	   	   Hence	   the	   government	  brings	  a	   ‘legal’	   touch	  to	  trading	  the	  diamonds	  but	  the	  country	  at	   large	  does	  not	  benefit	  at	  all	  from	  the	  mines.	  	  The	  diamonds	  are	  smuggled	  over	  the	  Mozambican	  border,	  where	  they	  are	  traded	  on	  the	  black	  market.131	  	  The	  revenues	  then	  return	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  Daniel	  Howden,	  “Diamond	  auction	  brings	  Zimbabwe	  £1.2bn	  pay	  day”,	  The	  Independent,	  August	  12,	  2010,	  accessed	  November	  27,	  2010,	  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/diamond-­‐auction-­‐brings-­‐zimbabwe-­‐16312bn-­‐pay-­‐day-­‐2050135.html.	  130	  Latham	  and	  Katerere,	  “Smuggled-­‐Diamond	  Revenue	  Flows	  to	  Mugabe's	  Zimbabwe	  Before	  Vote.”	  131	  This	  is	  an	  issue	  that	  we	  will	  review	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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to	  the	  military	  who	  have	  been	  massacring	  miners	  and	  forcing	  villagers	  to	  work	  as	  slaves.132	  The	  human	  rights	  abuses	  which	  began	  in	  2008	  when	  the	  army	  took	  over	   the	   fields	   forcing	  out	   tens	  of	   thousands	  of	   small-­‐scale	  miners,	   here	   led	   to	  Zimbabwe's	  being	  suspended	  from	  the	  KP.133	  Since	  early	  2009,	  Zimbabwe	  has	  had	  a	  unity	  government.	  But	  real	  power	  lies	  with	  Mugabe	   and	   the	   security	   chiefs	   in	   control	   of	   the	   armed	   forces,	   police	  and	   intelligence	   services.	   The	   rest	   of	   the	   government	   is	   powerless	   to	   stop	   this	  inner	  circle.	  A	  parliamentary	  committee	  looking	  into	  operations	  in	  Marange	  was	  snubbed	  for	  months.	  	  “The	  government	  has	  not	  received	  a	  cent	  from	  the	  biggest	  find	   of	   alluvial	   diamonds	   in	   the	   history	   of	   mankind,”	   Tendai	   Biti,	   the	   finance	  minister,	  has	  complained.134	   	  The	  government	  also	  reshuffled	  those	  who	  would	  have	  prospecting	  rights	  on	  the	  mines	  in	  Marange	  and	  Chiadzwa.	  	  After	  De	  Beers	  released	   its	   exclusive	   prospective	   order	   in	   March	   2006,	   Africa	   Consolidated	  Resources	   (ACR)	   took	  over	  but	   its	   rights	  were	   revoked	  and	   it	  was	   replaced	  by	  the	   state-­‐owned	   Zimbabwe	   Mining	   Development	   Corporation	   (ZMDC)	   whose	  board	  of	  directors	   is	  compliant	  with	  ZANU-­‐PF	  policies.	   	   It	   includes	  members	  of	  the	   “ex-­‐Zimbabwean	   military	   and	   dodgy	   dealers	   from	   the	   Congo	   and	   Sierra	  Leone,	  as	  well	  as	  former	  mercenaries.”135	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  'blood'	  trade	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  December	  2,	  2010,	  accessed	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  2,	  2010	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  “Diamond	  auction	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  accessed	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  the	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  in	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  the	  re-­‐shuffling	  of	  mining	  rights	  to	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  agents	  who	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  the	  Zanu-­‐PF.	  	  See	  Dianna	  Games,	  “How	  Clean	  are	  Zim’s	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  African	  9,	  2010,	  36-­‐37.	  	  Matters	  have	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  even	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  as	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  Governor	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  Gono	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  2007	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  smuggling	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  135	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What	  are	  the	  causes	  of	  blood	  diamonds	  in	  Zimbabwe?	  First,	   compared	   to	   the	   DRC,	   the	   Zimbabwean	   government	   has	   control	   of	   the	  mines	  around	  the	  country.	  	  No	  rebels	  or	  opposition	  groups	  have	  been	  able	  to	  use	  the	   mines	   to	   fight	   against	   the	   government.	   	   However,	   the	   issue	   of	   conflict	  diamonds	  remains	  present	  and	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  government,	   in	  particular	  the	  army	  have	   a	   vested	   interest	   to	   extract	   resources	   to	   preserve	   a	   status	   quo	   that	  will	   prevent	   opposition	   from	   toppling	   the	   dictatorship.136	   	   This	   situation	   was	  developed	  by	  Tsebelis	  in	  more	  theoretical	  terms.	  	  Each	  of	  the	  different	  actors	  in	  the	  Zimbabwean	  politics	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  veto	  player.	  	  A	  veto	  player	  is	  anyone	  whose	   assent	   is	   necessary	   for	   a	   change	   in	   the	   status	   quo.137	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	  Zimbabwe,	  Mugabe	  and	  his	  cronies	  have	  been	  using	  the	  resources	  in	  the	  country	  as	  their	  own	  and	  even	  though	  the	  diamonds	  could	  easily	  help	  the	  economy,	  it	  is	  better	  from	  their	  narrow	  self-­‐interested	  point	  of	  view	  to	  keep	  a	  status	  quo	  that	  will	  keep	  the	  government	  intact.	  	  This	  is	  exactly	  Tsebelis’	  conclusion	  he	  claimed	  that	   the	  agenda	  setter	  can	  preserve	  an	  outcome	  near	   the	  center	  better	   than	  he	  can	  make	   radical	   changes.138	   	   Human	  Rights	  Watch	   (HRW),	   Partnership	   Africa	  Canada	  and	  the	  MDC	  recently	  reported	  that	   the	  gems	  from	  Zimbabwe’s	  biggest	  diamond	   field	   in	   the	  Marange	   region	  are	   enriching	   the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  ahead	  of	  next	  year’s	  vote.139	  	  	  	  	   Second,	   the	   desire	   for	   governments	   to	   jeopardise	   their	   countries’	  developmental	  prospects	   is	  a	  result	  of	  political	   insecurity.	   	  Governments	   facing	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  Governments:	  Taxation	  in	  Democracies	  and	  Dictatorships”,	  World	  Politics	  50(3)	  (April	  1998):	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  George	  Tsebelis,	  Veto	  Players.	  138	  Ibid.	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impending	  threats	  to	  their	  rule	  often	  have	  “shorter	  time	  horizons	  and	  are	  more	  preoccupied	  with	  placating	  the	  specific	  groups	  most	  pivotal	  to	  their	  survival.”140	  	  Hence	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  prioritise	  short-­‐term	  interests	  and	  play	  dangerous	  ethnic	   and	   topographical	   games	   that	   will	   disrupt	   the	   normal	   functioning	   of	  society.	   	   Such	   tendencies	   can	   lead	   to	   myopically	   self-­‐interested	   political	  interventions	  with	  economically	  damaging	  consequences.141	   	  This	  explains	  why	  in	  Zimbabwe,	  the	  government	  started	  to	  use	  land	  reforms	  by	  targeting	  the	  white	  farmers	   in	   the	   early	   2000s	   to	   unite	   the	   people	   in	   a	   disastrous	   campaign	   that	  displaced	  many	  landowners	  who	  had	  been	  in	  the	  country	  for	  decades.	  	  It	  is	  also	  why	  the	  mines	  in	  Marange	  and	  Chiadzwa	  are	  now	  used	  by	  the	  government	  and	  the	  military	   to	   prevent	   societal	   groups	   from	   using	   these	  mines	   as	   a	   source	   of	  income	  to	  challenge	  the	  government.	  An	  equilibrium	  within	  a	  consensually-­‐strong	  state	  emerges	  when	  both	  the	  ruler	  and	  the	  citizens	  deviate	  from	  their	  myopic	  “best”	  responses.	  	  This	  requires	  an	   environment	   in	  which	   there	   is	   trust	   in	   politicians	   and	   in	   the	   functioning	   of	  political	   replacement	   mechanisms,	   and	   sufficient	   patience	   on	   the	   side	   of	   both	  parties.	   	  The	  equilibrium	  within	   the	  consensually-­‐strong	  state	   is	  quite	  different	  in	  nature	  than	  equilibria	  within	  either	  weak	  or	  authoritarian	  states,	  and	  leads	  to	  richer	  comparative	  static	  results.	  	  In	  particular,	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  political	  power	  of	   the	   state	   increases	   investment	   in	   public	   goods.142	   	   Hence,	   if	   this	   element	   of	  trust	  is	  not	  present,	  the	  use	  of	  diamonds	  for	  illicit	  reasons	  will	  be	  common	  in	  the	  country.	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Journal	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  (June	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Finally,	   as	   the	   government	   has	   no	   fixed	   institutional	   capacity	   to	   control	  the	   various	   mines	   around	   Zimbabwe,	   which	   seem	   to	   be	   controlled	   by	   many	  private	   individuals	   in	   the	   political	   elite,	   a	   political	   problem	   ressembling	   the	  Sierra	   Leonean	   civil	   war	   that	   was	   reviewed	   earlier	   seems	   a	   possible	   or	   even	  likely	  outcome.	  	  The	  eight-­‐member	  Joint	  Operational	  Command	  (JOC)	  of	  military	  and	   police	   leaders	   earns	   revenues	   from	   the	   mines	   through	   the	   control	   of	  companies.	  	  The	  different	  parties	  involved	  in	  Zimbabwe’s	  politics	  are	  gearing	  up	  for	   the	   future	   –	   the	   lower-­‐ranked	   army	   and	   police	   could	   participate	   in	   a	   coup	  against	  the	  constitutional	  order	  when	  Mugabe,	  86,	  dies	  or	  steps	  down.143	   	   	  This	  would	  require	  much	  political	  support	  and	  would	  most	  definitely	  cost	  money.	  	  	  	  
Ivory	  Coast	  Ivory	  Coast	  used	  to	  be	  conspicuous	  for	  its	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  harmony	  and	  its	  well-­‐developed	  economy.	  	  This	  all	  ended	  when	  Henri	  Bedie	  was	  ousted	  by	  a	  coup	  in	   1999.	   	   The	   latter	   fled	   but	   in	   the	   process,	   he	   stirred	   up	   xenophobia	   against	  Muslim	  northerners,	   including	  his	  main	   rival,	  Alassane	  Ouattara.	   	   In	  2002,	   this	  culminated	  to	  a	  rebellion	  that	  voiced	  the	  ongoing	  discontent	  of	  northern	  Muslims	  who	   felt	   they	   discriminated	   against	   in	   Ivorian	   politics.	   	   The	   mutiny	   was	  conducted	  by	  forces	  loyal	  to	  Ouattara,	  calling	  themselves	  Forces	  Nouvelles	  (FN).	  	  The	   conflict	   was	   officially	   declared	   over	   in	   April	   2007	   when	   Guillaume	   Soro,	  leader	  of	  the	  FN	  was	  declared	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  signed	  a	  peace	  agreement	  with	  Gbagbo	  in	  Burkina	  Faso.	  	  Nonetheless,	  Ivory	  Coast	  is	  still	  tense	  and	  divided;	  the	  North	  is	  still	  held	  by	  rebels	  and	  the	  South	  is	  mainly	  government-­‐controlled.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  143	  “Diamonds	  sharpen	  Zimbabwe	  Power	  Struggle,”	  The	  Daily	  Telegraph,	  September	  20,	  2010,	  accessed	  September	  20,	  2010,	  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/8012481/Diamonds-­‐sharpen-­‐Zimbabwe-­‐power-­‐struggle.html.	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Where	  does	   that	   lead	  us	  concerning	   the	  mining	  of	  diamonds?	  The	   Ivory	  Coast	  began	  to	  develop	  a	  fledgling	  diamond	  mining	  industry	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  	  After	  the	  coup	  in	  1999,	  the	  country	  became	  a	  route	  for	  exporting	  diamonds	  from	  Liberia	  and	  war-­‐torn	  Sierra	  Leone.	  	  Foreign	  investment	  began	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	   Ivory	   Coast.	   	   To	   curtail	   the	   illegal	   trade,	   the	   nation	   stopped	   all	   diamond	  mining,	  and	  the	  UN	  Security	  Council	  banned	  all	  exports	  of	  diamonds	  from	  Ivory	  Coast	   in	   December	   2005.	   	   However,	   despite	   UN	   sanctions	   the	   illicit	   diamond	  trade	  still	  exists	  in	  Ivory	  Coast.	  	  Rough	  diamonds	  are	  exported	  out	  of	  the	  country	  to	   neighbouring	   states	   and	   international	   trading	   centres	   through	   the	   Forces	  Nouvelles	  controlled	  section	  of	  the	  country.	   	  This	  group	  is	  reported	  to	  be	  using	  these	  funds	  to	  re-­‐arm	  and	  prepare	  for	  eventual	  raids	  against	  it.	  	   Michel	  Yoboue,	  head	  of	  the	  Abidjan-­‐based	  Extractive	  Industries	  Advocacy	  Research	  Group	  (GRPIE),	  which	  works	   for	  greater	   transparency	   in	  mining,	  said	  thousands	   of	   miners	   continued	   to	   dig	   for	   stones,	   which	   they	   often	   sold	   on	   to	  smugglers	  for	  a	  fraction	  of	  the	  market	  price.	   	  “The	  embargo	  is	  not	  stopping	  the	  extraction	   and	  when	   they	  mine	   and	   there	   is	   no	   buying	   centre,	   the	  miners	   are	  forced	  to	  sell	  through	  illegal	  smugglers,”144	  he	  added,	  saying	  most	  of	  the	  stones	  were	  exported	  through	  neighbouring	  Ghana,	  Guinea	  and	  Mali.145	  	  The	  U.N.	  panel	  of	  experts	  monitoring	  the	  embargo	  on	  Ivory	  Coast	  has	  also	  said	  that	  the	  trade	  in	  diamonds	  is	  flourishing	  and	  that	  access	  to	  the	  stones,	  which	  could	  be	  used	  to	  buy	  arms,	  was	  as	  important	  as	  ever	  for	  armed	  groups.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Loucoumane	  Coulibaly,	  “Ivory	  Coast	  Group	  wants	  U.N.	  Flexibility	  on	  Diamond	  Ban,”	  Reuters,	  September	  21,	  2010,	  accessed	  November	  23,	  2010,	  http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE68K1IU20100921.	  145	  Celeste	  Hicks,	  “Mali’s	  Diamond-­‐Smuggling	  Centre,”	  BBC	  News,	  October	  31,	  2007,	  accessed	  November	  22,	  2010,	  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7071286.stm.	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   As	  noted	  in	  figure	  4.2,	  the	  country	  is	  clearly	  divided	  between	  New	  Forces	  controlled	   areas	   in	   the	   north	   and	   Gbagbo’s	   regime	   in	   the	   south.	   	   The	   latter	  refusing	   to	   cede	   the	   reins	  of	  power	  after	   losing	   the	   recent	   elections	  will	   prove	  troubling	   for	   peace	   in	   the	   region	   and	   might	   turn	   the	   country	   into	   a	   highly	  unstable	  smuggling	  ground.	  	  This	  
	  
Why	  are	  there	  still	  conflict	  diamonds	  in	  Ivory	  Coast?	  The	   information	   on	   Ivory	   Coast	   is	   really	   sparse	   and	   it	   is	   rare	   to	   find	   any	  information	   concerning	   the	   amount	   of	   diamonds	   that	   have	  been	   traded	  by	   the	  country	  because	  most	  of	  it	  occurs	  on	  the	  black	  market.	   	  However,	  given	  the	  UN	  embargo	   on	   diamond	   trading	   and	   the	   KP	   listing	   the	   Ivory	   Coast	   as	   a	   country	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  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1043014.stm	  (accessed	  November	  24,	  2010).	  
	  
Figure	  4.2:	  Ivory	  Coast	  
	  
	  	   Source:	  BBC	  Ivory	  Coast	  Country	  Profile146	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where	   conflict	   diamonds	   are	   present,	   it	   seems	   undeniable	   that	   the	   problem	   is	  still	  present	  there.	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  conflict	  diamonds	  to	  still	  be	  present	  in	  the	  country	  is	  very	  simple:	  given	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  country	  into	  two	  main	  parts	  with	  most	  of	  the	  diamond	  mines	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  New	  Forces	  in	  the	  North	  of	  the	  country,	  it	  is	   clear	   that	   the	   rebels	   –	   now	   considered	   ex-­‐rebels	   –	   are	   using	   diamonds	   to	  finance	  their	  future	  operations	  against	  the	  government.	  	  After	  the	  recent	  election	  and	  the	  informal	  declaration	  of	  Ouattara’s	  victory	  which	  was	  then	  overturned	  by	  the	   electoral	   commission	   supported	   by	   Gbagbo’s	   men	   in	   a	   tour	   de	   force	   that	  reminds	   us	   of	   Mugabe’s	   dirty	   tricks,	   it	   seems	   that	   the	   world’s	   largest	   cocoa	  producer	  has	  to	  brace	  itself	  for	  conflict.147	  	  	  The	  diamonds	  have	  given	  economic	  independence	  to	  the	  New	  Forces	  so	  that	  they	  are	  able	  to	  maintain	  the	  North	  in	  their	  possession.148	  	  Among	  these	  is	  Seguela,	  an	  important	  mining	  town	  in	  Ivory	  Coast.	  	  This	  prolongs	  the	  instability	  in	  the	  region.	  Should	   Ivory	  Coast	  be	  considered	  a	  weak	  or	  a	  strong	  state?	   If	  we	   follow	  Snyder	   and	   Bhavnani’s	   definition	   of	   political	   capacity,	   we	   must	   consider	   it	   as	  weak.	  	  The	  government	  has	  no	  capacity	  to	  get	  revenue	  from	  the	  diamonds	  in	  the	  North,	  it	  cannot	  control	  the	  sales	  of	  diamonds	  by	  the	  rebels	  and	  it	  has	  no	  ability	  to	   create	   a	   sense	   of	   security	   in	   the	   country.	   	   If	   the	   state	   is	   excessively	   weak,	  meaning	   that	   it	   is	   unable	   to	   capture	   a	   sufficient	   fraction	   of	   the	   society’s	  resources,	  those	  controlling	  the	  state	  will	  have	  little	  incentive	  to	  undertake	  their	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  John	  James,	  “Thabo	  Mbeki	  to	  mediate	  in	  Ivory	  Coast	  President	  Crisis”,	  BBC	  News,	  December,	  5	  2010,	  accessed	  December	  5,	  2010,	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐africa-­‐11920739.	  148	  A	  report	  by	  Diamond	  Price	  Guide,	  an	  international	  diamond	  export	  institute	  reveals	  that	  the	  smuggling	  of	  Ivory	  Coast’s	  diamonds,	  alongside	  its	  Cocoa,	  have	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  helping	  the	  FN	  fight	  and	  topple	  Gbagbo’s	  government	  after	  the	  elections.	  This	  is	  actually	  why	  the	  UN	  has	  decided	  to	  lengthen	  the	  diamond	  ban	  on	  Ivory	  Coast	  to	  2012.	  	  See	  “Cote	  D’Ivoire	  Diamonds	  remain	  Conflict	  Diamonds,”	  Diamond	  Price	  Guide,	  May	  2,	  2011,	  accessed	  May	  2,	  2011.	  	  http://www.diamondpriceguide.com/news/nc43_Precious-­‐Metals/n89857_Cote-­‐DIvoire-­‐Diamonds-­‐Remain-­‐Conflict-­‐Diamonds.	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side	  of	  the	  investments,	  for	  example	  in	  public	  goods,	  in	  infrastructure	  or	  in	  law	  enforcement.	  	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  We	   have	   seen	   that	   the	   reasons	   why	   conflict	   diamonds	   are	   still	   a	   problem	   in	  Africa	  vary	  across	  cases.	   	  However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   there	  are	  other	  things	  that	  are	  missing	  in	  the	  whole	  thesis:	  First,	  we	  need	  to	  properly	  review	  the	  regional	  relationships	  that	  have	  been	  forged	  between	  these	  three	  countries	  and	  the	   ones	   around	   them.	   	   If	   these	   countries/rebel	   groups	  within	   these	   countries	  have	  been	  able	  to	  circumvent	  KP	  monitoring	  it	  is	  because	  they	  have	  been	  able	  to	  smuggle	   the	   stones	   out	   of	   the	   country.	   	   This	   requires	   an	   elaborate	   regional	  cooperation	  that	  we	  will	  try	  to	  consider	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	   Finally,	  we	  have	  yet	  to	  think	  about	  how	  the	  changing	  dynamics	  that	  have	  occurred	  on	  the	  consumer	  sides	  have	  affected	  the	  incidence	  of	  conflict.	  	  We	  have	  two	  large	  and	  hungry	  players	  in	  the	  diamonds	  industry,	  China	  and	  India.	   	  Their	  desire	   to	   control	   the	   diamonds	   industry,	   because	   it	   represents	   a	   potential	  commodity	  market	  for	  the	  future,	  might	  also	  have	  impeded	  the	  KP	  from	  having	  strong	  voice	  that	  could	  make	  a	  standard	  decision.	  	  While	  the	  KP	  managed	  to	  stop	  conflict	  diamonds	  in	  Angola,	  these	  new	  dynamics	  prevent	  it	  from	  accomplishing	  the	   same	   success	   in	   the	   remaining	   countries.	   	   The	   next	   chapter	   will	   open	   a	  window	  on	  these	  supra-­‐regional	  features	  to	  explaining	  conflict.	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Chapter	  5:	  Regional	  and	  International	  Factors	  
We	  have	  seen	  earlier	  that	  diamond-­‐rich	  countries	  are	  more	  prone	  to	  conflict	  not	  because	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   diamonds,	   but	   rather	   because	   there	   are	   specific	  internal	   political	   problems.	   	   Hence,	   reducing	   the	   causes	   of	   conflict	   to	   the	  presence	   of	  minerals	   is	   not	   an	   adequate	   analysis.	   	   Conflicts	   and	   political	   strife	  backed	  by	  the	  illegal	  trade	  in	  conflict	  diamonds	  within	  the	  DRC,	  Zimbabwe,	  and	  Ivory	   Coast	   show	   that	   the	   KP	   is	   still	   unsuccessful	   in	   its	   embargo	   on	   conflict	  diamonds.	   	   	  There	  must	   therefore	  be	  other	   factors	   that	  cause	  countries	   to	  defy	  sanctions.	  	  	  	  	  Conflicts	  seem	  to	  occur	  in	  resource-­‐rich	  countries	  at	  least	  partly	  because	  of	   ethno-­‐political	   problems.	   	   The	   Congolese	   and	   Ivorian	   governments	   do	   not	  function	  properly	   because	   they	   cannot	   find	   a	   common	  understanding	  with	   the	  different	   ethnic	   groups	   in	   the	   region.	   	   Gbagbo	   and	  Kabila	   are	  not	   ordering	   the	  army	  to	  take	  over	  mines	  and	  fight.	   	   In	  other	  words,	  we	  are	  not	  facing	  the	  same	  problem	  as	  in	  Liberia,	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  Angola.	  	  The	  rebels	  in	  the	  latter	  countries	  in	  the	  1990s	  were	  trying	  to	  resist	  the	  government	  (and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Congo	  they	  are	   currently	   trying	   to	   topple	   it),	   but	   they	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   focusing	   on	   that	  only.	   	   They	   have	   actually	   turned	   the	   diamond	   mines	   into	   an	   economic	   and	  political	  opportunity	  to	  advance	  their	  agenda.	   	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  warlords	  do	  not	   seem	   to	   be	   interested	   in	   getting	   rich	   only	   but	   want	   existential	   as	   well	   as	  political	   survival.	   	  Without	  money,	   they	  might	  be	  exterminated	  by	  other	  ethnic	  groups.	  	  	  In	  Zimbabwe	  the	  government	  has	  occupied	  two	  major	  diamond	  mines	  but	  the	   reasons	   are	   not	   to	  wage	   a	  war.	   	   Harare	   seems	   to	   have	   displaced	   artisanal	  
	   81	  
miners	  out	  of	  greed.	  	  Most	  importantly	  however,	  Mugabe	  and	  his	  entourage	  are	  controlling	  the	  mines	  of	  Marange	  and	  Chiadzwa	  because	  they	  want	  to	  hang	  on	  to	  power	  and	   to	  do	   that	   they	  need	   the	   support	  of	   the	  army.	   	   If	   the	   latter	   and	   the	  police	   are	  not	   kept	   at	   bay,	   Zimbabwe	   could	   explode	   into	   another	   conflict	   zone	  like	  Angola.	  	  Therefore,	  Mugabe’s	  plan	  is	  a	  way	  of	  keeping	  his	  political	  supremacy	  and	  what	  he	  regards	  as	  political	  stability.	  Stopping	   the	   analysis	   at	   this	   point	   however	  would	   be	   incomplete.	   	   	  We	  also	   require	   a	   politico-­‐economic	   analysis	   of	   the	   region	   and	   the	   international	  diamond	  markets.	  	  Hence,	  the	  analysis	  that	  I	  propose	  is	  twofold.	  	  First,	  it	  consists	  of	   understanding	   the	   black	   market	   for	   diamonds	   and	   the	   regional	   channels	  through	   which	   the	   market	   operates.	   	   My	   argument	   is	   that	   the	   intricate	  relationships	   between	   the	   different	   diamond	   traders	   in	   the	   informal	   channels	  allow	   some	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   actors	   to	   keep	   the	   trade	   in	   conflict	   diamonds	  going	   and	   unless	   this	   is	   tackled,	   the	   KP	   will	   not	   succeed	   in	   cleansing	   the	  diamonds	  industry.	  	  This	  part	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  the	  most	  challenging	  chapter	  as	  there	   are	   no	   official	   records	   given	   the	   secretive	   nature	   of	   the	   transactions.	  	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  unwise	  to	  avoid	  this	  issue	  altogether,	  so	  we	  must	  make	  the	  best	  possible	  use	  of	  the	  available	  sources.	  Furthermore,	  we	  have	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  diamonds	  industry	  is	  tightly	  interconnected	   from	   the	   initial	   mining	   through	   to	   polishing	   and	   the	   eventual	  sale.	   	   As	   Naylor	   shows,	   “gemstones	   are	   dug	   from	   the	   ground,	   traded	   locally	  perhaps	  several	  times,	  moved	  to	  wholesale	  centers	  to	  change	  hands	  again,	  resold	  to	  cutters,	  put	  back	   into	   international	   trade	  circuits	   to	  wind	  up	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  vendors	  of	   investment	  stones	  or	  manufacturers	  of	   jewelry,	   then	  sold	  to	  a	  retail	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clientele.”149	   	   These	   endless	   “peregrinations”	   makes	   it	   easy	   for	   smugglers	   to	  inject	   illegal	   diamonds	   into	   the	   diamonds	   pipeline.	   	   With	   the	   increasing	  competition	  between	  China	  and	  India	  for	  control	  of	  the	  diamond	  sector,	  conflict	  diamonds	  provide	  more	  opportunities	  for	  smugglers.	  	  	  I	  do	  not	   insinuate	   that	  China	  and	   India	  voluntarily	  condone	   the	   trade	   in	  blood	  diamonds.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  governments	  of	  both	  countries	  have	  tried	  very	  hard	  to	   prevent	   the	   dirty	   stones	   from	   entering	   their	   borders	   and	   being	   used	   in	   the	  booming	  diamond	  industry	  there.150	  	  Through	  the	  SDE,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  has	   tried	   to	   show	   its	   concern	   for	   developments	   in	   the	   diamonds	   industry	   and	  how	   China	   in	   cooperation	   with	   the	   world	   could	   try	   to	   tackle	   the	   problems	   of	  conflict	  diamonds	  and	  smuggling.151	  	  The	  Chinese	  have	  also	  introduced	  a	  system	  (illustrated	   in	   figure	  5)	  where	  they	  can	   internally	  control	   the	   flow	  of	  diamonds	  into	   the	   country	   and	   the	   implementation	   of	   which	   seems	   to	   be	   in	   conformity	  with	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   KP	   and	   the	   World	   Diamond	   Council.	   	   The	   DAC	  thereby	   attempts	   to	   regulate	   and	   control	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   diamonds	   and	   the	  part	  of	  the	  industry	  the	  stones	  will	  be	  used	  in.	  	  Even	  the	  exported	  diamonds	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  149	  Thomas	  Naylor,	  “The	  Underworld	  of	  Gemstones	  Part	  III:	  Hot	  Rocks,	  Cold	  Cash,”	  Crime	  Law	  and	  
Social	  Change	  53	  (2010):	  321.	  150	  In	  2010	  for	  instance,	  the	  CIBJO	  (Confédération	  Internationale	  de	  la	  Bijouterie,	  Joaillerie	  et	  Orfèvrerie),	  the	  World	  Jewellery	  Confederation,	  the	  WDC	  and	  other	  NGOs	  and	  government	  officials	  organised	  the	  China	  Diamond	  Conference	  in	  Shanghai.	  	  The	  conference’s	  main	  agenda	  was	  how	  the	  world	  diamond	  industry	  was	  going	  to	  enter	  the	  next	  decade	  after	  the	  recession	  of	  2008	  affected	  the	  diamond	  market	  and	  after	  it	  was	  marred	  by	  the	  issue	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  that	  was	  still	  present	  in	  Africa	  	  -­‐	  Zimbabwe	  and	  the	  DRC	  among	  others.	  In	  his	  keynote	  address,	  Gaetano	  Cavalieri	  explained	  how	  trainig	  and	  more	  awareness	  was	  important	  for	  the	  industry	  to	  manage	  to	  get	  over	  the	  problems	  they	  face	  in	  the	  diamonds	  market	  and	  one	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  he	  was	  referring	  to	  was	  blood	  diamonds.	  	  See	  Gaetano	  Cavalieri,	  “Keynote	  Address”,	  Keynote	  address	  at	  the	  CIBJO	  workshop	  at	  Shanghai	  Expo,	  September	  21,	  2010,	  accessed	  April	  16,	  2011,	  http://www.cibjo.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=279%3Ain-­‐keynote-­‐address-­‐in-­‐shanghai-­‐cibjo-­‐president-­‐traces-­‐10-­‐years-­‐of-­‐csr-­‐in-­‐jewellery-­‐sector&catid=29%3Anews-­‐update-­‐october-­‐7-­‐2010&Itemid=1.	  151	  In	  2010,	  the	  government	  organised	  the	  China	  Diamond	  Conference	  From	  November	  30th	  to	  Novermber	  1st	  and	  many	  issues	  related	  to	  conflict	  diamonds	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  China	  as	  a	  global	  player	  in	  the	  diamond	  market	  was	  mentioned.	  	  See	  http://www.2010cdc.com/en/HomePage/Index.aspx	  for	  more	  details.	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subject	  to	  scrutiny.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  fragile	  network	  of	  controls	  has	  not	  stopped	  illegal	  stones	  from	  being	  channeled	  into	  the	  trade.	  
Figure	  5:	  Procedures	  of	  diamond	  processing	  trade	  through	  SDE	  Customs	  
 
Source:	  DAC	  Website152	  
	  
Defining	  Illegal	  Markets	  To	  comprehend	  the	  illegal	  trading	  of	  diamonds	  in	  Africa	  one	  should	  evaluate	  the	  dynamics	   behind	   the	   organised	   black	  markets.	   	   Although	   there	   are	   no	   groups	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  http://www.dac.gov.cn/diamond/laws15.htm.	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that	  admit	  to	  being	  involved	  in	  such	  an	  activity	  and	  trying	  to	  expose	  them	  would	  be	  highly	  risky,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  include	  them	  in	  any	  framework	  that	  attempts	  to	  understand	   the	   presence	   of	   conflict	   in	   diamond-­‐rich	   countries.153	   	   Organised	  crime	  usually	  operates	   in	   illegal	  markets	  which	  are	   regulated	  by	  extortion	  and	  their	   ability	   to	   keep	   their	   activities	   hidden.	   	   What	   renders	   this	   project	  challenging	  is	  that	  organised	  groups	  make	  no	  written	  contracts	  or	  agreements	  to	  avoid	  producing	  evidence	  of	  illicit	  transactions.154	  Nevertheless,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  organised	  crime	  maintains	  an	  internal	   system	   of	   rules,	   regulations,	   codes	   of	   behaviour	   and	   arbitrage	   which	  makes	  it	  easy	  for	  those	  involved	  to	  run	  a	  parallel	  economy,	  either	  in	  “supplying	  illicit	   products	   and	   services	   (drugs,	   kidnappings,	   illegal	   sex-­‐workers);	   taking	  advantage	  of	  local	  economic	  situations	  such	  as	  large	  price	  differences	  or	  product	  deficit	  (cigarettes,	  cars);	  or	  by	  illegally	  supplying	  licit	  products	  (weapons,	  exotic	  animals	  and	  plants,	  diamonds).”155	  	  	  According	   to	   Williams	   and	   Godson,	   there	   is	   a	   network	   that	   connects	  organised	  crime	  as	  “[it]	  can	  best	  be	  understood	   in	  terms	  of	  network	  structures	  that	  are	  characterized	  by	  high	  levels	  of	  flexibility,	  redundancy,	  and	  resilience	  as	  well	  as	  a	  capacity	  to	  cross	  boundaries.”156	  	  Generally,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   classify	   networks	   of	   organised	   crime	   under	  different	   headings.	   	  Williams	   and	   Godson	   classified	   them	   under	   the	   following:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Dina	  Siegel,	  “Diamonds	  and	  Organized	  Crimes:	  The	  Case	  of	  Antwerp,”	  in	  Organized	  Crime:	  
Culture,	  Markets	  and	  Policies,	  eds.	  Dina	  Siegel	  and	  Hans	  Nelen,	  (New	  York:	  Springer,	  2002),	  90.	  154	  Ibid.,	  90.	  155	  Letizia	  Paoli,	  “The	  Paradoxes	  of	  Organised	  Crime,”	  Crime,	  Law	  and	  Social	  Change	  37	  (2002):	  51-­‐97	  156	  Phil	  Williams	  and	  Roy	  Godson,	  “Anticipating	  Organized	  and	  Transnational	  Crime,”	  Crime,	  Law	  
and	  Social	  Change	  37	  (2002):	  311-­‐55.	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political,	  economic,	  social,	  strategic,	  and	  composite	  or	  hybrid	  models.157	  	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  make	  an	  extensive	  outline	  of	  these	  models	  but	  instead	  I	  would	  rather	  like	  to	  use	  the	  composite	  or	  hybrid	  model	  to	  complement	  my	  paper	  because	  I	  believe	  that	  nowadays,	  criminal	  organisations	  operate	  according	  to	  this	  framework.	  	  The	  composite	   models	   believes	   that	   organised	   crime	   is	   systematised	   according	   to	  either	   a	   transnational	   model	   or	   a	   transshipment	   one.	   	   Under	   the	   former,	  smugglers	  operate	  from	  a	  home	  base	  where	  there	  are	  weak	  government	  control	  and	  economic	  disorganisation.	   	  However,	   the	  base	  is	  connected	  in	  some	  way	  to	  the	   global	   economy	   through	   informal	   channels.158	   	   	   This	   is	   definitely	   possible	  because	  in	  the	  globalised	  world,	   if	   formal	  businesses	  have	  managed	  to	  improve	  the	  connectedness,	  so	  have	  informal	  and	  illegal	  businesses.	  	  	  The	   transshipment	   model	   occurs	   when	   organised	   crime	   will	   “exploit	  states	  where	   there	   is	   ease	  of	   transit	   and	  access	   to	   the	   final	   destination	   for	   the	  transshipment	  of	   illicit	   goods.”159	   	   In	   that	   case,	   states	   that	   are	   corrupt	  but	   that	  have	   an	   export	   zone	  will	   become	   easy	   target	   for	   organised	   crime.	   	   These	   two	  models	  brings	  together	  many	  features	  of	  smugglers.	  	  In	  some	  countries,	  they	  can	  even	   become	   substitutes	   for	   the	   “protective	   and	   regulatory	   functions	   of	   the	  state.”160	   	   In	  other	  cases,	  organised	  crime	  has	   the	  ability	  and	  the	  willingness	   to	  act	   like	   legal	   enterprises	   and	   maximise	   its	   revenue	   by	   institutionalising	   its	  operations	  and	  colluding	  at	  different	  levels	  to	  facilitate	  the	  illicit	  trade.161	  	  In	  the	  diamond	  industry,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  such	  collusion	  exists.	  	  As	  in	  the	  legal	  mining	  of	  diamonds,	   from	   mining	   to	   retail	   there	   is	   cooperation	   across	   levels	   and	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  Ibid.:	  335.	  158	  Ibid.:	  347.	  159	  Ibid.	  160	  Ibid.,	  323.	  161	  Ibid.,	  328	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sometimes	  instances	  of	  vertical	  integration.	  	  In	  the	  illegal	  trade	  of	  diamonds,	  this	  type	  of	  cooperation	  must	  be	  present	  to	  allow	  conflict	  stones	  to	  get	  mixed	  up	  with	  conflict-­‐free	  ones	  that	  are	  en	  route	  to	  being	  certified.	  There	   are	   various	   criminal	   organisations	   involved	   in	   the	   diamonds	  sector.162	  	  According	  to	  Siegel,	  “if	  De	  Beers	  and	  various	  NGOs	  have	  contributed	  in	  raising	   the	   value	   of	   a	   diamond,	   the	   same	   is	   relevant	   for	   organised	   crime	   in	  promoting	   and	   continuing,	   often	  without	   even	   knowing	   it,	   the	  myth	   and	   glory	  associated	  with	   diamonds,	  which	   in	   its	   turn	  has	   a	   great	   influence	   on	   legal	   and	  illegal	  economic	  markets.”163	  	  The	  increased	  value	  of	  diamonds	  makes	  it	  viable	  to	  trade	  on	  the	  legal	  or	  illegal	  markets.	  	  Even	  if	  diamonds	  come	  from	  illicit	  sources,	  being	  able	  to	  ship	  them	  significantly	  increase	  their	  value.	  But	   how	   do	   diamonds	   enter	   the	   pipeline?	   	   Since	   the	   start	   of	   the	   KP,	  various	   evaluation	   reports	   have	   shown	   that	   certificates	   of	   origins	   are	   not	  effective	  because	  of	   the	   lack	  of	   reliable	  officials	   to	  monitor	   smuggling.	   	  The	  KP	  did	   not	   examine	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   the	   illegal	   trade	   in	   depth	   –	   diamonds	   are	  smuggled	   out	   of	   conflict	   countries	   without	   many	   problems	   and	   bought	   by	  dealers	  who	  sell	  them	  on	  to	  international	  trading	  centres	  in	  London,	  Antwerp	  or	  Tel-­‐Aviv	  (and	  now	  Shanghai).	  	  	  Siegel	   and	   Nelen	   proved	   that	   even	   a	   trading	   centre	   like	   Antwerp	   that	  tightly	   controls	   the	   origins	   of	   diamonds	   was	   unable	   to	   prevent	   diamond	  smuggling	   during	   the	   Angolan	   civil	   war.	   	   There	   were	   diamond	   traders	   and	  companies	  in	  Antwerp	  that	  were	  known	  to	  deal	  with	  rebels.164	  	  When	  analysing	  how	  Antwerp	  operated,	  Smilie	  explained	  that	  there	  were	  three	  types	  of	  diamond	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  Siegel,	  “Diamonds	  and	  Organized	  Crimes,”	  94.	  	  See	  also,	  Dina	  Siegel,	  The	  Mazzel	  Ritual:	  Culture,	  
Customs	  and	  Crime	  in	  the	  Diamond	  Trade,	  (New	  York:	  Springer,	  2009).	  163	  Ibid.,	  93.	  164	  Ibid.,	  93.	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market	   there.	   	   The	  white	   (legal	  market),	   the	   grey	   (unofficial,	   independent	   and	  parallel	  market)	  and	  the	  black	  market	  (illegal	  stones).165	  	  There	  are	  strong	  links	  between	  these	  markets	  and	  the	  stones	  can	  easily	  be	  transferred	  from	  one	  market	  to	   another.	   	   Siegel	   believed	   that	   Antwerp	   played	   an	   important	   part	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  smuggling	  and	  as	  it	  is	  more	  profitable	  for	  producers	  to	  cooperate	  on	  the	  illegal	  market,	  there	  is	  a	  lower	  desire	  to	  curb	  conflict.	  	  	  With	   the	   presence	   of	   new	  market	   leaders	   in	   diamond	  manufacturing	   –	  like	  China	  and	  India	  –	  the	  presence	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  is	  in	  danger	  of	  becoming	  self-­‐perpetuating	   simply	   because	   these	   markets	   lack	   appropriate	   controls	   or	  even	  incentivise	  to	  monitor	  the	  stones	  that	  are	  being	  traded	  there.	   	  What	  is	  the	  situation	  now	  that	  there	  are	  booming	  diamond	  trading	  centres	  in	  Shanghai,	  Surat	  and	  other	  countries?	  	  
Africa’s	  Porous	  Borders	  and	  Failing	  Policies	  Before	   the	   KP	   was	   implemented,	   the	   Hoge	   Raad	   voor	   Diamant	   (HRD	   –	   the	  Diamond	   High	   Council)	   located	   in	   Belgium	   was	   a	   pivotal	   actor	   in	   the	  international	   diamond	   industry.166	   	   The	   HRD	   is	   an	   industry	   umbrella	   group	  responsible	   for	   structuring	   the	   formal	   trading	   of	   diamonds	   which	   monitors	  diamond	  imports	  and	  exports	  for	  the	  Belgian	  government.	  	  Upon	  import	  the	  HRD	  records	  a	  diamond’s	  origin	  as	  that	  of	   the	  country	  from	  which	  the	  diamond	  was	  last	   exported.	   	   During	   the	   Sierra	   Leonean	   civil	   war,	   illegal	   diamonds	  circumvented	  that	  control	  because	  they	  were	  smuggled	  to	  other	  official	  diamond	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  Ian	  Smile,	  Lansana	  Gberie	  and	  Ralph	  Hazleton,	  The	  Heart	  of	  the	  Matter:	  Sierra	  Leone,	  Diamonds	  
and	  Human	  Security,	  (Ontario:	  Partnership	  Africa	  Canada,	  2000),	  accessed	  October	  26,	  2009,	  http://idl-­‐bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/33311/1/114727.pdf,	  29-­‐31.	  166	  Sheryl	  Dickey,	  “Sierra	  Leone:	  Diamonds	  for	  Arms,”	  Human	  Rights	  Brief	  7(3)	  (2000),	  accessed	  November	  4,	  2010,	  http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/07/3sierraleone.cfm.	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exporting	   countries.	   	   The	   KP	   brought	   that	   problem	   to	   light	   and	   added	   new	  measures	  to	  try	  to	  prevent	  that	  from	  happening.	  	  	  Other	  countries	  that	  imported	  diamonds	  were	  highly	  aware	  of	  the	  conflict	  diamond	  problem.	  	  The	  American	  CARAT	  Act	  provided	  a	  way	  in	  which	  American	  consumers	  could	  exercise	  their	  purchasing	  power	  wisely,	  by	  refusing	  diamonds	  whose	   country	   of	   origin	  was	  not	   declared	   at	   the	   time	  of	   purchase.	   	   Americans	  then	  bought	  most	   of	   gem-­‐quality	  diamonds	  worldwide	   giving	   them	  a	  powerful	  voice	  in	  the	  global	  market.	  	  American	  legislators	  were	  convinced	  that	  informing	  consumers	  of	  the	  original	  source	  of	  the	  diamonds	  they	  bought	  would	  “encourage	  countries	   and	   businesses	   in	   Africa	   to	   use	   their	   influence	   to	   end	   the	  wars	   that	  [wreaked]	  so	  much	  havoc	  on	  that	  continent	  before	  those	  wars	  [gave]	  diamonds	  a	  bad	  name.”167	  	  This	  consumer	  power	  was	  shattered	  by	  smuggling.	  	  	  These	   facts	   about	   the	   international	   black	  market	   for	   diamonds	   support	  the	  view	  that	  conflicts	  occur	   in	  diamond	  countries	  because	  of	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  international	   and	   regional	   markets.	   	   The	   risk	   associated	   with	   smuggling	   the	  stones	   give	   them	   value	   thus	   lowering	   the	   incentive	   to	   cooperate	   with	   the	  government.	   	  For	  example,	   the	  rebels	   in	  Congo	  are	   too	  small	   to	  overpower	   the	  government	  and	  too	   fractionalised	  to	  cooperate	  with	  each	  other.	   	  Hence,	   illegal	  diamond	  trading	  gives	  them	  the	  ability	  to	  resist	  and	  fight	  the	  other	  groups.	  	  	  For	  Ivory	  Coast,	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  the	  country	  cannot	  benefit	  from	  the	  diamond	  trade	  yet	  because	  of	  the	  UN	  ban	  on	  diamonds	  from	  the	  country.	   	  So,	  it	  makes	   sense	   for	   many	   producers	   to	   refuse	   cooperation	   and	   mine	   as	   many	  diamonds	  as	  possible	  until	   the	  conflict	   is	  over	  and	  the	  trade	  starts	  again.168	   	  As	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Ian	  Smile,	  et	  al.,	  The	  Heart	  of	  the	  Matter,	  66.	  168	  Gemma	  Ware,	  “Bad	  Business	  for	  Diamond	  Smugglers	  in	  Côte	  d’Ivoire”,	  The	  Africa	  Report,	  December	  7	  2010,	  accessed	  December	  7,	  2010,	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for	  Zimbabwe,	  the	  trade	  in	  blood	  diamonds	  is	  perpetuated	  to	  prevent	  a	  civil	  war	  that	  could	  further	  damage	  the	  country.	   	  I	  think	  that	  Mugabe	  and	  his	  cronies	  are	  encouraging	   illegal	   trade	   in	   the	   precious	   stones	   to	   prevent	   a	   massive	   power	  struggle	   like	   that	   previously	   experienced	   in	   Angola.	   	   In	   all	   three	   cases,	   the	  international	  market	  in	  addition	  to	  internal	  factors	  is	  causing	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  conflict	  in	  diamond-­‐rich	  countries.	  	  
Facts	  and	  Numbers	  don’t	  lie	  	  
Zimbabwe	  and	  Mozambique	  
	  Manica	   is	   a	   growing	   city	   in	   Mozambique	   that	   has	   been	   energised	   by	   the	  diamonds	   trade.	   	   Previously	   renowned	   for	   its	   high	   levels	   of	   poverty,	   diamond	  dealers	  now	   fuel	   the	  city’s	  development.	   	   “The	  diamonds	  enter	  Mozambique	   in	  an	  obscure	  and	  clandestine	  way.	  	  Nobody	  in	  Manica	  is	  permitted	  to	  [buy	  or	  sell]	  them	   because	   we	   do	   not	   have	   this	   mineral,”169	   Jose	   Tefula,	   administrator	   of	  Manica	   district,	   told	   Integrated	   Regional	   Information	   Networks	   (IRIN).	  	  According	  to	  IRIN,	  the	  diamonds	  traded	  in	  Manicaland	  are	  believed	  to	  come	  from	  the	   vast	   Chiadzwa	   diamond	   fields	   through	   Mutare	   which	   is	   not	   far	   from	   the	  border	  between	  both	  countries.	  Traders	  use	  ‘mules’	  who	  often	  ingest	  the	  stones,	  to	  smuggle	  the	  diamonds	  into	  Mozambique.170	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  169	  “Mozambique-­‐Zimbabwe:	  Border	  Town	  gets	  Cut	  of	  Diamond	  Action,”	  Integrated	  Regional	  
Information	  Networks,	  5	  January	  2010,	  accessed	  December,	  11	  2010	  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b45e2e91a.html.	  	  170	  Ibid.	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   The	  reason	  for	  the	  easy	  smuggling	  of	  diamonds	  between	  both	  countries	  is	  simple	  –	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  lack	  of	  personnel	  for	  adequate	  control	  and	  this	  allows	  stones	  worth	   hundreds	   of	   thousands	   of	   dollars	   to	   be	   smuggled.	   	   According	   to	  IRIN,	   the	   Zimbabwean	   authorities	   had	   long	   been	   aware	   of	   the	   illegal	   diamond	  pipeline	  but	  did	  not	  clamp	  down	  on	  the	  illegal	  trafficking.	   	  After	  many	  artisanal	  miners	  were	  driven	  out	  of	  Chiadzwa	  in	  late	  2008	  the	  problem	  became	  even	  more	  acute	  as	  most	  of	   these	  ex-­‐miners	  were	  either	  enslaved	  by	   the	  military	   to	  mine	  the	  precious	  stone	  or	  were	  willing	  to	  risk	  their	  lives	  to	  carry	  diamonds	  across	  the	  border.171	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  Ibid.	  
	  
Figure	  5.1:	  The	  Smuggling	  Route	  
	  
Source:	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  (Date,	  URL)	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Even	  though	  Mozambique	  is	  not	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  diamond	  exporter	  and	  producer,	   journalists	  have	  exposed	  the	  dirty	  trade	  that	  occurs	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	   	   KP	   investigators	   estimated	   that	   59%	   of	   Zimbabwe's	   production	   in	  2008	  wasn't	  exported	  through	  official	  channels.172	  	  Diamonds	  are	  usually	  sold	  to	  foreign	   buyers	   by	   the	   gram	   at	   about	   1,350	   Meticais	   (US$46.50),	   far	   below	  average	  global	  prices,	  before	  being	  taken	  overseas	  to	  be	  processed	  and	  sold	  on	  the	  global	  market.”173	  Alex	  Perry	   investigated	  the	  situation	  in	  Manica.	   	  After	  asking	  a	  waiter	   in	  his	  hotel	  about	  diamonds,	  he	  was	  introduced	  to	  a	  dealer	  who	  under	  the	  condition	  of	   anonymity	   claimed	   that	   illicit	   buyers	   began	   arriving	   to	  Manica	   from	  around	  the	  world.	   	  This	   in	  turn	  has	  attracted	  more	  smugglers,	  not	   just	   from	  Zimbabwe	  but	  also	   from	  diamond	   fields	   in	  Botswana,	  Namibia,	  Angola,	   the	  DRC,	  and	  even	  Guinea-­‐Conakry	   in	   West	   Africa.	   	   Manica	   has	   become	   a	   global	   hub	   for	   illegal	  diamonds.174	  Dealers	   usually	   act	   as	   quality	   control	   for	   the	   illegal	   trade	   by	   inspecting	  and	   valuing	   stones.	   	   They	   buy	   the	   ones	   they	   like	   and	   sell	   them	   to	   secondary	  buyers	  who	   fly	   in	   from	   the	  US	   to	  Asia.	   	   These	   second-­‐tier	   dealers	   smuggle	   the	  diamonds	  to	  polishers	  in	  their	  home	  countries,	  where	  the	  rough	  stones	  are	  cut,	  mixed	  with	  legitimate	  gems	  and	  sold	  to	  high-­‐end	  jewelers.175	  	  	  Zimbabwe	   has	   been	   suspended	   from	   the	   KP	   several	   times	   but	   has	  nonetheless	   traded	   the	   stones	   without	   much	   being	   done	   by	   the	   international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  172	  Sarah	  Childress,	  “Diamond	  Trade	  Finds	  Regulatory	  Loophole	  in	  Mozambique,”	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal,	  Africa	  News,	  November	  6,	  2009,	  accessed	  January	  23,	  2010,	  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125738837197329995.html.	  173	  IRIN,	  “Mozambique-­‐Zimbabwe.”	  174	  Alex	  Perry,	  “Why	  Zimbabwe's	  New	  Diamonds	  Imperil	  Global	  Trade,”	  Time,	  December	  5,	  2010,	  accessed	  December	  5,	  2010	  http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2029482,00.html.	  175	  Ibid.	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community.	  	  As	  long	  as	  the	  government	  is	  able	  to	  make	  money	  from	  that	  type	  of	  trade	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  that	  the	  human	  rights	  abuses	  in	  the	  Marange	  and	  Chiadzwa	   diamond	   fields	   will	   continue.	   	   Perry	   explains	   how	   in	   one	   instance,	  government	   officials	   managed	   to	   make	   $56	   million	   in	   just	   five	   hours.176	   	   The	  illegal	   stones	   of	   Zimbabwe	   can	   easily	   infiltrate	   the	   white	   market	   of	   diamond	  trading	  centres	  across	  the	  world.	  	  	  No	  country	  is	  willing	  to	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  mess,	  and	  even	  the	  KP	  has	  double	  standards	  on	  the	  issue.	  	  It	  has	  stated	  that	  Zimbabwe	  is	  not	  producing	  or	  smuggling	  ‘conflict	  diamonds’	  because	  no	  rebel	  groups	  use	  the	  Marange	  fields	  to	  fund	  conflicts	  against	  any	  state.	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  Zimbabwe’s	  human	  rights	  abuses	  are	  regarded	  as	  outside	   the	  purview	  of	   the	  KP.	   	   Investigators,	  however,	  suggest	   that	  Zimbabwe’s	   smuggling	  operations	   create	   illicit	   trading	   routes	   that	  “make	  possible	  the	   introduction	  of	  conflict	  diamonds.”177	   	  So	  while	  Zimbabwe's	  violations	  of	   the	  minimum	  guidelines	  may	  not	   fund	   its	  own	   internal	   conflict,	   it	  undermines	  the	  security	  of	  the	  trading	  channels.	  Evidence	   recently	   published	   by	   Wikileaks	   further	   exposed	   the	  Zimbabwean	  diamond	  trade.	  	  First	  there	  are	  the	  principals:	  Eleven	  Zimbabweans	  including	   Mugabe's	   wife,	   the	   Prime	   Minister,	   and	   the	   Minister	   of	   Mines	   and	  Mining	  Development,	   plus	   the	   local	   governor.	   	   Then	   there's	   the	   pipeline:	   after	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	  On	  August	  11,	  four	  private	  jets	  touched	  down	  at	  Harare	  airport	  and	  taxied	  to	  the	  side	  of	  the	  runway,	  pulling	  up	  at	  a	  red	  carpet	  leading	  to	  a	  large	  hangar.	  Several	  groups	  of	  men	  in	  suits	  —	  according	  to	  a	  TIME	  reporter	  present,	  they	  were	  Lebanese,	  Israelis,	  Indians,	  Russians	  and	  Americans	  —	  were	  escorted	  inside	  by	  Zimbabwean	  officials.	  One	  by	  one,	  the	  men	  were	  given	  a	  body	  search,	  then	  led	  into	  a	  large	  vault.	  Inside	  were	  1.1	  million	  carats	  in	  diamonds,	  according	  to	  the	  government.	  During	  the	  next	  five	  hours,	  the	  buyers	  bid	  a	  total	  of	  $56.4	  million.	  Then	  they	  packed	  their	  diamonds	  into	  briefcases	  and	  flew	  out.	  The	  government	  was	  ecstatic.	  Zimbabwe’s	  Mines	  Minister,	  Obert	  Mpofu,	  a	  Mugabe	  supporter,	  told	  TIME,	  “With	  all	  these	  buyers	  and	  our	  diamonds,	  what	  can	  stop	  me	  being	  happy?”	  	  See	  Ibid.	  177	  Brian	  Raftopoulous,	  “The	  Crisis	  in	  Zimbabwe:	  1998-­‐2008,”	  in	  Becoming	  Zimbabwe:	  A	  History	  
from	  the	  Pre-­Colonial	  Period	  to	  2008,	  eds.	  Brian	  Raftopoulos	  and	  Alois	  Mlambo,	  (Weaver	  Press:	  Harare,	  2009),	  228.	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being	   sold	   to	   “a	   mix	   of	   Belgians,	   Israelis,	   Lebanese	   (the	   largest	   contingent),	  Russians,	   and	   South	   Africans,”	   the	   low-­‐grade	   diamonds	   were	   smuggled	   into	  Dubai	  and	  traded	  in	  an	  economic	  free-­‐trade	  zone	  there,	  while	  gem-­‐quality	  stones	  found	  their	  way	  to	  Belgium,	  Israel,	  or	  South	  Africa.178	  There	   seems	   to	   be	   some	   cooperation	   between	   Zimbabwe’s	   neighbours	  too.	  	  South	  Africa,	  Angola	  and	  Namibia	  are	  readying	  an	  elaborate	  plan	  that	  would	  see	  them	  passing	  off	  Zimbabwe’s	  diamonds	  as	  their	  own,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  subvert	  the	  KP	  certification,	  players	  in	  the	  industry	  have	  alleged.	   	  Sources	  revealed	  that	  the	  African	  countries,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  United	  Arab	  Emirates	  (UAE),	  India	  and	  China	  were	  frustrated	  by	  the	  stalemate	  over	  the	  sale	  of	  gemstones	  and	  were	  willing	   to	   go	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	   debase	   the	   KP	   certification.	   	   Highest	   on	   their	  grievances	  was	   the	  domination	  of	   the	  KP	  process	  by	   the	  United	  States,	  Canada	  and	  Australia.179	  	  	  This	   became	   visible	   when	   it	   was	   reported	   that	   a	   company	   called	   the	  Zimbabwe	  Diamond	  Consortium	  signed	  a	  $2	  billion	  deal	  with	  an	  Indian	  company	  while	  the	  Zimbabwean	  government	  has	  had	  deals	  with	  its	  Chinese	  counterpart	  to	  secure	  the	  sales	  of	  diamonds	  at	  Chiadzwa.180	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  Charles	  Homans,	  “Inside	  the	  Zimbabwean	  Diamond	  Racket”,	  Foreign	  Policy,	  December	  9,	  2010,	  accessed	  December	  9,	  2010,	  http://wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/08/inside_the_zimbabwean_diamond_racket.	  179	  Nqaba	  Matshazi,	  “SA,	  Angola,	  Namibia	  plot	  secret	  diamond	  sales”,	  The	  Standard,	  November	  21,	  2010,	  accessed	  December	  1,	  2010,	  http://www.thestandard.co.zw/local/27417-­‐sa-­‐angola-­‐namibia-­‐plot-­‐secret-­‐diamond-­‐sales.html.	  	  See	  also	  Geoffrey	  York,	  “Zimbabwe	  Thumbs	  Nose	  at	  Diamond-­‐Control	  Regime”,	  Globe	  and	  Mail,	  November	  4,	  2010,	  accessed	  November	  10,	  2010,	  http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/africa-­‐mideast/zimbabwe-­‐thumbs-­‐nose-­‐at-­‐diamond-­‐control-­‐regime/article1786337/.	  
180	  “India,	  China	  in	  Zim	  plan	  to	  evade	  Kimberly	  Process,”	  Commodity	  Online,	  November	  24,	  2010,	  accessed	  March	  14,	  2011,	  http://www.commodityonline.com/news/IndiaChina-­‐in-­‐Zim-­‐plan-­‐to-­‐evade-­‐Kimberly-­‐Process-­‐33776-­‐3-­‐1.html.	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Ivory	  Coast,	  Guinea	  and	  Ghana	  The	   KP	   is	   often	   claimed	   to	   be	   a	   success	   as	   today	   there	   are	   no	   diamond	  wars.	  Official	   KP	   data	   suggests	   conflict	   stones	   are	   a	   negligible	   part	   of	   the	   diamond	  trade,	   down	   from	   15%	   a	   decade	   ago.	   	   It	   is	   certainly	   true	   that	   it	   has	   thwarted	  many	  illegal	  trades.	  	  In	  2006	  for	  instance,	  they	  found	  that	  Ghana	  was	  certifying	  as	  its	  own	  blood	  diamonds	  smuggled	  from	  Ivory	  Coast.181	  	  Table	  5.1	  illustrates	  how	  the	  official	  production	  and	  export	  of	  diamonds	  from	  Ghana	  has	  been	  decreasing	  after	   the	   KP	   tried	   to	   reduce	   the	   smuggling	   of	   diamonds	   from	   Ivory	   Coast.	   	   In	  2006,	  the	  volume	  of	  diamonds	  exported	  by	  Ghana	  stood	  at	  972,648	  carats.	  	  This	  dipped	  dramatically	  by	  about	  66%	  to	  only	  312,921.63	  carats	  in	  2009.	  	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   if	   we	   consider	   the	   value	   of	   Guinea’s	   production	   of	  diamonds,	   we	   can	   notice	   an	   interesting	   increase.	   	   In	   2006,	   Guinea	   reported	   a	  production	  of	  473,	  862	  carats	  and	  this	  totaled	  $42.9	  million	  worth	  of	  exports.	  	  By	  2008,	  this	  number	  had	  increased	  by	  a	  massive	  83%	  indicating	  that	  a	  new	  source	  of	  diamond	  production	  had	  appeared	  in	  the	  last	  two	  years.	  	  My	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  some	  of	  the	  smuggling	  that	  was	  stopped	  in	  Ghana	  was	  channeled	  to	  Guinea;	  this	  has	   proved	   impossible	   to	   confirm	   as	   sources,	   who	   work	   in	   the	   industry,	  repeatedly	   refused	   to	   comment	   but	   it	   would	   definitely	   explain	   why	   Guinean	  exports	  rose.	  	   The	   final	   interesting	   point	   to	   note	   about	   table	   5.1	   is	   that	   in	   2009,	   the	  overall	   level	  of	  diamonds	  traded	  by	  both	  countries	  fell	  below	  their	  2006	  levels.	  	  This	   could	   be	   explained	   by	   a	   combination	   of	   two	   main	   factors:	   (1)	   The	   UN	  embargo	  on	  Ivory	  Coast	  has	  been	  effective	  and	  the	  inspectors	  have	  been	  able	  to	  curb	  the	  smuggling	  significantly;	  (2)	  The	  worsening	  situation	  in	  the	  Ivory	  Coast	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  Alex	  Perry,	  “Why	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  New	  Diamonds	  Imperil	  Global	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with	   Alassane	  Ouattara	   calling	   for	   elections	   attracted	  more	   attention	   from	   the	  UN,	  making	  it	  harder	  for	  the	  dirty	  stones	  to	  be	  smuggled	  to	  Ghana	  and	  Guinea.	  	  
Table	  5.1:	  Diamonds	  Production,	  Import	  and	  Export	  by	  Ghana	  and	  Guinea	  
	  
Source:	  Kimberley	  Process	  	  
Country	   Production	   Import	   Export	  	   Volume	  (Cts)	   Value	  (US	  $)	   Volume	  (Cts)	   Value	  (US	  $)	   Volume	  (Cts)	   Value	  (US	  $)	  
2006	  Ghana	   972,647.88	   $30,910,703.33	   -­‐	   -­‐	   972,647.88	   $30,910,703.33	  Guinea	   473,862.25	   $39,884,880.00	   58,884.72	   $1,265,183.62	   468,122.21	   $42,916,106.12	  
2007	  Ghana	   894,783.20	   $23,202,421.73	   -­‐	   -­‐	   865,612.78	   $27,863,557.48	  Guinea	   1,018,722.90	   $46,101,145.27	   108,761.62	   $2,316,683.39	   1,009,732.96	   $50,197,581.82	  
2008	  Ghana	   643,289.21	   $18,460,766.40	   -­‐	   -­‐	   622,743.12	   $19,959,304.95	  Guinea	   3,098,490.09	   $53,698,455.99	   2,558.66	   $174,132.85	   3,097,360.91	   $66,705,270.41	  
2009	  Ghana	  	   376,371.01	   $6,984,025.13	   -­‐	   -­‐	   358,838.48	   $7,247,220.26	  Guinea	   696,731.70	   $28,975,789.30	   189.04	   $952,029.00	   312,921.63	   $19,650,297.42	  
This	   should	   be	   no	   surprise.	   	   After	   interviewing	   some	   smugglers	   in	   the	  region,	  the	  Africa	  Report	  found	  that	  most	  buyers	  obtain	  diamonds	  from	  Liberia	  now.	   	   “All	   the	  buyers	  who	  used	   to	  deal	   in	   Seguela	   in	   Ivory	  Coast	  have	   gone	   to	  Angola,	  Guinea	  or	  Liberia,	  more	  profitable	  places.”182	  	  
DRC	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Congo	  (ROC)	  In	   2004,	   the	   ROC	   became	   a	   prime	   destination	   for	   conflict	   and	   illicit	   diamonds	  from	   the	   DRC	   and	   other	   countries	   due	   to	   its	   corrupt	   and	   unstable	   political	  regime.	   	   It	   was	   expelled	   from	   the	   KP	   but	   the	   expulsion	   did	   not	   eradicate	   the	  ROC's	  illegal	  diamond-­‐related	  activities.	  	  To	  date,	  the	  repercussions	  of	  this	  illegal	  trade	  are	  still	  being	  felt	  by	  neighboring	  diamond-­‐rich	  nations	  and	  citizens	  of	  the	  impoverished	  ROC.	  	  The	  ROC	  has	  an	  extensive	  history	  of	  suspicious	  trading	  in	  diamonds.	  Most	  of	  the	  diamonds	  smuggled	  through	  the	  ROC	  come	  from	  the	  DRC	  and	  back	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  Ware,	  “Bad	  Business	  for	  Diamond	  Smugglers	  in	  Côte	  d’Ivoire.”	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1990s	   Angola;	   diamond	   trade	   between	   these	   nations	   has	   been	   occurring	   for	  approximately	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  a	  century,	  with	  diamond	  counters	  in	  Brazzaville,	  the	  ROC's	  capital.	   	  The	  DRC's	  smuggling	  problem	  gained	  momentum	  due	  to	  the	  geographical	   proximity	   of	   and	   well-­‐established	   trade	   routes	   between	   the	   two	  countries.	  	  	  Despite	  unreliable,	   confusing,	  and	  sometimes	  even	  nonexistent	  statistics	  profiling	  the	  international	  diamond	  trade,	  the	  inescapable	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  ROC	   has	   become	   “a	   major	   hub	   for	   the	   trafficking	   of	   illicit	   and	   conflict	  diamonds.”183	   	  Nevertheless,	   the	  nation	  was	  admitted	   to	   the	  KP	   in	  2003,	  but	   in	  response	  to	  concerns	  that	  the	  nation's	  rough	  diamond	  exports	  far	  surpassed	  its	  geological	  production	   capacity,	   the	  KP	  dispatched	  a	   review	  mission	   in	  2004.184	  	  The	  mission	  concluded	  that	  the	  ROC	  was	  still	  smuggling	  diamonds	  from	  the	  DRC	  and	  subsequently	  expelled	  it	  from	  the	  KP	  for	  “the	  protection	  of	  the	  legal	  diamond	  trade	  and	  politically	  fragile	  African	  countries.”185	  As	  a	  result	  of	  diamonds	  being	  smuggled	  out	  of	  the	  country,	  the	  DRC's	  GDP	  is	  robbed	  of	  approximately	  $	  854	  million	  per	  year.186	  	  As	  established	  earlier,	  the	  rebels	  have	  no	   incentive	   to	   join	   the	  government	  nor	  are	   they	  strong	  enough	  to	  topple	   it.	   	   The	  ongoing	   rebel	   activity	   is	  made	  possible	  by	   the	   elusive	  nature	  of	  their	  activities	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  remain	  funded	  due	  to	  this	  lucrative	  smuggling.	  The	  only	  official	   data	   for	   the	  ROC	   comes	   from	   the	  KP’s	  website	   and	   the	  earliest	  available	  information	  dates	  from	  2008.	  	  Previous	  figures	  were	  unreliable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	  Wolf-­‐Christian	  Paes,	  “’Conflict	  Diamonds’	  to	  ‘Clean	  Diamonds’:	  The	  Development	  of	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  Scheme,”	  in	  Resource	  Politics	  in	  Sub-­Saharan	  Africa,	  eds.	  Matthias	  Basedau	  and	  Andreas	  Mehler	  (Institute	  of	  African	  Affairs:	  Hamburg,	  2005),	  318.	  184	  Ibid.,	  318.	  185	  Haley	  Blaire	  Goldman,	  “Between	  a	  ROC	  and	  a	  hard	  place:	  The	  Republic	  of	  Congo’s	  Illicit	  trade	  in	  Diamonds	  and	  Efforts	  to	  Break	  the	  Cycle	  of	  Corruption,”	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Law,	  (Fall	  2008).	  186	  Ibid.	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as	  the	  ROC	  had	  been	  banned	  from	  the	  KP.	   	  However,	  even	  these	  limited	  figures	  reveal	  some	  strange	  facts.	  	  In	  2008,	  the	  ROC	  exported	  36,000	  carats	  of	  diamonds	  worth	  about	  $1million	  but	   in	  2009,	   the	  exports	   leaped	  to	  84,	  300	  carats	  worth	  $2.7million.	  	  This	  happened	  even	  though	  the	  production	  of	  diamonds	  in	  the	  ROC	  dropped	  from	  110,000	  cts	  to	  68,000	  cts	  within	  the	  same	  period.	  	  It	  suggests	  that	  the	  country	  is	  still	  obtaining	  diamonds	  from	  other	  sources	  that	  are	  unaccounted	  for.187	   The	  data	  from	  the	  DRC	  suggests	  that	  the	  government	  there	  has	  been	  able	  to	   regain	   control	   of	   some	   mines	   and	   production	   capacities	   but	   there	   are	   still	  problems.	   	   The	   price	   of	   diamonds	   fell	   from	   $27.76	   per	   ct	   to	   $13.61	   per	   ct	  showing	   that	   KP-­‐approved	   companies	   are	   producing	   diamonds	   for	   the	  international	  market.	  	  However,	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  price	  also	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  of	  getting	  diamonds	  from	  the	  DRC	  and	  these	  could	  explain	  why	  exports	  in	  the	  ROC	  were	  higher	  in	  that	  period	  too.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  production	  of	  diamonds	  dropped	  significantly	   from	  33	  million	  cts	   in	  2008	   to	  21	  million	   in	  2009,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  instability	  occurring	  during	  that	  period	  contributed	  to	  lower	  levels	  of	  official	  production	  and	  more	  smuggling	  of	  diamonds.	  	  So	   far,	  we	   have	   considered	   how	   the	   porous	   borders	   between	   different	  African	  countries	   allow	   for	   the	   smuggling	   of	   blood	   diamonds	   to	   occur.	   	   This	   in	   turn	  buttresses	  the	  politico-­‐economic	  abilities	  of	  rebels	  or	  the	  ability	  of	  dictatorships	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  	  As	  these	  dictatorships	  normally	  use	  brutality	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  and	  often	  face	  sanctions,	  they	  decide	  to	  use	  the	  minerals	  or	  resources	  available	  –	  in	   the	  case	  of	   this	  study,	  diamonds	  –	   in	   the	  country	   for	  personal	  gains	  and	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	  Data	  obtained	  from	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  Website	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creates	  major	  socio-­‐economic	  disruptions	  that	  can	  eventually	  lead	  to	  civil	  wars.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  was	  the	  mainstream	  view	  of	  how	  the	  diamond	  curse	  occurs	  for	  many	  countries.	  	  	  The	  suggestions	  provided	  by	  industry	  and	  governments	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  the	  KP,	  which	  has	  enjoyed	  some	  success.	   	  The	  required	  certificate	  of	  origin	  that	  has	  to	  accompany	  diamonds	  makes	  it	  harder	  for	  diamonds	  from	  conflict	  zones	  or	  countries	   with	   civil	   rights	   violations	   to	   enter	   the	   legal	   diamond	   pipeline.	  	  However,	  this	  has	  also	  lead	  to	  more	  smuggling.	  	  Despite	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  KP	  it	  seems	  that	  countries	  like	  the	  ones	  outlined	  in	  this	  study	  have	  managed	  to	  keep	  the	  problem	  of	  conflict	  diamonds	  alive.	  Lezhnev	   and	   Sullivan	   argue	   that	   an	   external	   actor	   (The	   US	   and	   other	  governments)	   should	   be	   monitoring	   the	   process	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   KP	   as	   the	  latter	   allows	   the	   African	   government	   in	   question	   to	   play	   a	   big	   part	   in	   the	  certification.	   	  African	  governments	  do	  not	  always	  do	  so	  properly	  and	  are	  often	  subject	  to	  corrupt	  practices.188	  	  However,	   this	   change	   would	   not	   guarantee	   that	   the	   problem	  would	   be	  solved	   for	   two	   reasons.	   	   First,	   it	   turns	   the	   certification	   issue	   into	   a	   legitimacy	  issue.	  	  The	  US	  and	  other	  external	  actors	  probing	  into	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  DRC,	  Ivory	  Coast	  or	  Zimbabwe	  might	  not	  not	  be	  acceptable	  internally.	  	  Second,	  I	  believe	  that	  such	   policies	   are	   misreading	   the	   current	   situation	   in	   the	   diamonds	   industry	  because	  they	  have	  ignored	  the	  international	  dimension.	  	  I	  propose	  an	  alternative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Lezhnev	  and	  Sullivan	  who	  published	  the	  latest	  report	  on	  conflict	  minerals	  in	  the	  Congo	  have	  declared	  that	  while	  the	  KP	  does	  it	  job,	  it	  fails	  by	  leaving	  certification	  go	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Congolese	  government.	  	  See	  Sasha	  Lezhnev	  and	  David	  Sullivan,	  “Certification:	  The	  Path	  to	  Conflict-­‐Free	  Minerals	  from	  Congo,”	  Enough	  Project,	  May	  5,	  2011,	  accessed	  May	  5,	  2011,	  http://enoughproject.org/files/certification_paper.pdf.	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which	   entails	   understanding	   how	   the	   global	   shift	   in	   market	   leaders	   in	   the	  diamonds	  industry	  has	  kept	  smuggling	  alive.	  	  	  	  To	  complete	  the	  overall	  analysis	  of	  the	  incidence	  of	  civil	  wars	  in	  diamond	  rich	  countries,	   I	  would	   like	   to	  expose	   the	  ultimate	   factor	  which,	   I	   think,	   causes	  civil	   wars	   to	   occur	   in	   diamond	   rich	   countries	   –	   the	   emergence	   of	   new	  international	  players	  in	  the	  diamond	  industry.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  China	  and	  India	  and	  the	   competition	  between	   them,	   are	   responsible	   for	   the	   troubles	   that	   diamond-­‐rich	  countries	  face.	  	  
The	  Impact	  of	  the	  New	  Market	  Leaders	  on	  the	  Resurgence	  of	  Conflict	  Diamonds	  The	   issue	   of	   conflict	   diamonds	   has	   conventionally	   been	   associated	   with	   the	  resource	  curse	  thesis	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  greedy	  individuals	  both	  within	  states	  and	   at	   the	   international	   level	   who	   were	   profiting	   from	   the	   trade	   of	   blood	  diamonds.	  	  But,	  there	  are	  new	  international	  dynamics	  that	  we	  need	  to	  consider.	  	  	   As	   mentioned	   in	   chapter	   2,	   there	   are	   three	   main	   factors	   that	   motivate	  China’s	   ever-­‐growing	   presence	   in	   the	   diamonds	   industry:	   (1)	   a	   huge	   local	   and	  international	   market;	   (2)	   a	   race	   to	   control	   sources	   of	   diamond	   mining	   and	  cutting	  around	  the	  world	  and	  (3)	  the	  investment	  market	  for	  diamonds	  which	  is	  set	   to	   boom.	   	   Now	   that	   we	   understand	   how	   the	   illegal	   market	   for	   diamonds	  works	   in	   Africa,	   we	   can	   consider	   these	   three	   factors	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  international	  framework	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  conflict	  in	  diamond-­‐rich	  countries.	  	  
The	  economic	  importance	  of	  the	  diamonds	  sector	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  2,	  diamonds	  are	  a	  new	  luxury	  for	  the	  new	  Chinese	  middle	  class.	  	  Mainland	  China	  and	  Hong	  Kong	  are	  currently	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  buyers	  of	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gems	  from	  Antwerp.	   	  While	  engagement	  rings	  are	  becoming	  more	  common,	  the	  market	   still	   has	   room	   to	   grow.	   	   China	   alone	   could	   account	   for	   16	   percent	   of	  global	  diamond	  demand	  by	  2016,	  estimates	  De	  Beers	  and	  with	  higher	  demand,	  prices	  are	  expected	  only	  to	  go	  up	  making	  them	  an	  attractive	  investment.	  Beijing	   has	   expanded	   its	   diamond	   cutting	   and	   polishing	   abilities.	  	  Guangdong	  is	  fast	  becoming	  a	  major	  cutting	  and	  polishing	  hub.	  	  Many	  global	  and	  local	   firms	  have	  branches	   in	  Guangdong	  and	  have	  also	  been	  encouraged	  by	  the	  Chinese	   government	   to	   set	   up	   branches	   in	   different	   parts	   of	   Africa	   to	   cut	   the	  prices	  of	  exports.	  	  	  This	   has	   created	   a	   new	   type	   of	   GPN	   where	   foreign	   firms,	   which	   have	  expanded	   their	   trade	   in	  China,	  have	  started	  setting	  up	  branches	   in	  Africa	   to	  be	  closer	  to	  the	  mining	  of	  roughs	  to	  cut	  the	  cost	  of	  diamonds	  when	  shipped	  to	  China	  for	  consumption.	  	  This	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  Beijing’s	  investment	  strategies	  in	  Africa	  that	   are	   described	   in	   chapter	   2.	   	   This	   desire	   to	   control	   the	   source	   of	   raw	  materials	  and	  encourage	  businesses,	  whether	   local	  or	   foreign,	   to	  set	  up	  centres	  in	  Africa	  has	  been	  part	  of	  China’s	  policy	  for	  the	  past	  five	  years	  and	  hence	  this	  has	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  African	  politico-­‐economic	  affairs.	  Additionally,	   diamonds	   used	   for	   industrial	   purposes	   or	   synthetic	  diamonds	  also	  have	  an	  economic	  importance.	  	  For	  now,	  synthetic	  diamonds	  are	  used	  to	  manufacture	  cutting	  and	  grinding	  tools	  that	  are	  important	  in	  production.	  	  In	   the	   near	   future,	   it	   is	   possible	   diamonds	  will	   be	   used	   as	   semiconductors	   for	  building	  microchips.	  	  For	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  manufacturer,	  the	  stone	  is	  thus	  very	  important	  and	   it	   is	  better	   to	  have	  control	  over	   the	  mining	  areas	   than	   to	  buy	   it	  from	  other	  countries	  at	  a	  higher	  price.	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The	  race	  for	  diamonds	  India	   seems	   to	   have	   adopted	   the	   same	   policy	   as	   the	   Chinese	   by	   attempting	   to	  control	   the	   sources	   of	   diamond	  mining.	   	   India	   has	   not	   hesitated	   to	   trade	  with	  Zimbabwe	  despite	   the	  KP	  ban.	   	  On	  several	  occasions	  this	  year,	  wealthy	   Indians	  have	   been	   known	   to	   pick	   up	   diamonds	   mined	   from	   Marange	   and	   arrange	  offshore	  payments.	  	  No	  documentation	  is	  produced,	  making	  it	  nearly	  impossible	  to	   trace	   the	   illegal	   exports.189	   	   When	   the	   Indian	   government	   decided	   to	   ban	  further	  deals	  with	  Zimbabwe,	  the	  Surat	  diamantaires	  were	  disgruntled	  and	  they	  complained	  that	  if	  they	  did	  not	  do	  it,	  the	  Chinese	  would.	   	  Aagam	  Sanghavi	  from	  the	   Surat	   Rough	   Diamond	   Sourcing	   Limited	   (SRDS)	   declared	   that	   ignoring	   the	  diamonds	  from	  Zimbabwe	  would	  be	  impossible.190	  It	   is	  little	  wonder	  that	  rough	  producers	  are	  clamoring	  to	  sell	  their	  goods	  to	  India,	  leaving	  competitors	  in	  Israel	  and	  Belgium	  under	  increasing	  pressure.	  	  It	  is	  India	  that	  controls	  polishing	  business	  trends	  for	  rough	  and	  polished	  diamonds	  today.	   	   To	   achieve	   further	   control,	   companies	   like	   SRDS	   have	   focused	   on	  Zimbabwe.	  	  SRDS	  was	  keen	  on	  being	  supplied	  with	  $100	  million	  worth	  of	  rough	  diamonds	   per	  month	   to	   help	   sustain	   the	   Surat	   industry.	   	  Whether	   or	   not	   such	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  “US$1	  billion	  Marange	  Diamonds	  Looted”,	  The	  Zimbabwean,	  December	  10,	  2010,	  accessed	  December	  10,	  2010,	  http://www.thezimbabwean.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36202:us1-­‐billion-­‐marange-­‐diamonds-­‐looted&catid=69:sunday-­‐top-­‐stories&Itemid=30.	  190	  Mineweb,	  “India	  Government	  block	  Zimbabwe	  roughs,”	  Mmegionline	  27(187)	  (2010),	  accessed	  December	  10,	  2010,	  http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=4&aid=7227&dir=2010/December/Friday10	  (Accessed	  December	  10,	  2010).	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  also,	  “Thoughts	  from	  the	  Rapaport	  Conference:	  Are	  Marange	  Diamonds	  Ethical?”	  JCK,	  October	  26,	  2010,	  accessed	  October	  26,	  2010,	  http://www.jckonline.com/blogs/cutting-­‐remarks/2010/10/26/thoughts-­‐from-­‐rapaport-­‐conference-­‐are-­‐marange-­‐diamonds-­‐ethical.	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volumes	  are	  realistic,	  Surat	  is,	  and	  will	  be,	  the	  main	  beneficiary	  if	  —	  or	  when	  —	  Marange	  diamonds	  are	  approved	  for	  export	  by	  the	  KP.191	  In	   the	   face	   of	   such	   competition,	   China	   has	   not	   sat	   idle.	   	   As	   the	  world’s	  biggest	  consumer	  of	  diamonds,	  it	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  let	  India	  gain	  control	  of	  the	  market	   and	   spend	  more	  money	   by	   having	   to	   purchase	   cut	   diamonds	   from	   its	  giant	  neighbour.	  	  Beijing	  has	  been	  using	  its	  economic	  and	  diplomatic	  strength	  to	  gain	  the	  attention	  of	  Harare.	  	  	  Closer	  economic	  and	  diplomatic	  ties	  between	  China	  and	  Zimbabwe	  have	  had	  far-­‐reaching	  effects.	  	  Not	  only	  has	  Beijing	  been	  vetoing	  plans	  by	  the	  West	  and	  European	   capitals	   to	   take	   sterner	   action	   against	   Harare	   at	   the	   United	   Nations	  Security	  Council	  for	  alleged	  human	  rights	  violations,	  its	  capital	  has	  also	  come	  in	  handy	  for	  Zimbabwe’s.	  	  To	   have	   a	   clearer	   picture	   of	   how	   India	   and	   China	   affect	   the	   diamond	  industry,	  we	  should	  mull	  over	  their	  emergence	  as	  global	  diamond	  actors.	  	  From	  2006	  to	  2009,	  both	  countries	  imported	  about	  $13	  billion	  worth	  of	  diamonds	  per	  annum	  with	  India	  dominating	  the	  scene.	  	  	  However	  China	  has	  been	  exporting	  more	  diamonds	  than	  India	  in	  terms	  of	  value	  ever	  since	  2006.	  	  The	  value	  peaked	  at	  $1.8	  billion	  in	  2008.	  	  In	  2009	  trade	  fell	  drastically	   in	  both	  countries	  due	  to	  the	  global	  economic	  downturn	  but	  they	  remained	  top	  traders	  of	  diamonds	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  expand	  their	  market	  share	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come	  by	  getting	  access	  directly	  to	  rough	  diamonds	  instead	  of	  going	  through	  middlemen,	  diamond	  market	  dynamics	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  remain	  volatile.	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  “India:	  From	  Mine	  to	  Market”,	  Diamonds.Net,	  October	  14,	  2010,	  accessed	  October	  26,	  2010http://www.diamonds.net/news/NewsItem.aspx?ArticleID=32920.	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Table	  5.2:	  Production,	  Import	  and	  Export	  of	  diamonds	  by	  China	  and	  India	  
	  
Source:	  Kimberley	  Process	  	  	   The	  aim	  of	  this	  section	  was	  not	  to	  vilify	  the	  Indian	  or	  Chinese	  government	  and	  diamantaires	  but	  rather	  to	  explain	  the	  difference	  their	  rise	  has	  made.	  	  In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  the	  introduction	  of	  legislations	  like	  the	  CARAT	  Act	  made	  it	  easier	  to	  control	  the	  inflow	  of	  blood	  diamonds	  to	  the	  USA	  and	  helped	  reduce	  the	  trade	  of	  blood	   diamonds	   to	   American	   consumers.	   	   In	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   decade,	  however,	  China	  and	  India,	  became	  willing	  to	  help	  Zimbabwe.	  	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  Sino-­‐Indian	  competition	  has	  led	  black	  markets	  in	  Zimbabwe,	  the	  DRC	  and	  Ivory	  Coast	  to	  respond	  to	  this	  demand	  by	  the	  new	  leaders	  of	  the	  diamond	  industry.	  	  
Diamonds	  are	  becoming	  a	  hot	  investment	  In	   many	   respects,	   the	   development	   of	   the	   diamond	   market	   in	   China	   can	   be	  compared	  to	  the	  early	  development	  of	  the	  diamond	  market	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  diamond	  center	  most	  closely	  parallels	  that	  of	  New	  York,	  
Country	   Production	   Import	   Export	  	   Volume	  (Cts)	   Value	  (US	  $)	   Volume	  (Cts)	   Value	  (US	  $)	   Volume	  (Cts)	   Value	  (US	  $)	  
2006	  India	   10,278.95	   $1,763,359.00	   172,255,201.00	   $8,555,618,896.74	   40,084,816.46	   $546,441,891.07	  China	   74,080.20	   $1,240,000.00	   24,588,418.97	   $2,114,097,440.24	   18,014,942.73	   $964,410,286.56	  
2007	  India	   -­‐	   -­‐	   173,769,293.61	   $9,664,344,752.49	   30,555,340.94	   $601,053,027.52	  China	   61,373.33	   $1,110,000.00	   26,625,366.82	   $2,230,128,415.04	   15,886,844.33	   $896,979,020.82	  
2008	  India	   -­‐	   -­‐	   147,786,659.43	   $9,591,569,934.20	   37,596,697.62	   $829,588,202.61	  China	   69,480.29	   $1,370,000.00	   26,658,724.61	   $2,331,180,223.90	   23,146,488.38	   $1,821,156,879.40	  
2009	  India	  	   9,317.27	   $1,663,091.37	   119,731,249.14	   $6,954,949,715.70	   22,430,500.63	   $712,180,968.00	  China	   45,932.26	   $480,000.00	   19,567,681.01	   $1,674,661,366.20	   14,046,799.40	   $763,414,649.94	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said	  Moshe	  Mosbacher,	  President	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Diamond	  Dealers	  Club	  (DDC),	  in	  his	  address	  to	  the	  China	  Diamond	  Conference	  in	  Shanghai.192	  	   Indeed,	  given	  the	  abovementioned	  factors,	   the	  diamonds	  sector	   is	  apt	  to	  become	  an	  important	  commodity	  market	  that	  may	  even	  rival	  gold.193	  	  However,	  the	  business	  models	   that	  have	  been	  developed	  by	   the	  US	  over	   the	  past	   several	  decades	   are	   particularly	   applicable	   to	   Shanghai	   and	   the	   Peoples	   Republic	   of	  China.	   	   The	   SDE	   was	   the	   first	   diamond	   bourse	   to	   be	   established	   in	   Mainland	  China,	   and	   it	   functions	   today	   as	   the	   official	   point	   of	   entry	   to	   this	   country's	  diamond	  market.	  	  The	  President	  of	  the	  DDC	  recognised	  that	  Shanghai	  is	  going	  to	  become	   like	   the	   diamond	   bourse	   in	   New	   York	   which	   is	   a	   profit-­‐generating	  trading	   platform	   where	   diamonds	   are	   traded	   between	   jewelers	   and	   investors	  under	  a	  trustworthy	  environment.	  As	  the	  SDE	  turn	  into	  an	  effective	  online	  diamond	  trading	  site,	  the	  diamond	  industry	  will	   not	   remain	  unaffected	   as	  more	   investors	  will	   be	   attracted	   to	   this	  booming	   sector	   in	   Shanghai	   and	   China	   as	   a	   whole.194	   	   Bearing	   in	   mind	   that	  organised	  crimes	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  transshipment	  and	  transnational	  transaction	  of	  diamonds,	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  they	  will	  also	  be	  able	  to	  infiltrate	  the	  Chinese	  market.	  	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  in	  Antwerp	  there	  are	  three	  types	  of	  diamond	  markets	  –	  the	  white,	  grey	  and	  black	  –	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  same	  model	  can	  be	  applied	   to	   diamond	   bourses	   worldwide.	   	   Hence,	   just	   as	   illegal	   diamonds	   can	  enter	  the	  white	  market	  in	  Antwerp,	  they	  can	  do	  so	  in	  New	  York,	  Tel	  Aviv,	  Bharat	  or	  Shanghai.	   	  This	  keeps	   the	   lucrative	   illegal	   trade	  very	  much	  alive	  and	   causes	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  “NY	  Dealers	  Club,	  DDC	  President	  Draws	  Similarities	  Between	  Shanghai	  and	  New	  York,”	  December	  1,	  2010,	  accessed	  December	  1,	  2010,	  http://www.diamonds.net/news/NewsItem.aspx?ArticleID=33580.	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  Ibid	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  Ibid.	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the	  black	  market	  for	  diamonds	  to	  thrive.	  	  It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  faced	  with	  such	   competition,	   India	   has	   also	   launched	   a	   new	   bourse	   in	   Bharat	   because	   it	  wants	  to	  establish	  itself	  as	  a	  regional	  diamond-­‐trading	  hub	  too.195	  	  
Conclusion	  This	   chapter	   showed	   that	   it	   is	   not	   only	   greed	   by	   dictators	   and	   warlords	   that	  motivates	   the	   persistent	   trade	   in	   blood	   diamonds.	   	   Instead,	   two	  major	   factors	  that	   are	   beyond	   the	   state’s	   control	   –	   the	   rise	   of	   GPN	   created	   by	   new	   market	  leaders	   and	   a	   thriving	   illegal	   market	   for	   diamonds	   that	   makes	   the	   most	   of	  Africa’s	  porous	  borders	  –	  keep	  the	  trade	  alive.	  	  	  	   This	   is	   an	   important	   observation	   because	   some	   of	   the	   previous	  scholarship	   on	   the	   explanation	   of	   conflict	   diamonds	   has	   ignored	   international	  factors.	   	   However,	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   intricacies	   of	   the	   international	  diamonds	  sector	  has	  shown	  that	  these	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  	  If	  we	  consider	  how	  the	  diamond	   industry	   looks	  now	  and	  how	   it	   looked	  during	   the	  Angolan	  and	  Sierra	  Leonean	  civil	  war,	  we	  can	  notice	  a	  marked	  difference.	   	   Initially,	   the	  rebels	  who	  were	  financing	  the	  civil	  war	  were	  known	  to	  secretly	  sell	   their	  diamonds	  on	  the	  black	  market.	  	  Now,	  those	  who	  trade	  with	  blood	  diamonds	  are	  different	  types	  of	  dealers.	   	   Even	   if	   they	   still	   have	   to	   trade	   in	   secret,	   they	   have	   more	   formal	  networks	  into	  which	  they	  can	  trade	  their	  diamonds.	  	  The	  pipeline	  is	  much	  more	  diversified	  than	  before	  thanks	  to	  the	  different	  diamond	  cities	  that	  have	  emerged	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  Additionally,	  leaders	  like	  Mugabe	  have	  not	  hesitated	  to	  defy	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  195	  Anjili	  Raval,	  “Indian	  Diamond	  Bourses	  opens,”	  Financial	  Times,	  October	  17,	  2010,	  accessed	  October	  22,	  2010,	  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e3f2a82c-­‐da0c-­‐11df-­‐bdd7-­‐00144feabdc0.html#axzz1BJI1UfuI.	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UN	  to	  sell	  the	  stones	  and	  have	  gotten	  away	  with	  it	  despite	  blatant	  human	  rights	  abuses.	  	  This	  is	  because	  he	  has	  the	  support	  of	  many	  members	  of	  the	  KP.	  	   If	   the	  KP	   imposes	  more	   sanctions	   on	   Zimbabwe,	   the	   diamonds	  markets	  there	  will	  become	  shadier.	  	  At	  least	  now	  we	  know	  what	  Mugabe	  is	  doing	  with	  the	  stones.	  	  If	  the	  Marange	  and	  Chiadzwa	  mines	  are	  more	  hidden	  from	  international	  scrutiny,	   more	   human	   rights	   abuses	   are	   to	   be	   expected	   and	   the	   prices	   of	   the	  stones	   will	   start	   to	   skyrocket.	   	   Unfortunately	   for	   the	   Zimbabweans	   and	   for	  people	  from	  the	  Ivory	  Coast	  and	  the	  DRC,	  it	  is	  purely	  business	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  dirty	   stones	   that	   are	   still	   smuggled	   to	   the	   formal	  market,	   is	   a	   reality	   that	   they	  must	  live	  with.	  	  	  This	   can	   lead	   to	   two	   case	   scenarios	   as	   what	   we	   have	   witnessed	   in	   the	  three	  countries	  used	  as	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  First,	  as	  in	  Zimbabwe	  and	  the	  DRC,	  it	  prevents	  political	  change	  from	  occurring.	  	  This	  is	  because	  when	  diamonds	  or	   other	   resources	   are	   involved,	   they	   ensure	   negative	   political	   conditions.	  	  Alternatively,	  as	  witnessed	  recently	   in	   Ivory	  Coast,	   there	   is	  a	  drive	   to	  maintain	  diamond	   smuggling	   to	   use	   the	  proceeds	   to	   finance	   a	   cause,	   as	   the	  New	  Forces	  have	   done.	   	   This	   has	   eventually	   led	   to	   a	   never-­‐ending	   downward	   spiral	   that	  revived	  a	  civil	  war	  after	  the	  elections.196	  If	   policymakers	   want	   to	   win	   the	   war	   on	   conflict	   diamonds,	   it	   would	  require	  banning	  the	  sales	  of	  the	  stones	  altogether	  within	  their	  own	  borders.	  	  But	  given	   its	   importance	   as	   a	   symbolic	   luxury	   and	   the	   major	   part	   it	   plays	   in	   the	  manufacturing,	  it	  is	  not	  bound	  to	  happen	  anytime	  soon,	  especially	  not	  when	  two	  economic	  powerhouses	  are	  holding	  the	  reigns	  of	  the	  industry.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	  Now	  that	  Ouattara	  has	  managed	  to	  get	  in	  power,	  one	  should	  wonder	  whether	  those	  loyal	  to	  Gbagbo	  will	  turn	  to	  smuggling	  and	  become	  the	  rebellion.	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Chapter	  6:	  Conclusion	  	  When	   analysing	   conflict	   diamonds,	   internal	   factors	   are	   insufficient	   for	  understanding	  why	   conflict	   occurs	   in	   diamond-­‐rich	   countries.	   	  One	   also	  has	   to	  consider	   what	   happens	   at	   the	   supranational	   level.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Africa,	   it	   is	  important	   to	  consider	   the	  transnational	  relationship	  between	  African	  countries	  and	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  international	  black	  market.	  Most	   importantly,	   we	   need	   to	   see	   the	   policies	   that	   the	   businesses	   and	  market	  leaders	  in	  the	  diamonds	  industry	  have	  adopted	  to	  increase	  their	  share	  of	  the	  market.	  	  When	  the	  U.S.	  was	  the	  biggest	  diamond	  importer,	  the	  illegal	  trade	  of	  diamonds	   from	   Angola	   and	   Sierra	   Leone	   faltered	   because	   the	   latter,	   together	  with	  other	  countries,	  diamantaires	  worldwide,	  and	  civil	   society,	  pushed	   for	   the	  setting	  up	  of	   a	   global	  watchdog	   for	  diamonds	  –	   the	  KP.	   	  Now	   that	  China	   is	   the	  new	   market	   leader	   and	   India	   is	   the	   main	   polishing	   market	   for	   world	   roughs,	  different	   dynamics	   are	   to	   be	   expected.	   	   Countries	   like	   Zimbabwe	   are	   getting	  away	  with	  selling	  diamonds	  from	  controversial	  mines.	  Most	  importantly,	  as	  I	  have	  explained	  in	  chapter	  5,	  we	  have	  to	  review	  the	  way	  we	  understand	  political	  instability	  which	  at	  the	  extreme	  can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  civil	  wars	  apart	  from	  the	  internal	  and	  regional	  paradigms	  that	  might	  encourage	  conflicts,	  I	  believe	  that	  external	  players	  do	  have	  a	  role	  in	  creating	  more	  tensions	  in	  war-­‐prone	  countries.	  	  As	  this	  essay	  has	  shown,	  the	  way	  China	  and	  India	  have	  changed	   the	  diamonds	  market	   has	   increased	   the	  desire	   to	   smuggle	   the	   stones.	  	  Hence,	   I	   believe	   that	  we	  need	   to	   engage	   the	  new	  market	   leaders	   for	  diamonds	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and	   reshuffle	   the	   way	   things	   are	   undertaken	   in	   the	   KP	   if	   we	   want	   to	   make	   a	  lasting	  impact	  on	  the	  fight	  against	  conflict	  diamonds.	  	  	  The	  factors	  that	  were	  identified	  in	  earlier	  literature	  do	  not	  explain	  exactly	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  countries	  where	  there	  are	  human	  rights	  abuses	  or	  conflicts.	  	  The	  DRC,	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Ivory	  Coast	  all	  have	  political	  problems	  but	   it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  use	  of	  diamonds	  to	  fund	  conflicts	  or	  prevent	  regime	  change	  occurs	  because	   of	   internal	   factors	   exclusively.	   	   If	   we	   continue	   to	   ignore	   international	  and	   transnational	   factors,	   it	   will	   be	   impossible	   to	   tackle	   the	   problem	   at	   its	  source.	   	  Such	  a	  project	  also	  allows	  us	   to	  understand	   the	   impact	   that	  China	  and	  India	  have	  on	  the	  KP,	  which	  I	  outline	  below.	  	  
Implications	  for	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  This	  paper	  was	  not	  prescriptive	  and	  I	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  set	  any	  guidelines	  that	  the	   KP	   or	   any	   other	   regulating	   bodies	   in	   the	   diamonds	   sector	   should	   follow.	  	  However,	  it	  does	  identify	  certain	  factors	  that	  should	  be	  considered	  if	  the	  war	  on	  conflict	  diamonds	  is	  to	  make	  progress.	  	  These	  factors	  have	  major	  implications	  for	  the	  KP.	  	  	  The	  KP	  believes	   that	   states	  or	  other	  actors	  are	  bound	  by	  a	  commitment	  and	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  to	  avoid	  trading	  in	  blood	  diamonds.	  	  These	  actors’	  behaviour	  is	  subject	   to	   scrutiny	   under	   the	   general	   rules	   and	   discourse	   of	   international	   law,	  and	   domestic	   law	   as	   well.	   	   On	   the	   production	   side,	   diamond	   mining	   and	  exporting	   countries	   are	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   the	   stones	   that	   they	   export	   do	   not	  come	  from	  conflict	  zones.	  	  Diamond	  importing	  countries	  have	  the	  responsibility	  of	  checking	  the	  certificate	  of	  origins	  of	  the	  stones	  that	  they	  import	  and	  they	  also	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have	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   traders	   and	   jewellers	   operating	   within	   their	   borders	  inform	  their	  consumers	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  stones	  they	  deal	  with.	  However,	   given	   the	   ability	   for	  dirty	   stones	   to	   enter	   the	   formal	  diamond	  pipeline,	   the	  KP	   clearly	   has	   only	   a	  weak	   basis	   in	   current	   international	   law:	   Its	  provisions	  are	  mere	  recommendations	  and	   it	  believes	   that	  state	  sovereignty	  as	  well	  as	  the	  principles	  of	  equality	  should	  be	  adhered	  to.	   	  One	  could	  describe	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  as	  an	  inclusive	  consultation	  process	  that	  imposes	  no	  binding	  obligations.	   	   This	  prevents	   the	  KP	   from	  making	  quick	  decisions	  when	   it	   has	   to	  act;	  we	  have	  seen	  how	  hard	  it	  has	  been	  for	  it	  to	  come	  to	  an	  agreement	  on	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  Zimbabwe.	  But	   the	  biggest	  problem	  of	   the	  KP	   lies	   in	   its	   inability	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  stones	  that	  are	  certified	  by	  diamond	  mining	  countries	  do	  not	   include	  smuggled	  stones.	   	   This	   is	   indeed	   very	   hard	   to	   achieve	   because	  most	   diamond	   producing	  countries	  are	  African	  and	  they	  do	  not	  have	  qualified	  personnel	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  diamonds	  they	  certify	  are	  untainted.	  	  As	  this	  paper	  has	  shown,	  the	  black	  market	  for	  diamonds	   still	   allows	   conflict	   stones	   to	   enter	   the	  white	  diamond	  market	   in	  trading	   centres	  worldwide.	   	   To	   fix	   that	   would	   require	   that	   the	   KP	   reviews	   its	  policies	  and	  sets	  up	  centres	  within	  countries	  with	  an	  accountable	  personnel	   to	  control	   the	   issuance	   of	   certificates	   of	   origin.	   	   Inevitable	   attempts	   by	   African	  countries	   to	   portray	   this	   as	   an	   affront	   to	   sovereignty	   would	   have	   to	   be	  disregarded	  if	  diamonds	  are	  to	  be	  kept	  pure.	  It	   is	   also	   important	   for	   the	   KP	   to	   review	   its	   decision-­‐making	   abilities.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  Indian	  and	  Chinese	  government	  should	  be	  given	  a	  bigger	  say	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  KP.	  	  Keeping	  it	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Western	  countries	  is	  bound	  to	  create	  tensions	  and	  result	  in	  an	  inability	  to	  reach	  agreements	  swiftly.	  	  Both	  the	  world’s	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biggest	  consumer	  and	  the	  biggest	  producer	  of	  diamonds	  should	  be	  given	  higher	  responsibility	   in	   the	   organisation.	   	   KP	  members	  who	   blindly	   condemn	   leaders	  like	   Mugabe	   are	   partly	   right,	   but	   they	   have	   to	   keep	   in	   mind	   that	   China	   has	  considerable	   influence	   in	   Africa.	   	   India	   also	   has	   a	   growing	   interest	   there	   and	  policy-­‐makers	  within	  the	  KP	  have	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  fact.	  	  	  Finally,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  KP	  has	  to	  start	  re-­‐organising	  the	  trading	  centres	  across	  the	  world.	  	  It	  has	  to	  be	  more	  involved	  with	  Antwerp,	  New	  York,	  Tel-­‐Aviv,	  but	   also	   Surat,	   Shanghai,	   Bharat	   and	   Chennai.	   	   A	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	  white,	  grey	  and	  black	  market	  should	  be	  undertaken	  because	   if	  blood	  diamonds	  are	  entering	  the	  white	  market,	  they	  are	  bound	  to	  do	  so	  in	  new	  markets	  that	  are	  not	   well-­‐organised.	   	   The	   SDE	   and	   other	   new	   diamond	   markets	   are	   current	  examples.	  Nonetheless,	  even	  if	  the	  KP	  cannot	  impose	  international	  legal	  obligations	  it	  can	  and	  has	  made	  domestic	  legislation	  a	  condition	  of	  membership.	  So,	  though	  each	  state	  chooses	  whether	  to	  apply	  for	  membership	  to	  the	  Kimberley	  Process,	  it	  needs	   to	  make	   domestic	   legal	   changes	   in	   order	   to	   be	   admitted.	   	   	   In	   theory,	   to	  remain	  in	  the	  regime,	  the	  state	  must	  follow	  the	  minimum	  domestic	  legislations.	  These	  requirements	  include	  the	  rules	  governing	  the	  export	  and	  import	  of	  conflict	  diamonds,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  homogeneity	  of	  certificate	  design	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  domestic	  penalties.	  	  At	  least	  the	  domestic	  part	  of	  the	  KP	  is	  solid	  but	  now	  it	  needs	  to	   focus	   on	   enforcement.	   	   As	   the	   black	   market	   reinvents	   itself	   to	   adapt	   to	  changing	   politico-­‐economic	   circumstances,	   the	   KP	   has	   to	   keep	   on	   reinventing	  itself	  likewise.	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Future	  Avenues	  of	  Research	  To	   find	   out	   the	   exact	   role	   that	   the	   international	   framework	   plays	   on	   the	  incidence	   of	   conflict,	  we	   need	   to	   have	  more	   exact	   information	   on	   the	   trade	   of	  diamonds	   from	   the	   new	  market	   leaders.	   	   As	   China	   and	   India’s	   dominance	   is	   a	  new	  phenomenon	  we	  will	  need	  time	  to	  collect	  the	  information.	  	  The	  framework	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  expanded	  to	  include	  commodities	  other	  than	  diamonds.	  Many	   of	   the	   rebel	   groups	   are	   still	   fighting	   across	   swathes	   of	   Africa	   and	  they	   get	   their	   cash	   from	   other	   types	   of	   minerals.	   	   Apart	   from	   diamonds,	   they	  illicitly	  sell	  cassiterite	  (used	  in	  laptops),	  coltan	  (important	  component	  of	  mobile	  phones),	  gold	  and	  wolframite	  (which	  is	  common	  in	  light	  bulbs).	  	  Hundreds	  of	  the	  mines	   containing	   such	   treasures	   across	   Africa	   should	   be	   part	   of	   the	   analysis.	  	  However,	  again	  we	  face	  the	  problem	  of	  unavailability	  of	  reliable	  data.	   	   It	  would	  be	   interesting	   to	  explore	  how	  these	  other	  potential	   ‘blood	  resources’	  are	  being	  addressed	  by	  the	  international	  community	  and	  the	  businesses.	  	  Will	  they	  set	  up	  other	   organisations	   like	   the	   KP	   or	   will	   there	   be	   more	   direct	   control	   by	  governments?	  	  	   No	  matter	  what	  the	  next	  conflict	  resource	  under	  scrutiny	  will	  be,	  it	  would	  be	  mistaken	   to	   limit	   any	   analysis	   to	   internal	   factors	   exclusively.	   	   As	   shown	  by	  this	   paper,	   international	   factors	   such	   as	   business	   dynamics	   and	   the	  way	  GPNs	  change	  really	  matter.	   	   It	   is	   time	  for	   the	  civil	  war	   literature	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  internal	   dynamics	   of	   ethnic	   fractionalisation,	   political	   problems,	   GDP	   growth,	  political	  systems	  etc.	  	  While	  these	  count,	  they	  do	  not	  reveal	  the	  whole	  picture	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  conflicts.	  	  My	  work	  is	  the	  stepping-­‐stone	  to	  a	  new	  type	  of	  literature	  in	  the	  field	  of	  international	  investment,	  resource	  politics,	  and	  civil	  war.	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Appendix	  B:	  The	  Members	  of	  the	  Kimberley	  Process	  
















China	  ,	  People's	  Republic	  of	  
Congo	  ,	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  












Korea	  ,	  Republic	  of	  
























United	  Arab	  Emirates	  







NOTE:	  The	  rough	  diamond-­‐trading	  entity	  of	  Chinese	  Taipei	  has	  also	  met	  the	  minimum	  requirements	  of	  
the	  KPCS.	  
*	  Venezula	  has	  voluntarily	  suspended	  exports	  and	  imports	  of	  rough	  diamonds	  untill	  further	  notice.	  
**	  Cote	  d'	  Ivoire	  is	  currently	  under	  UN	  sanctions	  and	  is	  not	  trading	  in	  rough	  diamonds.	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Appendix	  C:	  The	  Kimberley	  Process	  Certification	  Scheme	  	  
(Adapted	  from	  Kimberley	  Process	  sources:	  See	  











retailed	  in	  jewelry	  
shops	  across	  the	  
world	  




Step	  2:	  Diamonds	  are	  checked	  to	  ensure	  
they	  are	  conflict	  free.	  They	  are	  then	  
placed	  into	  tamper	  resistant	  containers	  
and	  issued	  a	  government-­validated	  
Kimberley	  Process	  Certificate,	  each	  
bearing	  a	  unique	  serial	  number.	  
Step	  3:	  Diamonds	  can	  only	  legally	  be	  
imported	  into	  one	  of	  the	  74	  
Kimberley	  process	  countries.	  	  there,	  
the	  government	  customs	  checks	  the	  
certificate	  and	  seals..	  Diamonds	  
without	  a	  validated	  Certificate	  or	  
that	  are	  unsealed	  are	  turned	  back	  or	  
impounded	  by	  Customs.	  
Step	  4:	  Once	  a	  diamond	  has	  been	  
legitimately	  imported	  it	  is	  ready	  to	  be	  
traded,	  cut	  and	  polished	  and	  set	  into	  
jewelry.	  Each	  time	  the	  diamond	  
changes	  hands	  it	  must	  be	  accompanied	  
by	  a	  warranty	  on	  invoices	  stating	  that	  
the	  diamond	  is	  not	  from	  a	  conflict	  
source.	  This	  is	  called	  the	  System	  of	  
Warranties.	  
Step	  5:	  Retailers	  are	  to	  ensure	  that	  
the	  diamonds	  they	  stock	  and	  sell	  
carry	  a	  warranty	  that	  they	  are	  
conflict	  free.	  Retailers	  are	  required	  to	  
audit	  these	  Systems	  of	  Warranties	  
statements	  on	  their	  invoices	  as	  part	  
of	  their	  annual	  audit	  process	  and	  to	  
keep	  records	  for	  5	  years.	  
